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| Identifier: | 05BOGOTA10396 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BOGOTA10396 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bogota |
| Created: | 2005-11-04 15:41:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV KJUS PINR CO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010396 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015 TAGS: PGOV, KJUS, PINR, CO SUBJECT: HISTORIC LOW TURNOUT FOR CARTAGENA MAYORAL ELECTIONS; CURI TO SERVE THIRD TERM Classified By: Political Counselor Jeffrey DeLaurentis; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ------- SUMMARY ------- 1. (C) On October 30, a record low number of Cartagena's residents voted to return controversial doctor-turned-politician Nicolas Curi to the mayor's office for a third, non-consecutive term. Seventy-eight percent of eligible voters stayed home during the special election. Curi's main opponent was a "blank vote" movement, known in Cartagena as "voto en blanco." If this movement had received fifty percent of the vote, new elections, with a new slate of candidates, would have been required. Curi received 45.6 percent of the nearly 120,000 votes cast; the "blank vote" movement received 34 percent. Because of death threats and accusations of vote buying in the weeks leading up to the vote, the GOC took extra action to ensure fairness and transparency. Ultimately, election day transpired in an orderly fashion. --------------------------------------------- --- CARTAGENA ELECTS CURI TO THIRD TERM; OPPOSITION CHOOSES TO SUPPORT "BLANK" CANDIDATE --------------------------------------------- --- 2. (U) Cartagena held a special mayoral election on October 30. The election was called to resync Cartagena, off cycle for administrative reasons, with the national mayoral election schedule. While there were six candidates on the ballot, only two were in contention: two-time former mayor, Nicolas Curi Vergara, and a "blank vote," known as the "voto en blanco." Curi, a former doctor who served as Cartagena's mayor on two prior occasions, 1992-1995 and 1998-1999, is a controversial figure. According to Curi himself, he is a man of the people, interested only in promoting the well-being of poor people who inhabit the impoverished neighborhoods south of the historic city center. According to other local leaders, including Representative German Viana, Curi is the "worst of the worst," the most corrupt politician in a city known for corruption. (The day before the elections, Interior Minister Sabas Pretelt denounced the awarding of the city's trash collection contract as corrupt.) Curi left office in 1999, before the scheduled 2000 end of his second term as mayor, amid a flurry of corruption charges. He was not convicted, but the charges were widely reported by local and national press in the months leading up to the elections. 3. (C) Curi's only real opponent was the "voto en blanco" movement, which, had it won 50 percent of the vote, would have mandated new elections with a new slate of candidates. In a meeting with poloffs, Curi claimed the movement was funded by Cartagena's wealthy elite as a means to defeat him and install a candidate of their choosing. Others claimed Curi was allied with the city's elite and that the "voto en blanco" movement was the spontaneous creation of a group of young people. The movement itself had no spokesperson and made no statements. Polls in the week leading up to the elections showed Curi and "voto en blanco" running about even. No poll showed the "voto en blanco" movement receiving the necessary 50 percent of the votes, and Curi was expected to win the elections. 4. (U) Ultimately, Curi received 45.6 percent of the nearly 120,000 votes cast. The "voto en blanco" movement received 34 percent. In third place, Mary Luz Londono, the Democratic Pole (Polo Democratico) candidate, received 11 percent. Turnout hit an historic low; 78 percent of those eligible did not vote. (Comment. Had this been a regular election, Curi's vote total and margin of victory would likely have been much larger, as city council and other local races would have mobilized the traditional electoral machinery. End Comment.) ------------------------------------------- ELECTIONS A QUIET AFFAIR, DESPITE CONCERNS ABOUT ELECTION FRAUD, VIOLENCE ------------------------------------------- 5. (C) The weeks preceding the election were marked by threats of violence and accusations of vote buying. Representative Viana told poloffs he received a death threat as a result of his vocal support of the "voto en blanco movement." Journalists, including the editor of the leading local paper, El Universal, also received anonymous death threats. 6. (U) The GOC took extra measures to ensure that the elections were fair and transparent. Fifteen hundred members of the various security agencies, including the Colombian National Police (CNP), the Colombian Navy and the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) were stationed at polling locations to ensure order and prevent vote fraud. Both the Fiscalia and the Department of Administrative Security (DAS) created telephone hotlines to report voting fraud or difficulty. These numbers were published in local newspaper El Universal on election day and posted at many of the polling locations poloffs visited. El Universal reported on October 29 that the Fiscalia's Technical Investigations Unit and the CNP had carried out raids on election headquarters and homes of the candidates and their relatives, including the "voto en blanco" movement, looking for money and other items with which to buy votes. The Fiscalia did not comment specifically on what items were found during these raids; El Universal reported that caches of money totaling 200 million Colombian pesos (COP) and 700 million COP, respectively, were found in two of the raided locations. According to the paper, the raids were carried out in response to tips received on the DAS election hotline. 7. (C) On election day, poloffs visited seven of the 54 polling locations throughout Cartagena including the center of the city, the Bocagrande suburb, and the impoverished neighborhoods south of the center. They did not witness any voting impropriety. Schools and shopping areas served as polling locations. Voting moved swiftly at each location visited; there were no lines. Voters were able to locate their pre-registered Colombian national identity number on boards posted outside the polls, their polling station within a given location, vote and leave in less than three minutes. At one polling location, a couple complained to poloffs of voting difficulties associated with attempting to vote at a location other than the one at which they had pre-registered. Fiscalia representatives at each polling location said voter turnout was low. On November 1, a Fiscalia representative told poloff that no formal complaints of voting impropriety or fraud had been received during the election. (On October 31, El Tiempo reported accusations of vote buying in the El Poson area of Cartagena.) In general, election day transpired in an orderly fashion. Law and order was the norm. Cartageneros commented that such a development was in itself a novelty. ------- COMMENT ------- 8. (C) In the days leading up to the election, poloffs met with Curi and other Cartagena politicians, including Senator Javier Caceres Leal, Governor Libardo Simancas Torres and David and Jose Turbay (former Bolivar Governor and former Representative, respectively). All supported Curi, either openly or behind the scenes; all were skeptical about the "voto en blanco" movement's origins and chances for electoral success. Despite Curi's contention that attacks against him were motivated by Cartagena's elite, his election to a third term demonstrates that most of the old guard in Cartagena politics continues to support him. WOOD
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