US embassy cable - 05MANILA5166

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 005166 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EAP, INR/EAP, S/CT, AND EAP/MTS 
NSC FOR GREEN 
SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP FOR ALLEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, ASEC, PREL, RP 
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL THREATS TO DEMOCRACY IN 
THE PHILIPPINES 
 
REF: A. MANILA 5018 
     B. MANILA 5023 
     C. TDX-315/63725-05 
     D. MANILA 5098 
 
Classified By: (U) Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Paul Jones 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C/NF) SUMMARY.  The Philippines' once again turbulent 
political environment has sparked new waves of rumors that 
the President or her advisers are considering emergency rule 
or martial law, and that elements within the military are 
seeking to stage a coup.  We assess that neither scenario yet 
seems probable here, but we continue to monitor the situation 
closely and to stress in public and private statements the 
need for the rule of law, our opposition to any and all 
extreme measures -- by the government or opposition -- and 
the negative impact any such action will have on US 
assistance.  We also seek at every opportunity to focus the 
GRP on our substantive agenda, which is considerable and 
productive in many areas.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WHAT GMA IS THINKING 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (S/NF)  Senior GRP officials presented an aide memoire 
that reflects the views of at least some key Arroyo advisors 
to Secretary Rice and Director for National Intelligence 
Negroponte, and attached it to a letter on Iraq to President 
Bush.  It claimed that "political opportunists and 
destabilizers have forged understandings with Communists, 
terrorists and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists to remove the 
President" and urged "vocal support for our President" from 
the USG to help with this "increasingly serious and dangerous 
situation."  Intel reporting (ref C) has also indicated that 
senior advisors are considering -- and perhaps have begun 
drafting -- possible measures to implement emergency rule of 
some sort in the Philippines.  In a one-in-one discussion 
with President Arroyo on November 7 on the margins of USAID 
Assistant Administrator Kunder's call (septel), CDA noted 
that we did not share the analysis in the aide memoire or 
believe circumstances would justify extreme measures. 
President Arroyo appeared somewhat nonplused, but responded 
only that she was "so sorry to hear" this. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "in 
times of war or other national emergency," Congress may 
authorize the President for a "limited period" to "exercise 
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national 
policy" until the next adjournment of Congress.  A separate 
clause gives the President, as Commander-in-Chief, power to 
suspend habeas corpus or "place the Philippines or any part 
thereof under martial law" in cases of invasion or rebellion, 
even without Congressional approval -- although Congress has 
the right within 48 hours to revoke such a proclamation by 
majority vote. 
 
4.  (S/NF) We have made clear in our meetings with 
senior-level GRP officials, also including during CDA's 
October 21 meeting with President Arroyo (ref A) and a 
separate meeting with Foreign Secretary Romulo on November 3, 
our firm opposition to emergency rule or martial law. 
Additionally, in a speech to Manila Rotary Clubs on November 
3, CDA described USG support to democratic institutions, 
concluding that the USG would reject emergency rule or 
extra-Constitutional measures.  We will continue in public 
and private statements to insist on the need for the rule of 
law, emphatically stress our opposition to any and all 
extreme measures, and underscore that such actions would have 
serious, negative impacts on US assistance, international 
investor confidence, and the Philippines' international 
image. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  We do not believe that GMA has reached a decision 
to move to this next phase.  One factor that bodes well is 
GMA's view of herself as a long-time democratic activist and 
a worthy successor to her respected father, former President 
Diosdado Macapagal.  We are nonetheless concerned that her 
advisers may be increasingly successful in convincing her 
that so-called plots by the opposition are now combined with 
long-standing opposition to the GRP by leftist groups, 
notably the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's 
Army (CPP/NPA), in order to ensure her downfall.  She may be 
increasingly inclined to react to boisterous public 
demonstrations as "evidence" of incipient "rebellion" and 
hence seek to impose at least limited emergency measures. 
EAP DAS John's upcoming visit will provide yet another 
opportunity to disabuse the GRP of any belief that the USG 
would view such a step by the GRP benignly.  Some GRP 
officials may misread the relaxed USG response to the limited 
imposition of emergency rule following the Oakwood Mutiny on 
July 27, 2003 as an indication of our likely reaction to 
emergency rule today.  In the current political environment, 
any emergency rule could only be justified by a blatant 
attempt to overthrow the government, which we do not see as 
forthcoming. 
 
 
NO EVIDENCE COUP PLOTTERS HAVE MOVED BEYOND POSTURING 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6.  (C/NF) AFP Chief of Staff General Generoso Senga has 
publicly called for the military to remain apolitical, as has 
Secretary of National Defense Avelino Cruz, who used a recent 
 
SIPDIS 
address at the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) to urge the 
AFP to "remain insulated from partisan politics."  If the 
past is any guide, any coup attempt would likely have to 
involve a number of elite units and be directed against a 
series of specific targets: Malacanang Palace; Philippine 
National Police Headquarters at Camp Crame; AFP Headquarters 
and the Department of National Defense at Camp Aguinaldo; 
Fort Bonafacio; radio and television stations; and the Manila 
International Airport.  The Scout Rangers, Philippine 
Marines, Navy Special Warfare Group, Special Forces, and 
Light Reaction Companies (LRCs) are potential sources of coup 
recruits.  The failed Oakwood Mutiny included elements from 
each of these units. 
 
7.  (C/NF) The Philippine Marines have only one infantry 
battalion and a handful of light armored vehicles and 
artillery pieces at their Fort Bonafacio headquarters; their 
remaining 10 infantry battalions are deployed to Mindanao, as 
are two of the three LRCs.  Scout Ranger, SWAG, and Special 
Force units were consolidated into smaller components 
following the Oakwood mutiny; much of their combat power, as 
well, is deployed to Mindanao.  The only combat aircraft that 
could be used to support a coup are based at Sangley Point 
Air Station in Cavite, and consist of OV-10s and MG-520 
helicopter gunships.  The Presidential Security Group (PSG) 
and the 300-man Philippine National Police Special Action 
Force (SAF) have traditionally served as anti-coup forces and 
are expected to remain loyal. 
 
8.  (C/NF) It is highly likely that any coup attempt would 
split the military, something that AFP leaders fear, pointing 
to the failed effort in 1989 that pitted brother against 
brother and PMA classmate against PMA classmate.  In the 
Marines, this led to the motto, "Never Again."  This legacy 
weighs heavily on the minds of field grade and senior 
officers.  For a coup to succeed, it would need widespread 
support among the entire military. 
 
9.  (C/NF) The AFP chain of command remains fully functional. 
 General Senga, while not as popular as his predecessor, 
General Abu, retains the respect of his subordinates. 
Philippine Army commander Lieutenant General Hermogenes 
Esperon is a GMA loyalist, as is the commander of the 
National Capital Region Command, Lieutenant General Alan 
Cabalquinto.  Similar to 1989, if a serious coup were 
attempted, fighting would probably devolve into a series of 
small unit actions centered around Malacanang, Camp 
Crame/Camp Aguinaldo, and Fort Bonafacio, and involve 
significant destruction.  Even a failed coup attempt could 
undermine peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF), fuel the Communist insurgency, set back defense 
reform, and take badly needed attention away from the 
counterterrorism fight. 
 
COMMENT: US VIEWS MATTER 
------------------------ 
 
10.  (C)  GRP and AFP officials care very much about the 
judgments of the USG and will watch and listen closely to our 
actions and words as they deliberate possible next steps. 
Both Embassy officials and USG visitors from Washington and 
PACOM can helpfully continue to disabuse any on the ground 
here who might mistakenly believe that we would condone or 
support any efforts to undermine democratic rule, whether 
technically permissible under the Constitution or blatantly 
unconstitutional.  We will continue to monitor the situation, 
and will request Washington's assistance in pressing the 
message as needed. 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
Jones