US embassy cable - 05PARIS7521

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL, FR, EAID, BO, KPAL, IZ, SY, YI, EAGR, MK, ETRD, EUN 
SUBJECT: FRENCH REACTION TO DEMARCHE FOR EU GAERC 
 
REF: A. STATE 198361 
 
     B. STATE 201513 
 
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1.  (SBU) Deputy Political Minister-Counselor met November 3 
with MFA Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP unit deputy 
director Pascal Le Deunff to receive an informed French 
reaction to ref A and B demarches for the November 7 meeting 
of EU foreign ministers.  The points were also shared with 
European Directorate DAS-equivalent Caroline Ferrari.  Le 
Deunff limited his remarks to foreign policy issues within 
his brief. 
 
2.  (C) Balkans:  Le Deunff said new UN envoy Martti 
Ahtissari would join the lunch and saw general agreement 
among Contact Group countries on policy guidelines toward 
Kosovo, notwithstanding some remaining Russian reservations. 
Noting that Ahtissari would have only a single deputy (i.e., 
no NATO or EU deputy), Le Deunff commented that EU-Ahtissari 
coordination still needed to be worked out.  France was in 
favor of allowing him enough flexibility to negotiate; at the 
same time, he would have to take note of EU positions.  Given 
the important incentive represented by European integration, 
the EU would insist on being involved; there would be "no 
repetition of Aceh," where Ahtissari acted independently. 
Asked about Serbia, Le Deunff said EU integration was also an 
important incentive in dealing with Belgrade; like Russia, 
France also hoped to use its traditionally good relations 
with Serbia to advance the final status process. 
 
3.  (C) Iran:  Le Deunff said France saw a need for continued 
firmness on the nuclear issue, human rights, Israel (in light 
of the Iranian President's recent statements), and the Middle 
East Peace Process (not further specified).  The GOF still 
hoped Iran would re-engage in negotiations and saw the 
upcoming November 24 IAEA BOG meeting as the next milepost. 
The GOF, he said, was not yet prepared to refer Iran to the 
UNSC, although it believed it was important to keep up the 
pressure on Iran and give Iran the sense that UNSC referral 
was approaching. 
 
4.  (C) Syria-Lebanon:  Le Deunff said the EU's conclusions 
document on the Mehlis report and next steps was still under 
discussion.  France wished to maintain pressure on Syria to 
cooperate in the investigation of the Hariri assassination. 
Le Deunff was emphatic that France would focus in Brussels on 
the Mehlis investigation and restoration of Lebanese 
sovereignty, and not Syria's role with respect to terrorist 
infiltration into Iraq.  That said, France would not object 
to a general call for Syrian cooperation with its neighbors. 
(Note: UK Embassy counterparts informed us that the French EU 
delegation in Brussels has objected to any mention of Iraq or 
Syrian support for Palestinian rejectionists in the Syria 
portion of the draft November 7 GAERC declaration.  End 
note.) Asked about the UK invitation to President Asad to 
attend the Barcelona summit (see also para 5 on Iraq), Le 
Deunff said Syrian participation was "legitimate" and that 
Asad therefore could not be disinvited, even if he was not 
welcome.  Moreover, at this juncture there were no UN 
sanctions being imposed on Syria, which should not be equated 
with Burma or Zimbabwe.  Chirac would not seek a meeting with 
Asad, but Le Deunff conjectured that, if Asad sought contact 
with him, Chirac would speak frankly. 
 
5.  (C) Iraq:  Le Deunff did not expect much discussion 
beyond a general welcoming of the results of the 
constitutional referendum and a reiteration of EU programs to 
support stabilization and reconstruction, including JUSTLEX. 
Asked whether EU election monitoring for the December 15 
elections was under consideration, Le Deunff said the 
security situation would rule out it out (as with the 
referendum).  Le Deunff expressed France's extreme 
displeasure over the UK Presidency's decision to invite the 
Iraqi FM to attend the Barcelona Summit as an observer, given 
that Iraq was not part of the Barcelona process or the 
Mediterranean.  France, he said, planned to take up with the 
British at the GAERC. 
 
6.  (C) MEPP:  Le Deunff stressed EU efforts to support 
Wolfensohn and Ward and to help the Palestinians "take 
control of the street," to which France favored reinforcing 
the UK-led EU policing mission beginning January 1 with an 
additional 30 experts.  The EU hoped to assist the 
Palestinians in reorganizing their security apparatus.  Le 
Deunff said the EU was also preparing a support mission for 
the Gaza-Egypt border at Rafah, with which he said Israel 
agreed in principle.  He emphasized that the EU's role should 
go beyond mere observation or monitoring to include a 
third-party "good offices" dimension that would allow the EU 
to serve as a mediator if necessary.  Discussions with the 
Israelis and Palestinians, he said, would begin starting 
November 7. 
7.  (C) Belarus:  Le Deunff said the EU would warn Lukashenko 
against human rights abuses in advance of the 2006 elections. 
 He said the EU was prepared to move to additional sanctions; 
nothing was specifically under consideration, but nor was 
anything specifically excluded.  The EU, he said, would 
support an OSCE observation mission for the elections.  He 
expressed satisfaction that the existence of an opposition 
candidate and said the EU would continue to work with the 
U.S. and Russia toward finding the best possible outcome. 
Asked specifically about the idea of not recognizing 
Lukashenko's election, Le Deunff did not exclude the 
possibility but thought such action premature; France 
preferred to see how things went at the time of the elections. 
 
8.  (C) CFSP:  Deputy PolCouns asked whether Le Deunff 
sensed, in the wake of French and Dutch rejection of the EU 
constitutional treaty, an increased EU emphasis on using CFSP 
and ESDP to advance European integration.  Le Deunff 
responded that this was definitely the case and that the 
French and Dutch had not voted against CFSP or ESDP.  He 
cited European polls that showed that most Europeans wanted 
the EU to have a larger role on the international stage.  He 
cited two obstacles that needed to be overcome in the 
immediate future, one institutional and the other financial. 
On the first, France was interested in finding new ways to 
reinforce Solana's position within the existing treaties.  On 
the second, CFSP currently had a budget of only 60 million 
euros, which needed to be raised to about 300 million.  Le 
Deunff claimed that ministers at the EU informal summit at 
Hampton Court had approved a larger role for Solana, and had 
responded positively to Solana's call for an increased budget. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
Stapleton