US embassy cable - 05GENEVA2712

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 GENEVA 002712 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PARM, KACT, US, RS, UP, BO, KZ, START, JCIC, INF 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW PAVLOGRAD PRODUCTION 
FACILITY FROM THE LIST OF FACILITIES SUBJECT TO 
SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS AND UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL TO CHANGE 
THE FUNCTION OF THE PAVLOGRAD CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION 
FACILITY, NOVEMBER 2, 2005 
 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-038. 
 
2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 2, 2005 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
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3.  (S) At a heads of delegation (HOD) meeting, held at the 
U.S. Mission on November 2 at which all Parties were 
represented, the Ukrainian Delegation proposed to remove the 
Pavlograd ICBM Production Facility from the list of 
facilities subject to suspect-site inspections (SSI).  They 
also proposed to change the function of the Pavlograd 
Conversion or Elimination Facility to that of a solid rocket 
motor storage facility and remove it from inspectability. 
The U.S. Delegation said that Washington would study the 
proposal.  Other Parties received the statements without 
initial comment. 
 
------------- 
PAVLOGRAD SSI 
------------- 
 
4.  (S) At a heads of delegation meeting at the U.S. Mission 
on November 2, 2005, Shevtsov said Ukraine proposed that the 
Parties consider a draft JCIC Agreement to remove the 
Pavlograd ICBM Production Facility from the list of 
facilities subject to SSI (text follows below).  Shevtsov, 
reading from a prepared paper, stated that SS-24 first-stage 
solid rocket motors (SRM) without nozzles, which remained 
after the first phase of phased elimination, were located at 
the facility.  Recognizing that, in accordance with paragraph 
10 of Article IV of the Treaty, such SRMs for first stages of 
mobile ICBMs may be stored only in production, storage, and 
testing locations, he stated that the SS-24 first stages 
would be moved to the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination 
Facility, where they would be stored and the solid propellant 
would be removed.  Upon this transfer, he noted that there 
would be no more items of inspection at the Pavlograd 
Production Facility, which would permit the removal of the 
site from the list of facilities subject to SSI as listed in 
paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Ukrainian Memorandum of 
Understanding.  He noted that JCIC Agreement Number 51 on 
removing Bershet' from the list of Russian facilities subject 
to SSI had great influence on the creation of the Ukrainian 
proposal.  Taylor said Ukraine's proposal would be conveyed 
to Washington for review.  All other Parties took account of 
the proposal without initial comment. 
 
5.  (S) Begin text (Ukrainian Non-Paper on the Removal of the 
Pavlograd Facility Subject to SSI from the List of Facilities 
Subject to SSI): 
 
 
                                       Official Translation 
 
                                       JCIC-XXVII 
                                       Non-paper of the 
                                       Ukrainian Side 
                                       November 2, 2005 
         Removal of the Pavlograd Facility Subject to 
           Suspect-Site Inspections from the List of 
        Facilities Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections 
 
     The Ukrainian side, on the basis of the provisions of 
paragraph 5 of Section VIII of the Inspection Protocol, plans 
in the immediate future to remove the Pavlograd Production 
Facility (the Pavlograd Machine Plant) from the list of 
facilities subject to suspect-site inspections. 
 
     At present the SS-24 ICBM solid rocket motors (SRMs) 
without nozzles attached, which remained after the 
elimination of ICBMs under the first phase of their 
elimination in accordance with the provisions of JCIC Joint 
Statement No. 34 on Phased Elimination of SS-24 ICBMs Located 
in Ukraine, are in storage at this facility. 
 
     The provisions of paragraph 10 of Article IV of the 
Treaty specify that each of the Parties to the Treaty may 
locate solid rocket motors (SRMs) for first stages of ICBMs 
for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at locations where 
production and storage, or testing of such motors occurs and 
at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of 
ICBMs. 
 
     Proceeding from the requirements of this article of the 
Treaty, SRMs of ICBM first stages may be located at a 
production facility; however, in connection with the 
necessity for removing solid fuel from the cases of rocket 
motors, the SRMs of the first stages will be transferred in 
the immediate future to the Pavlograd Chemical Plant (a 
portion of whose territory has been declared an "ICBM 
conversion or elimination facility"), which radically changes 
the situation at this facility.  This means that at the 
Pavlograd Production Facility there will no longer be items 
of inspection, as defined in paragraph 20(a) of Section VI of 
the Inspection Protocol. 
 
     In addition, the Ukrainian side is attentive to the fact 
that for about 15 years there has been no production of ICBMs 
for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stages of such 
ICBMs at this facility. 
 
     Since January 1995, the Pavlograd Machine Plant has been 
subject to the Treaty's inspection regime.  Having conducted 
numerous inspections at that particular enterprise over time, 
the U.S. side has had the opportunity to ascertain that at 
that enterprise there is no covert assembly of ICBMs for 
mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of the first 
stages of such ICBMs. 
 
     Attention should also be drawn to the fact that since 
December 2001, the U.S. side has not conducted a suspect-site 
inspection at the given facility, which testifies to the 
absence of any concerns on the part of the U.S. side in terms 
of the Ukrainian side's compliance with Treaty obligations in 
regard to the given facility. 
 
     The Ukrainian side has prepared a draft of an 
appropriate JCIC Agreement ("Removal of the Pavlograd 
Facility Subject to Suspect-site Inspections from the List of 
Facilities Subject to Suspect-site Inspections") which will 
be handed over to the delegations at today's meeting. 
     While developing this document, the Ukrainian side used 
as a prototype an analogous agreement regarding the Russian 
"Bershet'" facility, which was signed during the first part 
of the current session. 
 
     It is important for us at today's meeting to hear the 
preliminary thoughts of the other Parties about this issue in 
order to coordinate our subsequent actions in this area. 
 
End text. 
 
6.  (S) Begin text (Ukrainian-Proposed Draft Text of JCIC 
Agreement): 
 
                                      Official Translation 
 
                                      JCIC-XXVII 
                                      Draft Proposed 
                                      by the Ukrainian Side 
                                      November 2, 2005 
 
          JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION 
                    AGREEMENT NUMBER BLANK 
              RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE 
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET 
             SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION 
          AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 
                       OF JULY 31, 1991 
 
         REMOVAL OF THE PAVLOGRAD FACILITY SUBJECT TO 
           SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS FROM THE LIST OF 
        FACILITIES SUBJECT TO SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS 
 
     The Government of the United States of America, the 
Government of the Republic of Belarus, the Government of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Russian 
Federation, and the Government of Ukraine, hereinafter 
referred to as the Parties, 
 
     In accordance with the Treaty Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, 
 
     Acting pursuant to the authority contained in paragraph 
5 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspections and 
Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
                         Article One 
 
     The Pavlograd Facility Subject to Suspect-Site 
Inspections shall be removed from the list of facilities 
contained in subparagraph 12(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum 
of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base 
Relating to the Treaty. 
 
                         Article Two 
 
     This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its 
signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty 
remains in force. 
     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly 
authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this 
Agreement. 
 
     DONE at Geneva on (BLANK), 2005, in five copies, each in 
the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally 
authentic. 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE 
 
End text. 
 
------------------------- 
PAVLOGRAD C OR E FACILITY 
------------------------- 
 
7.  (S) Shevtsov, reading from a prepared paper, said that 
Ukraine proposed to change the function of the Pavlograd 
Conversion or Elimination Facility to that of an SRM storage 
facility (text follows below).  Noting that 
partially-eliminated SS-24 SRMs will be stored there, 
Shevtsov explained that the Treaty did not provide for the 
storage of SRMs at conversion or elimination facilities.  He 
argued that, based on the fact that "storage facility(ies) 
for solid rocket motors" are not listed in paragraph 5 of 
Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, such facilities are 
not subject to data update or new facility inspections under 
the Treaty.  He said that the change in function would occur 
five days after Ukraine issued a NRRC notification.  After 
the solid propellant has been removed from the motor cases by 
hydro-mining at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant, Ukraine intends 
to declare a new Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination facility 
for the second stage of the phased elimination process. 
Taylor said the proposal will be sent to Washington for 
further study.  All other Parties took account of the 
statement without initial comment. 
 
8.  (S) Begin text (Ukrainian Non-Paper on Changing the 
Function of the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility): 
 
                                       Official Translation 
 
                                       JCIC-XXVII 
                                       Non-Paper of the 
                                       Ukrainian Side 
                                       November 2, 2005 
 
          On Changing the Function of the Pavlograd 
             Conversion or Elimination Facility 
 
     As our colleagues are aware, the elimination of SS-24 
ICBMs is being carried out by the Ukrainian side in 
accordance with JCIC Joint Statement No. 34 on Phased 
Elimination of SS-24 ICBMs Located in Ukraine. 
 
     At present all the tasks of the first phase of 
elimination of Ukrainian SS-24 ICBMs have been performed in 
full.  We now have to implement the final operation to 
eliminate the SRM cases after removing the solid rocket fuel 
from them. 
 
     Despite the fact that the U.S. cut off funding for this 
project, preparations for the second phase of elimination of 
SS-24 ICBMs are proceeding successfully.  In June 2005 the 
process of actually washing out the solid rocket fuel began, 
using the water washout method from standard ICBM motors at a 
pilot unit. 
 
     Taking into account the foregoing, there exists an 
opportunity to make certain adjustments to the function of 
the facilities and simplify the situation at the Pavlograd 
facilities. 
 
     In this context the Ukrainian side intends in the near 
future to change the function of the Pavlograd Conversion or 
Elimination Facility to the Pavlograd Storage Facility for 
Solid Rocket Motors. 
 
     Despite the fact that in accordance with the provisions 
of JCIC Joint Statement No. 17 on Changes in the Function of 
a Facility, each Treaty Party has the right to change the 
function of any facility declared in the MOU data, the 
Ukrainian side considered it necessary, on a preliminary 
basis, to provide the delegations with information on this 
issue. 
 
     This was due to the fact that there are certain special 
features for the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility 
(within the boundaries pursuant to JCIC Joint Statement No. 
S-20 on Changes to the Boundary of the Pavlograd Conversion 
or Elimination Facility). 
 
     Solid rocket motors (SRMs) of SS-24 ICBMs without 
nozzles attached, which remained after the elimination of 
ICBMs under the first phase of their elimination in 
accordance with the provisions of the above-mentioned JCIC 
Joint Statement No. 34, are in storage at the Pavlograd 
Conversion or Elimination Facility (PCP (Pavlograd Chemical 
Plant)). 
 
     In accordance with paragraph 107 (103) of the 
Definitions Annex, the term "solid rocket motor" means that 
part of a stage that consists of the case filled with solid 
fuel. 
 
     The provisions of paragraph 10 of Article IV of the 
Treaty specify that each Treaty Party may locate SRMs for 
first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at 
locations where production and storage, or testing of such 
motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for 
mobile launchers of ICBMs. 
 
     Such a category of facilities is provided for in the 
Treaty and is specified in paragraph 5 of Annex I to the 
Treaty's  Memorandum of Understanding.  The Ukrainian side 
believes that the Pavlograd Chemical Plant falls into the 
category of an SRM storage facility. 
 
     Thus, based on the requirements of the aforementioned 
article of the Treaty, as we understand it, SRMs of ICBM 
first stages may not be located at conversion or elimination 
facilities.  Only the rocket motor cases that remained after 
the solid rocket fuel was removed from them may be located at 
such facilities for the purpose of their subsequent 
elimination.  Indeed, that is one of the reasons for our 
proposal on changing the function of this facility. 
 
     We would like to point out to the Delegations of the 
Parties some further aspects concerning this issue. 
     In connection with the beginning of actual work on 
removing solid rocket fuel from the rocket motor cases using 
the water washout method at the Pavlograd Conversion or 
Elimination Facility (Pavlograd Chemical Plant), a special 
regime has been introduced at this enterprise, under which 
access of individuals to the premises during this work has 
been restricted to the maximum extent.  This is because a 
large quantity (approximately 5,000 tons) of hazardous 
explosive material is concentrated at the enterprise. 
 
     The process of removing rocket fuel from the rocket 
motor cases is not subject to confirmatory inspections, as 
specified in para. 2 of Section I of the Conversion or 
Elimination Protocol.  At the same time, in inspecting this 
facility, as an ICBM elimination facility, provision is made 
for access of U.S. inspectors and escort team members to that 
portion of the enterprise which is in direct proximity to the 
structures where the fuel removal work is carried out. 
 
     Taking into account the fact that the inspected Party is 
responsible for the safety of inspection team members during 
an inspection in Ukraine, the Ukrainian side will be 
compelled to suspend work at the enterprise during the 
inspection period; this is unacceptable since such actions 
will prevent ensuring the safety of the technological process. 
 
     In addition, this will lead to violation of the 
requirements of paragraph 6 of Section VI of the Inspection 
Protocol, under which inspectors do not have the right to 
interfere with ongoing activities at an inspection site...and 
do not have the right to hamper or delay the operation of a 
facility.  Moreover, under this provision inspectors do not 
have the right to take actions affecting the safe operation 
of a facility. 
 
     Thus, the Ukrainian side believes that these arguments 
are valid and are such that they do not contradict the 
provisions of the Treaty and that they are aimed at strict 
fulfillment of the provisions of the Treaty as it pertains to 
ensuring safety while conducting inspections. 
 
     Taking into account the requirements of the provision of 
JCIC Joint Statement No. 17 on Changes to the Function of a 
Facility, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 9 of the 
Notification Protocol, the Ukrainian side will provide 
notification formats for changing the function of a facility. 
 
     In addition, the Ukrainian side understands that after 
the change in function, under the requirements of JCIC Joint 
Statement No. 17, this facility will be regarded as a new 
facility and will be declared in Annex I data of the START 
MOU. 
 
     At the same time, under paragraph 5 of Section VII of 
the START Inspection Protocol, this category of facility, 
"storage facility for solid rocket motors," is not subject to 
data update or new facility inspections under this Treaty. 
    On this basis, after expiration of a five-day period from 
the time the U.S. side receives the notification, in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of the Notification Protocol, of 
a change in the data by categories of data in the MOU in 
connection with a change in the function of a facility, the 
inspection regime at that new facility will be terminated. 
 
     In the future the Ukrainian side plans to declare a new 
facility, the "Pavlograd Elimination Facility for ICBMs," 
where the final phase of SS-24 elimination, i.e., the 
elimination of solid rocket motors, will be carried out, 
taking into account the elimination method selected by the 
Ukrainian side, as well as the requirements of the START 
Treaty and the agreements reached in the JCIC. 
 
     Thus, our proposals are within the Treaty framework, are 
consistent with the current state of affairs, and are aimed 
at simplifying the final phases of elimination. 
 
End text. 
 
9.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Ukraine: 
 
    -- Ukrainian Non-Paper on the Removal of the Pavlograd 
Facility Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections from the List of 
Facilities Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections, dated 
November 2, 2005; 
 
    -- Ukrainian-Proposed JCIC Agreement on the Removal of 
the Pavlograd Facility Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections 
from the List of Facilities Subject to Suspect-Site 
Inspections, dated November 2, 2005; and 
 
    -- Ukrainian Non-Paper On Changing the Function of the 
Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility, dated November 
2, 2005. 
 
10.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Deihl 
Mr. Dunn 
LCDR Feliciano 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hay 
Mr. Johnston 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Maj Mitchner 
Col Rumohr 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baisuanov 
 
Russia 
 
Mr. Boryak 
Col Yegorov 
Mr. Istratov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Amb Masterkov 
Mr. Mezhennyy 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Vodopolova 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Fokin (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
Mr. Dotsenko 
Gen Fedotov 
 
11.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Cassel