US embassy cable - 05PARIS7597

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MFA ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS: MORE OF THE SAME

Identifier: 05PARIS7597
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS7597 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-11-07 17:41:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL IZ IR FR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007597 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, IR, FR 
SUBJECT: MFA ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS: MORE OF THE SAME 
 
REF: A. PARIS 7496 
 
     B. PARIS 7174 
     C. PARIS 5220 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: During a November 4 discussion, MFA 
DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Iran Antoine Sivan affirmed that the 
GoF will view the next Iraqi government as fully sovereign, 
but gave no indication that the GoF will increase its 
assistance to Iraq after December elections.  Sivan expressed 
satisfaction with the Iraqi constitutional referendum 
results, but voiced concern over the constitution's division 
of authority between the central government and provinces. 
In response to poloff's urging greater GoF assistance to 
Iraq's next government, he repeated familiar GoF arguments 
against sending personnel into Iraq and cited Iraqi 
uresponsiveness to the GoF offer to train Iraqi police in 
France.  Sivan confirmed general acceptance of the draft Iraq 
UNSCR text proposed by the U.S., though he said the GoF would 
seek amendments linking the transfer of security 
responsibilities to Iraqis to an eventual departure of 
foreign troops, as well as a six-month time-frame for review 
of the MNF-1 mandate.  Sivan's comments on Iran are reported 
septel.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf Affairs 
Antoine Sivan, during a November 4 meeting with poloff, 
expressed satisfaction with the conduct of the October 15 
constitutional referendum in Iraq, which he said gave Iraqi 
Sunnis the chance to correct their earlier error of 
boycotting Iraq's political process.  Sivan agreed that the 
shift in Sunni attitudes towards the political process was an 
important, positive development.  At the same time, Sivan 
said the GoF remained concerned by the constitution's 
content, which he described as a fragile compromise which did 
not settle many of the fundamental dilemmas facing Iraq, 
including the division of natural resources, the role of 
Islam, and the relationship between the central government 
and the provinces.  Sivan focused on the latter point in 
particular, and expressed concern that the new constitution 
had essentially "robbed Peter to pay Paul," and created a 
central government which would be a "political dwarf" in 
relation to to the regions, thereby exacerbating 
sectarianism.  Poloff questioned Sivan's pessimism, and 
pointed to the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi population 
which had approved the constitution, as well as its 
unprecedented human rights advances and protections for 
minorities, including the Sunni community.  Sivan responded 
that what counted most for the GoF was the fact that the new 
constitution could be amended, which would help allow all 
those who reject violence to participate in the political 
process. 
 
3. (C) Poloff commented that Sivan's concerns over the 
competence of Iraq's central government were all the more 
reason for the GoF to contribute more to Iraqi capacity 
building and help realize our shared goal of a stable and 
democratic Iraq.  Although Sivan affirmed that the GoF would 
view Iraq's next government as fully sovereign, he gave no 
indication that December elections would herald increased GoF 
assistance to Iraq.  In response to poloff's urging the GoF 
to look for ways to increase assistance to Iraq, Sivan 
reviewed the GoF's modest assistance efforts for Iraq thus 
far, including the activities of the French cultural center 
in Baghdad, which has a 2005 budget of about 2.5 million 
euros (an increase of 300 percent over 2004), and French 
participation in the EU "JUSTLEX" program, under which 40 
Iraqi police officers underwent one-month training in France 
in summer 2005.  On the long-stalled French bilateral offer 
to train up to 1,500 Iraqi police in France, Sivan blamed the 
Iraqi government for the impasse, and said the GoF was 
waiting for the ITG to send a senior-level MOI delegation to 
follow-up on a July visit by Iraqi MOI officers (ref c). 
Sivan claimed that all the GoF needed to launch the training 
program were a list of participants and confirmation of areas 
of interest from the ITG.  Asked by poloff to what degree the 
GoF might modify its training proposal to better meet Iraqi 
needs, Sivan offered little response.  He noted GoF redlines 
against sending troops into Iraq remained unchanged, and that 
the GoF was unwilling to send any humanitarian or NGO 
personnel to Iraq as long as the security situation remained 
difficult.  He summed up that the GoF did not want "any new 
hostages." 
 
4. (C) On the draft Iraq UNSCR under discussion in New York 
(ref a), Sivan said the GoF had no fundamental problems with 
the U.S. proposed text.  He suggested that the GoF would 
focus on two points in negotiations of the draft text: seek 
preambular language alluding to a linkage between an eventual 
departure of foreign troops from Iraq and the gradual 
transfer of security authority to the Iraq government, and 
advocate a six-month, vice the proposed eight-month, review 
of the mandate of the MNF-1. 
 
5. (C) Comment: The GoF continues to be generous in offering 
opinions on Iraq but much less so in providing significant, 
concrete support for Iraq's government.  We will continue to 
press the GoF to increase its support for our shared goal of 
a stable, democratic Iraq, particularly after December 
elections.  Unfortunately, it appears that the prospect of an 
elected, permanent government in Iraq, while finally meeting 
GoF criteria of a fully sovereign government, has not yet 
prodded France to contemplate increasing its meager 
engagement in Iraq.  End comment. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
Stapleton 

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