US embassy cable - 05WARSAW3762

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 003762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2010 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, PGOV, BO, EUN, Poland-Belarus 
SUBJECT: POLISH RESPONSE ON BELARUS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 
REF: STATE 201513 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d) 
 
1. (C) Acting Polcouns delivered reftel demarche to Beata 
Kolecka, Deputy Director of the EU Department of the Polish 
MFA.  Kolecka welcomed the U.S. perspectives, which she said 
very closely paralleled Poland's own policy on Belarus.  She 
noted the ongoing excellent bilateral and regional 
cooperation with the U.S. on the Belarus problem and agreed 
that U.S.-EU partnership and solidarity was particularly 
important in dealing with the Lukashenko regime. 
 
2. (C) Kolecka agreed that Lukashenko should be given the 
clear message not to run for a third term.  However, she 
worried that there was not a practical method available to 
deliver that message, given the ban on high-level contacts 
with the GOB.  She ruled out any public statements in this 
regard, as they would only "insult" Lukashenko and harden his 
resolve.  She said that there was a possibility of EU High 
Rep Solana's meeting with the Belarusian FM, perhaps 
accompanied by the FMs of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, but 
this would depend entirely on the results of the November 7 
GAERC discussion. 
 
3. (C) Regarding the appropriate reaction should Lukashenko 
indeed manipulate the presidential election and win a third 
term, Kolecka said that many EU member states were undecided, 
although all admitted that some form of strong reaction would 
be necessary.  One school of thought was consistent with the 
U.S. approach of not recognizing such election results and 
declaring Lukashenko illegitimate, while the other felt that 
this would shut off all avenues for dialogue and render aid 
to civil society virtually impossible.  The U.S. and the EU 
definitely had to be prepared to take appropriate steps, but 
there was still no consensus on what those steps should be. 
For example, other EU member states had still not responded 
to Poland's call for a visa ban on the key individuals 
responsible for the ongoing persecution of the Polish Union 
in Belarus. 
 
4. (C) Kolecka said that the GAERC communique would include a 
public call for free, fair and transparent elections and 
unfettered media access, but not necessarily any concrete 
further steps.  Poland would continue to push at the GAERC, 
the PSC and in other EU fora for a coherent and pro-active 
policy on Belarus. 
 
5. (C) Regarding Russia, Kolecka said that the GOP had been 
trying for months to establish a bilateral dialogue on 
Belarus.  However, the Russians simply dismiss the issue as 
"interference in Belarusian domestic affairs" and refuse to 
discuss it.  Kolecka added that there were signals that the 
Russians were looking to deepen the nature of the 
Russia-Belarus relationship, which would make such a dialogue 
all the more difficult to launch. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT.  Embassy consults extremely closely with the 
GOP on Belarus, and they have been very pro-active and 
cooperative at all levels. 
CURTIN