US embassy cable - 05PARAMARIBO713

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REPORTED DECISION TO CLOSE USDAO PARAMARIBO

Identifier: 05PARAMARIBO713
Wikileaks: View 05PARAMARIBO713 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paramaribo
Created: 2005-11-04 11:22:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: AMGT PREL MARR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS PARAMARIBO 000713 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: AMGT, PREL, MARR 
SUBJECT: REPORTED DECISION TO CLOSE USDAO PARAMARIBO 
 
1. Although this Embassy has received no official indication 
of the Defense Department's intent to close the DAO, 
personnel of DAO have been advised informally of changes in 
TODs designed to effect the closure of the office NLT the 
end of June, 2006.  It is alleged that a decision to close 
was taken several months ago.  In the last month the Embassy 
has signed a lease on a larger house, obligating DOD funds, 
to accommodate someone whose assignment was announced, but 
whose tour is now said to have been cancelled. 
 
2. While I can appreciate the need to realign resources to 
meet changing priorities, I regret the proposed closure of 
the DAO.  The office has been a vital participant in this 
Embassy's efforts to help Suriname turn a coup-staging, drug- 
running military beholden to no one into a more professional 
organization committed to the nation's security under 
civilian leadership.  The conclusion of a long sought Status 
of Forces Agreement formalizes the progress we have made. 
The former military dictator remains a player on the 
political stage and continues to have some admirers within 
the military.  The Chinese and Venezuelans are stepping up 
their levels of engagement with Suriname's military.  In the 
absence of DAO, we will be less able to assess the role the 
military will play in Suriname.  Further, as new programs 
come on line, for example, a Yuma Proving Ground program to 
test vehicles in a tropical environment, it is unclear that 
the Embassy will be able to provide appropriate support or 
oversight in the absence of a DAO.  The other military 
presence at this small Embassy consists of a TDY officer 
filling an SAO billet, supported by a sergeant and a TDY 
officer detailed by SouthCom to support HAP and TCA 
activities. 
 
3. In order to enable post to plan, including the provision 
of notification to the Government of Suriname, it is 
imperative that the NSDD38 process be complied with 
promptly. 
 
BARNES 
 
 
NNNN 

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