US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1571

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CZECH-CUBA CONFLICT IS HEATING UP

Identifier: 05PRAGUE1571
Wikileaks: View 05PRAGUE1571 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Prague
Created: 2005-11-04 09:00:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PHUM PREL SOCI CU EZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T PRAGUE 001571 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR CALEB C. MCCARRY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2015 
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, SOCI, CU, EZ 
SUBJECT: CZECH-CUBA CONFLICT IS HEATING UP 
 
REF: A. HAVANA 21834 
 
     B. PRAGUE 01560 
 
Classified By: Poloff Sarah C. Peck for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.   (U) Action request at paragraph 5. 
 
2.    (S) Summary. The Czechs are concerned they will lose 
their mission in Cuba as part of the fall-out from the Czech 
National Day incident in Havana (ref A). They are therefore 
trying to use the incident to rally EU support at the Nov 7 
GAERC, and are looking for ways to increase pressure on the 
Castro regime without endangering their mission. To help them 
form an effective strategy, they have asked the U.S. to share 
intelligence on the importance to the GOC of the Cuban 
mission in Prague. End summary. 
 
3.    (S) Pol-Econ Chief and Poloff met on Nov. 3 with Edita 
Hrda, Director of the Czech MFA Americas Desk, to get an 
update on the Czech National Day incident in Cuba. Hrda 
confided that the Castro regime delivered two dip notes that 
caused the Czechs to fear that the GOC may expel the Czech 
political officer now in Havana, or worse, close the mission 
(among the Cuban complaints was the extensive schedule of 
meetings that U.S. Coordinator for Cuban Transition Caleb 
McCarry had in Prague, ref B). The Czechs have planned an 
internal strategy session next week to discuss possible 
actions against Cuba at the EU level, bilaterally, and in 
Havana. As part of this planning, the Czechs feel they need 
to determine how far they can push back without endangering 
their mission. Central to this assessment is a better sense 
of how important the Cuban Mission in Prague is to the Cuban 
government. Accordingly, Hrda asked if the USG had available 
any intelligence or other information on this question that 
we could share with the MFA. 
 
4.    (C) The Czechs are also trying to rally support in the 
EU. For example, the Czechs will explain the incident over 
lunch at the Nov 7 GAERC meeting. They hope that an EU 
statement condemning GOC actions will be possible at the 
December GAERC.  In addition, on Nov 8 the Czechs will 
request the COLAT working group to evaluate human rights 
abuses in Cuba. And, of course, Czechs will continue to push 
for a common EU-Cuba policy that recognizes political 
dissidents and provides sanctions for senior officials of the 
Castro regime, although Hrda was not optimistic that there 
would be any changes in the EU common position before next 
summer. Historically, most EU countries have not supported 
the Czech positions on Cuba.  However, the Czechs expect 
support from the Danes, and hope the new governments in 
Germany and Poland will be supportive as well. 
 
5.    (S) Comment. Some EU countries may accuse the Czechs of 
over-reacting to the Czech National Day incident. However, 
the Czechs stand to lose more than a hotel reservation. The 
GOC has sent signals that cause the Czechs to fear they will 
lose their Cuban mission. The loss of this mission would make 
it harder (if not impossible) for the GOCR and the Czech NGO 
People in Need to provide critical support to the Cuban 
people, and therefore would undermine important U.S. policy 
objectives. Post recommends providing the assistance 
requested by the Czechs, including sharing intelligence (to 
the extent it exists), and urging EU partners, in particular 
Germany, Poland, Denmark, Slovak Republic, and the Baltic 
states (see reftel B), to support the Czech EU proposals. 
 
CABANISS 

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