US embassy cable - 02AMMAN6823

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 006823 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ASEC, PTER, JO 
SUBJECT: USE OF FORCE IN MA'AN ASSERTS GOJ AUTHORITY, BUT 
LEAVES A BAD TASTE 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 6535 
     B. AMMAN 6650 
 
Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
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MA'AN OPERATION ONLY A PARTIAL SUCCESS... 
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1.  (S)  The winding down but not quite completed security 
operation in Ma'an against Islamic militant leader Mohammed 
Shalibi (aka Abu Sayyaf - refs) has been a decidedly 
unsatisfying operation from the standpoint of most 
Jordanians.  For the government and its staunch supporters, 
the week-long operation clearly demonstrated government 
resolve not to permit an armed group to challenge its 
authority, led to the confiscation of some explosives and 
heavy weapons, and broke up a group that might have used 
them.  It may in the short term reduce the incidents of 
gangsterism committed by Abu Sayyaf's group in Ma'an, acts 
often carried out in the name of an extremist Islam at odds 
with the moderate beliefs of most Jordanians (although 
tolerated by most Ma'anis).  However, the operation did not 
lead to the arrest of Abu Sayyaf, and netted only a few of 
his supporters.  It also cost at least five lives, two of the 
dead policemen involved in the operation.  Some young members 
of the dead policemen's tribe allegedly blamed the government 
for putting their kinsmen into a dangerous situation, and 
attacked a police station in a village near the city of 
Kerak.  (Leaders of the tribe subsequently declared the 
policemen martyrs and reaffirmed the tribe's loyalty to King 
and country).  Perhaps most seriously, the militants killed 
in the operation could become martyrs. 
 
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... AND LEAVES A BAD TASTE 
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2.  (S)  From the standpoint of the citizens of Ma'an, a 
semblance of order has been restored, and an armed group that 
had previously attacked a police station, taken over the 
hospital, and vandalized the women's dormitory at the local 
university has at least been pushed into hiding.  In 
addition, a November 17 visit to Ma'an of five Ministers, and 
the announcement of a modest increase in money for Ma'an 
development projects, indicates that the city could get 
greater government attention and support.  (The announced 
program amounts to quick fixes, but longer-term projects in 
the planning stages, such as irrigation and waste disposal, 
may help over time.  The government has not shown much 
interest, though, in addressing the Ma'anis' firm conviction 
that they are not getting their fair share of water.) 
 
3.  (S)  However, Ma'anis were forced to endure a week of 
siege, closed schools and businesses, and house to house 
searches.  Furthermore, contacts in Ma'an indicate that many 
in the city consider Abu Sayyaf -- a former government Imam 
who was fired because of his fiery mosque sermons -- to be a 
devout Muslim who incurred the wrath of the government by 
publicizing official corruption.  Foreign correspondents who 
were taken into Ma'an earlier this week -- as well as embassy 
contacts with connections to Ma'an -- report many expressions 
of local anger over the government's use of force.  Outside 
of Ma'an, many Jordanians question the timing of the 
operation, variously tying the raid to a perceived need to 
show the U.S. that the GOJ is moving against Islamic 
militants, working hard to catch the killers of Larry Foley, 
or demonstrating that it will not tolerate public disorder as 
violence in the West Bank escalates and a war in Iraq looms. 
 
 
4.  (S)  Many contacts applaud the government's goal in Ma'an 
-- getting rid of an armed band that thought itself above the 
law -- but fault its tactics.  The Ma'an and Amman rumor 
mills are rife with unflattering (and unconfirmed) stories of 
bad conduct by police and security forces during the Ma'an 
operation.  Families of arrested militants have accused 
security forces of looting their houses of jewelry and other 
valuables during the searches.  "Eyewitnesses" from Ma'an 
swear that they saw Jordanian army helicopters firing 
missiles into houses held by militants.  Even though this 
allegation is probably not true, it conjures up for most 
Jordanians images of Israeli helicopters attacking 
Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza.  That a 
significant number of Jordanians are describing the Ma'an 
operation in these terms should be of concern to the 
government. 
 
5.  (S)  We note that, despite these widespread but vague 
rumors of excesses, we have not heard allegations that 
non-militants were targeted, injured or killed.  One 
independent observer who was allowed to tour the city freely 
on November 18 scoffed at rumors of "war damage" to Ma'an. 
He found evidence of gunfights, but nothing to support the 
stories about widespread destruction, much less government 
use of missiles or heavy weapons.  Although press reports 
indicate that the government has referred sixty-six 
individuals rounded up in Ma'an to the State Security Court 
for possible prosecution, the government quickly released a 
number of others -- including non-Jordanians -- who had no 
connection to Abu Sayyaf.  The short detention of the local 
correspondent for al-Jazeera and one of his relatives may 
have contributed to the largely negative coverage of events 
in Ma'an on the pan-Arab media. 
 
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DID THE GOJ HAVE ANY OTHER CHOICE? 
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6.  (S)  Several GOJ officials have argued to us that the 
resort to force in Ma'an was certainly not ideal, but was 
forced on the government by the militants.  Abu Sayyaf and 
his group posed a direct and armed challenge to government 
authority in Ma'an -- the group possessed heavy weapons and 
explosives, engaged in a gun battle with police to gain Abu 
Sayyaf's release, commandeered a local hospital at gunpoint 
to secure him medical treatment, and Abu Sayyaf made public 
statements that he would not submit to the illegitimate 
government authorities without a fight.  With a well-armed 
and defiant Abu Sayyaf gang essentially running free in 
Ma'an, the government was put in the unenviable position of 
having to consider the use of force against some of its own 
citizens.  Abu Sayyaf's direct public challenge to royal 
authority -- a slap at the honor of the King -- virtually 
assured that the government would take some action. 
 
7.  (S)  Jordanians outside of Ma'an express little sympathy 
for Abu Sayyaf's Islamic militants, and the militants' 
message of armed resistance to the government does not seem 
to be resonating in other parts of the country.  Most 
recognize that they were an armed gang that had challenged 
governmental authority and Jordan's stability. 
 
8.  (S)  Conversely, however, most Jordanians are not 
comfortable with the government's use of force.  Many 
Jordanians would have preferred that the government put more 
time and energy into pressing local leaders to come up with a 
proper "tribal" solution, one that would have resulted in a 
reaffirmation of government authority, and custody and trial 
of Abu Sayyaf and his lieutenants, but would have avoided 
laying siege to Ma'an.  Several sources indicate that the 
anger of many Ma'anis is being specifically directed against 
the King by name -- a likely formula for further trouble, 
since the security forces will not stand for open disloyalty. 
 However, since the message of the militants is not spreading 
outside of Ma'an, Jordanians are likely to see this episode 
-- like bread and gas price riots in 1989 and 1996 -- as just 
another sad chapter in the history of Jordan's most 
politically volatile city. 
GNEHM