US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI4548

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SY, AE 
SUBJECT: SYRIAN DEPUTY FM MOALLEM VISIT TO UAE 
 
REF: A. ABU DHABI 3272 
 
     B. ABU DHABI 3700 
     C. ABU DHABI 4540 
     D. ABU DHABI 3801 
     E. ABU DHABI 3615 
 
Classified By: DCM Martin R. Quinn for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Moallem 
visited Abu Dhabi October 31 for meetings with President 
Khalifa and Information Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al 
Nahyan.  Sheikh Abdullah told Ambassador that Moallem "had 
nothing new to offer" and that he had declined the invitation 
to visit Damascus again.  Private comment by UAEG senior 
leaders, as distinct from UAE media, may indicate a cooling 
in the UAE-Syria relationship.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Moallem visited 
Abu Dhabi October 31 to seek UAEG support for the embattled 
Syrian regime.  Moallem met one-on-one with President Khalifa 
bin Zayed Al Nahyan to seek UAE support for Damascus as it 
faces further scrutiny over its role in the assassination of 
former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri.  Moallem assured 
Khalifa of Syria's willingness to cooperate with the Mehlis 
inquiry into Hariri's assassination, while underscoring the 
dangers of destabilizing Syria.  Moallem told the press that 
he was upset that the United Nations Security Council had 
adopted Resolution 1636 on October 31, saying that "It is an 
unhappy time for me and for my country." 
 
UAE SENIOR LEADERSHIP TURNS MORE NEGATIVE ON SYRIA 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3. (C) The UAE leadership has refrained from criticizing 
President Bashar al-Asad publicly in the past, preferring 
quieter consultations with other Arab League states and 
directly with Damascus.  UAE Information Minister Sheikh 
Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ) visited Asad in Damascus 
July 31 (ref A, B) and told Ambassador November 6 that he 
also met one-on-one with Walid Moallem, who "had nothing new 
to offer."  AbZ said that Moallem invited him to return to 
Damascus and that he responded firmly in the negative. 
 
UAE PRESS COVERAGE OF SYRIA 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (U) Syria is learning to play the PR game, with local 
press carrying extensive statements by Syria's Ambassador to 
the UAE, Riyadh Nassan Agha.  Agha said that Syria was 
explaining to the leaders of other Arab countries that any 
conflict in the region is not in the interest of Syria, 
Arabs, and the Muslim nations.  He thanked the UAE and other 
GCC states for their support for Syria and said the situation 
was "very critical and we need the support of all Arabs." 
Agha further said that the UN resolution's reference to 
Chapter 7, which allows the use of force, was "horrible" and 
"illogical."  The UNSC is "talking about the use of force 
while the investigation into Hariri's death has not finished 
yet."  Agha said that Syria has decided to cooperate with the 
UN and the international community "to prove its innocence in 
the assassination" of Hariri.  He emphasized Syria's desire 
to cooperate with the Mehlis Committee and said that the 
Syrian President has ordered the creation of a special legal 
committee to help Mehlis and the international commission 
investigate the assassination.  Agha also underscored the 
dangers of destabilizing Syria.  The Arab media and others 
should know that "whatever affects Syria will not harm us 
alone, but the entire Arab region will plunge into chaos." 
 
5. (U) Just prior to Moallem's visit, semi-official Arabic 
daily Al-Ittihad (October 30) lauded the Syrian decision to 
form a special committee to investigate Hariri's murder, 
editorializing that since the Syrian president gave the 
investigating committee authority to question both civilians 
and military, the gesture "reflects Syria's real desire to 
get to the truth."  The editorial further expressed concern 
that extreme pressure on Syria (like that directed against 
Iraq) will add to regional tension and instability, spawning 
a new crisis. 
 
6. (C) COMMENT:  If Syria was looking for a public statement 
of support from the UAEG as a result of the Moallem visit, it 
is probably not going to get it.  Over the past few weeks we 
have detected a cooling in the UAE-Syria relationship, at 
least at the senior leadership level.  There have been some 
recent signs.  During October 11 telcon with NEA A/S David 
Welch, AbZ enthused that it was time for Bashar "to feel the 
heat."  Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed 
(MbZ) told us (during October 18 visit of Ambassador 
Khalilzad) that the Syrian president was untrustworthy and 
had the "same mentality as the old guard" in Syria.  MbZ also 
opined that "Syria is a country that needs a major change" 
(ref C).  However, the next level down of MFA officials, 
non-decision-makers like U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi and 
one former UAE ambassador to Damascus (Asst U/S Tariq Al 
Haidan) have tended toward a softer approach (ref D, E), more 
aligned with local media and popular opinion.  END COMMENT. 
SISON