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| Identifier: | 05ATHENS2841 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ATHENS2841 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Athens |
| Created: | 2005-11-04 14:30:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ETTC KOMC RS GR |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS ATHENS 002841 SIPDIS PASS TO PETER DADE PM/DTCC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETTC, KOMC, RS, GR SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO BLUE LANTERN CHECK ON UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATIONS TO U.S. ARMORED VEHICLES IN GREECE REF: STATE 154415 1. (SBU) Post and ODC have completed the above referenced investigation into the modification of A.M. General HMMWV's with the Russian Kornet E ATGM missle system. The information collected has indicated that in 2001, AM General Corporation signed contract No 2001-173 with the Greek State owned Hellenic Vehicle Industry S.A. (ELBO) for the procurement of 98 incomplete vehicles, HMMWV, M1113. Said contract is titled M1113 Incomplete Vehicles for KORNET-E phase-1 Co-production program. An option to this contract was exercised in 2003 for an additional 98 each, total number procured being 196 ea. 2. (SBU) Articles 7.2 and 7.3 of the contract clearly indicate that the seller (AM General) will obtain all necessary USG licenses, permits and authorizations and/or clearances and is subject to all US laws and regulations relating to exports. The contract specifies the Buyer (ELBO) provide and sign the end-user certification and Form BXA-711 required by the US Department of Commerce. Consequently, all pertinent licenses, to include Export License No D311979 and a US Department of State export license for the KORNET ancillary parts contract were secured and the 196 each incomplete vehicles were shipped to Greece. 3. (SBU) It should be noted that Article 7.5 indicates that the defense articles procured with this contract will not be transferred to a person in a third country unless the prior written approval of the Seller and the US Department of Commerce has been obtained. 4. (SBU) In the meantime, the Hellenic MOD had signed a contract with the Israeli firm PLASAN SASA to procure 196 each HMMWV heavy armor protection kits of level 2, Stanag 4569 and a separate contract with the Russian MOD for the procurement of an equal number of KORNET-E anti-tank systems. At ELBO facility, the HMMWV vehicles were heavily armored with the PLASAN SASA kit and the KORNET-E system was mounted on a pedestal on the roof of the vehicle. Storage for additional missiles has been accommodated within the vehicle. 5. (SBU) It appears that no major modifications were made to the armored HMMWV vehicles since the KORNET-E missile launcher has been mounted on an ordinary and existing roof pedestal. The three extra KORNET containerized missiles are stored in the vehicle,s rear storage compartment. 6. (SBU) Comment. This Blue Lantern investigation was conducted with sensitivity, particularly in view of the ongoing contract negotiations between GOG and AM General for the procurement of 691 each HMMWV vehicles (301 Grenade Machine Gun Carriers and 390 Light Armored Recon). Competition from major European countries (Germany, France, and Spain) is fierce on this project and any negative comment on the HMMWV program might jeopardize the efforts of the US firm to win the contract. It took many years of hard and persistent efforts to establish the HMMWV family of vehicles in the Greek military and the future looks very promising for increased requirements. End Comment. RIES
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