US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA10419

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 010419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR INL/LP AND WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR, PTER, MOPS, CO 
SUBJECT: CD BRIGADE COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
ERADICATION OPERATIONS - GOOD IDEAS, BUT EXPENSIVE 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a visit by NAS Bogota and INL 
personnel on October 27, the Counter Drug Brigade (CD BDE) 
Commander made twelve recommendations to improve the CD 
BDE's support to spray operations.  His principal 
recommendations included standing up a fourth combat 
battalion with air assets to provide support to 
eradication's third spray package, targeting high 
concentration areas and hitting them more than once a year, 
and improving maintenance and intelligence.  Most of his 
recommendations come with a price tag.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) On October 27, the NAS Bogota Director traveled to 
the CD BDE headquarters in Larandia, Caqueta, as part of a 
familiarization/courtesy call on Brigadier General Luis 
Felipe Paredes, Commander of the CD BDE.  The NAS Director 
was accompanied by two INL program officers from Washington 
and NAS Bogota's CD BDE program manager. 
 
3. (SBU) During the course of a briefing, General Paredes 
made twelve recommendations on how to improve eradication 
operations. 
 
(1) Spray the same area three times during the year.  This 
would be a powerful economic disincentive by denying growers 
and narco-terrorists any profit from successive crops and 
would defeat their tactic of rapid replanting of sprayed 
crops (Note:  It would also mean spraying replanting well 
before they were ready for harvest). 
 
(2) Orient efforts towards spraying in zones containing the 
highest concentration of illicit crops and the most numerous 
production and processing facilities for coca.  General 
Paredes specifically mentioned targeting Meta, Caqueta, 
Putumayo, and Narino departments. 
 
(3) Improve the maintenance and operational readiness of 
spray aircraft and Plan Colombia helicopters. 
 
(4) Create a fourth combat battalion to provide operational 
security to the third spray package.  (NOTE:  Given the need 
for battalion training, rotation, and rest, the three CD 
battalions can only support two of the current three spray 
packages.  As a consequence, the third spray package 
operates without CB BGE ground troop support, except for a 
Quick Reaction Force in case of an emergency.  We also have 
discouraged this option because of the cost.) 
 
(5) Increase the number of helicopters and crews so as to be 
able to support a fourth combat battalion by providing 
transportation for them.  (Note: The Plan Colombia 
helicopter program can only support two locations or spray 
packages at any one time.) 
 
(6) Streamline the process to provide faster human rights 
certification of military units to operationally support the 
CD Brigade during spray missions, so that we can spray where 
the troops already are. 
 
(7) Strengthen the property and asset forfeiture efforts in 
areas sprayed to dissuade re-planting and further 
cultivation in surrounding areas. 
 
(8) Assign a member of the Colombian Judicial Police to the 
Quick Reaction Force.  This would allow arrests to be made 
during CD Brigade operations.  (NOTE:  At present, the only 
arrests that can be made by CD Brigade personnel are of 
persons who are caught while committing a crime.  CD Brigade 
members are not allowed to enter houses from which shots are 
fired at spray planes, for example.) 
 
(9) Increase civil-military operations in the spray area. 
This includes proving basic information on the spray program 
and the CD Brigade's mission. 
 
(10) Strengthen all-source intelligence gathering and 
sharing between the CD Brigade and NAS elements. 
 
(11) Continue training with U.S. Special Forces instructors. 
 
(12) Improve the CD Brigade's basic equipment (i.e., 
helmets, bulletproof vests, assault weapons, etc.) 
 
4. (SBU) Comment:  The CD BDE Commander's recommendations 
are worth considering.  A few of the recommendations could 
be implemented with no major funding impact.  However, most 
of them would require major financial outlays. 
Consideration of training and equipping a fourth combat 
battalion for the CD BDE would involve purchasing four UH- 
60s.  With a spare parts package, the purchase of additional 
UH-60s would cost approximately USD 19 million each, for a 
total of USD 76 million for transportation support alone. 
End Comment. 
 
WOOD