US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA10498

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010498 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, MOPS, PHUM, SNAR, CO 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIAN THINK TANK SEEKS TO ADVANCE ELN PEACE 
THROUGH US/EU ENGAGEMENT 
 
REF: BOGOTA 10106 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) The consultative process underway between the National 
Liberation Army (ELN) and Colombian advisors is unlikely to 
lead to substantive peace talks with the GOC unless the 
international community, especially the United States, nudges 
the parties forward, according to Ideas for Peace (Ideas Para 
La Paz) Director Sergio Jaramillo in a November 2 meeting 
with the Ambassador.  He probed whether the U.S. (and perhaps 
the UK on behalf of the EU) would be willing to have a 
"non-meeting" with ELN spokesperson Galan, to convey the 
international community's interest in peace and to stress 
that the process would not be indefinite.  The Ambassador 
emphasized that neither the USG nor the Colombian government 
was willing to negotiate with terrorists unwilling to 
renounce terrorist activity.  Jaramillo said he would convey 
to the ELN that abandoning terrorist action now was a 
critical step to advance any negotiations domestically and 
international support. End summary. 
 
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ELN Intransigent Despite Dwindling Numbers 
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2. (SBU) On November 2, Ideas Para La Paz Director Sergio 
Jaramillo briefed the Ambassador on the status of the ELN's 
"Peace House" project outside Rio Negro, Antioquia.  ELN 
leader Gerardo Antonio Bermudez Sanchez, a.k.a. "Francisco 
Galan," is participating in discussions with various members 
of civil society, the private sector, and members of 
Congress.  Five "guarantors" (Grupo de Garantes -- Moritz 
Akerman, Daniel Garcia-Pena, Alvaro Jimenez, Gustavo Ruiz and 
Aleja Vargas) support the effort.  With the concurrence of 
the GOC, think tank Ideas Para La Paz is serving as the 
technical secretariat to the process.  Jaramillo told the 
Ambassador that the ELN's political significance continued to 
surpass its dwindling size (roughly 3,600).  While the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), paramilitary 
forces, and desertions had worked to reduce the overall ELN 
rank and file each year, the communities in ELN strongholds 
remained dedicated to the ELN's social revolution ideology. 
Both Galan and the guarantors asserted that the debilitated 
ELN was ready to get serious about the peace process and use 
the Peace House as a confidence-building measure towards 
larger issues. 
 
3. (SBU) Jaramillo admitted that the ELN retained more 
autonomy and internal coherence than many believed. 
Nevertheless, he was skeptical about the ELN's readiness and 
willingness to negotiate.  He recounted earlier ELN offers to 
reach a deal, all of which failed to advance past initial 
stages.  He acknowledged that the Peace House initiative did 
not have any notable advantages over the June 2004-April 2005 
Mexican-mediated discussions, which collapsed when the ELN 
walked away in April. 
 
4. (SBU) Jaramillo added that the ELN had become increasingly 
fragmented as their numbers dwindled.  The control of the 
Central Command over some local fronts was also in doubt. 
Nonetheless, according to Jaramillo, the ELN believed it 
needed concessions from the GOC to prove to the rank and file 
that it had won social improvements for the Colombian people. 
 
 
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Probing for U.S. Involvement 
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5. (C) Jaramillo probed for U.S. willingness (and that of UK 
on behalf of the EU) to have a role in the process.  He asked 
whether a U.S. official would consider meeting Galan: (1) to 
convey the international community's interest in peace and 
that the ELN was still on the radar screen; and (2) to 
impress upon the ELN that time was running out and they 
 
needed to negotiate.  Jaramillo said one encounter with a 
U.S. official emphasizing these points could make the 
exercise relevant and increase the chances of forward 
movement. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. strongly supported 
the idea of a serious peace process with the ELN, but the 
U.S. would not negotiate with active terrorists, nor would it 
counsel the GOC to do so.  He reminded Jaramillo that the GOC 
had made several good faith offers over the last year -- all 
rebuffed by the ELN.  The GOC's final stand was that it would 
not negotiate with a group that refused to renounce 
kidnapping and terrorist attacks during talks.  Jaramillo 
acknowledged the point but said the ELN could not take the 
risk by unilaterally starting the peace process.  The 
Ambassador countered that neither the GOC nor the United 
States would condone the ELN's continued terrorist activity 
while it purported to negotiate peace to "meet the ELN 
halfway."  The ELN must renounce terror and become serious 
about moving from terrorist activity to the political 
mainstream.  Even if the rank and file caused a rare 
cease-fire violation, it would be a vast improvement over the 
current ELN leadership blanket approval of terrorist 
activities. 
 
7. (SBU) Jaramillo said he would tell Galan that a cease-fire 
would be a necessary step to progress any further.  He 
recognized that the ELN had rejected GOC offers over the last 
few years because of its unwillingness to negotiate with 
Uribe.  However, the likelihood of a second Uribe term 
coupled with an increase in attacks against the ELN might 
persuade them to seek a deal. 
 
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Time Running Out 
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8. (SBU) In an aside to the PolCouns, Jaramillo said he 
doubted the ELN would be able to extend the Peace House 
discussions past the original December deadline.  The GOC 
seemed reluctant to let the pre-negotiation process drag on, 
possibly due to the ELN's historic difficulty with 
negotiations or as a counterbalance to having denied the 
request by the paramilitaries to extend their demobilizations 
past December 31, 2005.  In any case, Jaramillo said he 
sought to make the ELN's dialogues "meaningful" and hoped he 
could motivate Galan to advance negotiations in time. 
WOOD