US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1572

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CZECHS ON NOV 7 GAERC

Identifier: 05PRAGUE1572
Wikileaks: View 05PRAGUE1572 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Prague
Created: 2005-11-04 09:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL EZ EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001572 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EZ, EUN 
SUBJECT: CZECHS ON NOV 7 GAERC 
 
REF: A. STATE 198361 
 
     B. STATE 201513 
     C. HAVANA 21834 
 
Classified By: Poloff Sarah C. Peck for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.    (C) Summary. The Czechs support tough measures against 
Syria, Belarus, and Cuba, but do not have the full support of 
their EU partners. On Iraq, the Czechs will continue their 
mission independent of any EU mission. In the Balkans, Czechs 
support the open door policy.  However, due to enlargement 
fatigue, the EU is likely to beckon new candidates with one 
hand, while gently holding them back with the other. On a 
separate note, the Czechs urged Washington to make GAERC 
demarches more effective by delivering them to EU member 
states at least a week earlier in the process. End summary. 
 
2.    (C) Pol-Econ Chief and Poloff met on Nov. 2 with Petr 
Kaiser, Director of the Czech MFA's CFSP Department, to 
discuss the Nov 7 GAERC. They also met separately on Nov. 3 
with Miloslav Stasek, Director of the MFA Middle East and 
Africa Department, and Edita Hrda, Director of the MFA 
Americas Desk. As summarized below, the discussion primarily 
focused on the Middle East, Belarus, the Balkans, Cuba, and 
the China arms embargo. 
 
--------------- 
The Middle East 
--------------- 
 
3.    (C) On Iraq, Kaiser said the FMs will discuss how the 
EU should support the current mission there. Kaiser predicted 
EU involvement will be limited to capacity building, rather 
than to military operations. He confirmed the Czechs will 
continue their current efforts in Iraq independent of an EU 
mission. With respect to timing, Kaiser said some EU 
countries think any EU commitment must wait until after the 
election of the new Iraqi government. The Czechs agree, but 
nevertheless think it is necessary to prepare in advance of 
the election. He noted the Czechs would welcome suggestions 
from the U.S. on possible EU missions. (Separately, Stasek 
noted that FM Svoboda is planning to visit Iraq early next 
year, after the December elections.) 
 
4.    (C) On Syria, Kaiser expects the FMs will agree (as do 
the Czechs) that Syria must cooperate on the investigation 
into the assassination of former PM Hariri, and that the 
international community should not engage with Syria until it 
does so. However, on the question of Syria,s invitation to 
the Barcelona Anniversary Summit, Kaiser said the EU will not 
agree to withdraw the invitation because it would not be 
feasible in light of the complicated rules of the EU (an 
opinion shared by Stasek). 
 
5.    (C) On the Middle East peace process, the EU has a 
concrete proposal to provide training for both Israeli and 
Palestinian police (COPPS). The focus is security 
enhancement, and Kaiser felt the proposal would have traction 
within the EU. 
 
------- 
Belarus 
------- 
 
6.    (C) Turning to Belarus, Kaiser said the Czechs raised 
at the EU working group the U.S. proposal that the EU should 
tell Lukashenko not to run in the presidential election. 
However, the Czech Republic was the only country in support 
of the proposal. The Czechs also support political 
&sanctions8 for Belarus, such as denying visas for senior 
GOB officials. 
 
7.    (C) Kaiser said the Czechs want the EU to find a way to 
provide EU funding to civil society in Belarus (and not just 
through GOB channels) so that opposition groups can actually 
benefit. In line with this view, the Czechs will urge the EU 
to invite Belarusian opposition leader, Alexandr 
Milinkievich, to Brussels to explain what he needs. According 
to the Czechs, it is important for the EU to signal to 
opposition leaders that they have not been forgotten. 
 
----------- 
The Balkans 
----------- 
 
8.    (C) On Macedonia, Kaiser said the EU is likely to try 
to slow the integration process for two reasons: enlargement 
fatigue, and Greek opposition.  Any efforts made will be in 
the broader context of Serbia and Croatia integration.  The 
FMs will focus on fostering stability in the region. 
 
9.    (C) The status of Kosovo is still on the table. The EU 
focus is on meeting standards first, then on status. Because 
Kosovo has not fully realized its goals for reform (although 
there has been progress), the question of status is 
premature. Therefore, the EU will continue to pressure Kosovo 
to meet the standards. Kaiser also acknowledged that the 
question of status is not just an EU question -- the 
international community, including the U.S., will need to be 
involved. Regarding this last point, Kaiser emphasized the 
importance of the international community working closely 
with Belgrade, as any change in Kosovo,s status will be 
viewed as a loss. 
 
10.   (C) Kaiser said Croatia remains a &hard issue8 that 
is still being considered by the EU.  Kaiser noted that the 
EU,s general language of support for Croatia integration is 
a far cry from the concrete language on requirements that 
need to be met. He also said the Austrians, not the Czechs, 
pushed for Croatia at the Oct 3 GAERC meeting. 
 
11.   (C) On EU enlargement generally, Kaiser said the Czechs 
(as a new member state) will continue to support the open 
door policy, so long at the candidate country in question 
fulfills all conditions set. 
 
---- 
Cuba 
---- 
 
12.   (C) Kaiser said, and Hrda confirmed, that the Czechs 
are angry with the GOC over the National Day incident in 
Havana (reftel C). On November 1, 2005, the Czech MFA called 
the Cuban Charge d,Affaires in to denounce the actions taken 
by Cuban authorities. Czechs plan to ask the EU to take 
action against the GOC under the EU solidarity clause. Kaiser 
said Deputy FM Mueller (sitting in for FM Svoboda) will raise 
the issue at the FM lunch on Monday, Nov. 7, because it was 
too late to get the issue into the GAERC conclusion. Hrda 
said the Czechs will raise the issue formally at the next 
GAERC meeting, and are planning to take further action 
against Cuba at the EU level, bilaterally, and in Havana 
(further details septel). 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
The Czechs suggest delivering GAERC demarches earlier 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
13.   (SBU) Kaiser said the Czechs appreciate receiving U.S. 
demarches on upcoming GAERC meetings. Unfortunately, the 
demarches arrive after the work of the EU working groups has 
been completed. Because these groups conclude their work two 
weeks before the GAERC meeting, he said that, for maximum 
effect, the U.S. should send its demarches at least three 
weeks prior to the date of the GAERC meeting (and posts 
should, of course, deliver them promptly). 
CABANISS 

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