US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4512

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FADILA PARTY MAKES ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO RUN ON ITS OWN

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD4512
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD4512 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-11-03 18:38:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KDEM IZ Fadhila party Shia Islamists Elections
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004512 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, IZ, Fadhila party, Shia Islamists, Elections 
SUBJECT: FADILA PARTY MAKES ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO RUN ON ITS 
OWN 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 4481 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 ( 
B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Fadila Party approached the 
Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) 
November 2 in an effort to break with the Shia 
Islamist United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) coalition.  After 
the Commissioners declined the request, a Fadila Party 
spokesman announced that his party would remain an 
unwilling member of the UIA.  IECI's international 
electoral advisors noted that granting Fadila's 
request would likely lead to a delay in the December 
15 election due to the ballot production timeline. 
END SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) Five days after the coalition and candidate 
list registration deadline, Fadila Party Spokesman 
Hassan al-Shamari met with IECI Commissioners to 
request permission for his party to break with the 
Shia Islamist UIA coalition and run on its own. 
According to the IECI's international advisors, the 
Commissioners unanimously replied that they could not 
grant an exception to the October 28 deadline for 
coalition and candidate registration.  The 
Commissioners reportedly told Shamari that he was 
welcome to resubmit his request in writing.  However, 
the Commissioners subsequently told international 
electoral advisors that they had made this suggestion 
out of politeness, with no intention of reconsidering 
their position. (NOTE: The Commissioners appear to 
have relied on section 4.7 of IECI regulation number 
6, which states, "no political entity may withdraw 
from a coalition after the period set to present lists 
of candidates.") 
 
3. (C) Upon hearing reports of Fadila's request and 
the IECI's response, post contacted party members who 
confirmed their unhappiness with their share of seats 
on the coalition candidate list.  They also claimed 
unhappiness with public statements by Muqtada al-Sadr 
distancing himself from the coalition.  They said he 
thereby reneged on an understanding reached during 
negotiations over the coalition.  The Fadila members 
said they had joined the coalition -- and accepted 
less than their share of seats in the process -- in 
order to preserve the unity of the Sadrist trend, of 
which they are a part. 
 
4. (C) U.S. and UK Pol and Legal officers also 
discussed the matter with International Commissioner 
Jenness and other international electoral advisors. 
Jenness and his colleagues acknowledged that allowing 
Fadila to run on its own would be consistent with the 
principles of electoral pluralism.  At the same time, 
the international team said that the printing process 
for the ballots is due to start within days and that 
an IECI decision to grant the Fadila request would 
almost certainly lead to a delay of the December 15 
election. 
 
5. (C) At a press conference held after his meeting 
with the IECI, al-Shamari said that he had concluded 
that the technical obstacles to a split with the 
coalition were insurmountable and, as a result, the 
party "had no choice but to remain part of the Unified 
Iraqi Coalition's list, but unwillingly." 
 
6. (C) COMMENT: In light of Shamari's statement, we do 
not expect the Fadila Party to press this matter 
further with the IECI.  As of midday November 3, 
Jenness reported no further contact from the party on 
this issue.  Jenness (protect) said that the 
combination of a written request from the Fadila 
leadership and public support from senior politicians 
might break the unanimity of the Commission's 
opposition to the Fadila request.  However, he told us 
that he had pressed his staff on the ballot production 
timeline and was confident that allowing Fadila to run 
alone at this late stage would result in a delayed 
election.   Assuming that Fadila remains with the 
other Shia Islamist parties, this episode reaffirms 
our view that the UIA will remain a fractious 
alliance, and likely become even more so after the 
December election.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
Satterfield 

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