US embassy cable - 05HANOI2967

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COMMUNIST PARTY SEIZED WITH UPCOMING PLENUM; RUMORS ABOUT SENIOR PERSONNEL CHANGES ABOUND

Identifier: 05HANOI2967
Wikileaks: View 05HANOI2967 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Hanoi
Created: 2005-11-08 04:45:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PGOV PINR VM DPOL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002967 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, VM, DPOL 
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY SEIZED WITH UPCOMING PLENUM; RUMORS 
ABOUT SENIOR PERSONNEL CHANGES ABOUND 
 
Reftel: Hanoi 2063 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In preparation for next year's Party 
Congress, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) is currently 
preparing for its 13th and penultimate Plenum, during which 
key personnel decisions will be thrashed out based on 
ongoing lower-level party congresses.  A number of rumors, 
sometimes contradictory, about possible resignations and new 
appointments indicate that the political horse-trading has 
begun in earnest.  As Vietnam's political season moves 
forward, the GVN is likely to become increasingly inwardly 
focused, and perhaps less willing to take on sensitive or 
controversial issues.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) According to several well-known journalist 
contacts, the Central Committee of the CPV is planning at 
least two more plenums to finalize policy and personnel 
decisions in advance of next year's 10th Party Congress, 
reportedly scheduled for some time in June 2006.  The Party 
is currently conducting district-level party congresses, 
which will be followed by provincial-level congresses in the 
run-up to the first of these two plenums, planned for the 
end of this year.  Party committees in important ministries 
will also conduct congresses to nominate candidates for the 
new Central Committee. 
 
13th Plenum 
----------- 
 
3. (SBU) In late December, the Central Committee will 
reportedly convene its 13th Plenum for the current five-year 
interval, following the conclusion of provincial-level party 
congresses, in order to appoint the membership of the new 
Central Committee.  Members will be drawn from nominees from 
each province, ministry and agency in accordance with 
guidelines established by the 12th Plenum held last July 
(reftel).  In theory, Central Committee members must meet 
these guidelines' age, professional and geographic 
qualifications.  According to official sources, the current 
Central Committee has stipulated that all new members must 
not be older than 50 years of age to allow them to serve at 
least two five-year terms.  The new Central Committee is 
projected to consist of between 160 and 165 members, 
excluding alternates.  (Note:  The current Committee 
consists of 150 "full" members and no alternates.  End 
note.) 
 
4. (SBU) Le Tho Binh, head of the Legal Affairs Journal's 
Hanoi office, claimed that the Party hopes to "promote 
democracy" by this expansion of the Central Committee -- 
which in theory is the Party's leading institution when 
Party Congresses are not in session -- in anticipation of 
major policy debates in the coming years.  Alternate 
membership, a personnel option that has not been used since 
the 6th Party Congress in 1986, may also be considered, and 
would give probationary opportunities to a greater number of 
key officials so that they are better prepared to serve the 
Central Committee while they are still relatively young, 
Binh asserted.  Sharing the same observation, Nguyen Chi 
Dzung, former Editor-in-Chief of the National Assembly- 
affiliated Legislative Affairs Journal, added that alternate 
membership is also meant to provide replacements for "full" 
members who have to step down for any reason. 
 
5. (SBU) According to official sources, the Central 
Committee has for the first time ever asked the Vietnam 
Fatherland Front (VFF), the Party's umbrella for mass 
organizations, to vet current and prospective members of the 
new Committee.  VFF President and former permanent Politburo 
member Pham The Duyet told the press that the VFF is 
expected to confirm candidates' "professional efficiency and 
trustworthiness," as well as their age and physical health. 
The other criteria considered are "the three no's" set by 
the Central Committee itself:  "no corruption, no red tape 
and no wastefulness."  Duyet added, however, that there 
would be no open discussion within the VFF of nominated 
candidates, as "personnel issues are critical and sensitive 
in nature."  Instead, each member of the VFF's Presidium 
will forward his or her respective comments to the VFF 
President, who in turn will forward them to the CPV's 
Commission for Organization and Personnel, he explained. 
 
Personnel Change Rumors 
----------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Tran Nhung, former chief of international affairs 
of Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army) newspaper, Binh and 
Dzung shared their common belief with Poloffs that any final 
decisions concerning top leadership will not be available 
until the 14th Plenum, expected to be the last and most 
important meeting before the Party Congress.  All final 
decisions on the Party's platform, agenda and personnel 
decisions will be made at the 14th Plenum.  Nevertheless, 
they report rumors that, "for the sake of continuity and 
stability," Nong Duc Manh will apparently stay on for 
another five-year term as Party Secretary, despite the fact 
that he is "not considered particularly capable."  It is 
also thought that Vietnam's other three top leaders -- 
President Tran Duc Luong, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and 
National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Van An -- will step down. 
Phan Dien, a current Politburo member and permanent member 
of the Central Committee's Secretariat, is also expected to 
step down, and is likely to be replaced by Nguyen Phu Trong, 
the current Party Chief in Hanoi, a Politburo member and 
Chief of the Central Committee's Theoretical Council.  Trong 
is thought to be the CPV's strongest ideologue and is seen 
as part of the conservative faction within the current 
Central Committee.  (Note:  The Secretariat handles the 
Party's day-to-day affairs, which makes its 9 members 
powerful within Party circles.  End note.) 
 
7. (SBU) The journalists also report rumors that Politburo 
members Standing Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung and 
National Assembly Vice Chairman Truong Quang Duoc will 
continue in the new Politburo and will be named Prime 
Minister and Chairman of the National Assembly, 
respectively.  Dzung has been a permanent deputy prime 
minister for a number of years, so replacing Khai would be 
seen as a "logical development."  The same could be said for 
Vice Chairman Duoc.  Other key positions in the new Central 
Committee, as well as the Politburo, will be clearer only 
after the Party congresses have been held in key provinces 
and cities like Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, as well as in 
important ministries such as the Ministries of Public 
Security and National Defense.  The CPV's current Politburo 
reportedly recently met with key Party officials from Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City to discuss preparations for their 
municipal Party congresses because these congresses will 
likely decide other critical leadership positions in the 
CPV. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) Comment:  With the district, provincial and 
ministry party congresses taking place in anticipation of 
the 13th Plenum, political horse-trading season is in full 
swing.  Individual rumors notwithstanding, we will not 
really know who is up and who is down within the CPV until 
much later.  We also cannot precisely predict when the Party 
Congress will be take place, as internal politicking and 
concerns about APEC events' timing are significant 
variables.  However, we can expect that, as the preparatory 
political battles become more heated over the next few 
months, the GVN will likely become increasingly inwardly 
focused, and Government leaders may be less inclined to make 
decisions about or take positions on controversial or 
sensitive issues.  End comment. 
 
MARINE 

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