US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4511

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

TALABANI VIEWS ON SITUATION IN SYRIA

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD4511
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD4511 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-11-03 15:05:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL SY LE IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, IZ 
SUBJECT: TALABANI VIEWS ON SITUATION IN SYRIA 
 
REF: DAMASCUS 5499 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David M. Satterfield, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) On October 31 (other topics septels), President 
Jalal Talabani commented to Charge that the SARG had 
been sending emissaries to make its case to foreign 
governments since the issuance of the Mehlis report. 
(Note:  Indeed, on several occasions prior to the 
report, Talabani has noted to us "private contacts" 
via intermediaries with the SARG, all proffering 
progress on Iraq-related issues in exchange for a 
Talabani or other senior level Iraqi visit to 
Damascus.  End Note.)  Charge underscored the gravity 
of the information in the report, including direct 
charges of Syrian regime obstruction of justice, and 
cautioned strongly against acceptance of any Syrian 
overtures.  Damascus should be isolated, Charge 
emphasized, until it complied with the will of the 
international community on Mehlis and on other issues. 
Talabani assured that he had no intention of 
responding to any Syrian approaches. 
 
2. (C) Talabani told Charge that he had in fact read 
the Mehlis report.  He expressed amazement that 
President Bashar al-Asad had threatened Rafik Hariri, 
having said: "I will break Lebanon on your head and 
Jumblatt's head."  (Charge recounted that Hariri had 
called him shortly after that meeting, deeply upset, 
to recount the Asad threat.)  Talabani said he knew 
from his own contacts that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt 
had been against re-appointing Lebanese President 
Emile Lahoud, as had been the late Syrian Interior 
Minister Ghazi Kanaan.  It was unlikely, Talabani 
thought, that Kanaan had wanted Hariri assassinated, 
but noted that the inner workings of the Alawite 
ruling clique were very difficult to discern. 
 
3. (C) Talabani asserted that the Damascus Statement 
(reftel) had helped publicly weaken the SARG and that, 
with former Syrian COS Hikmat Shahabi and former VP 
Khaddam now in Paris, the Syrian opposition had an 
opportunity to demand President al-Asad's resignation. 
With major players gone from the SARG ranks, the might 
of the Alawites (Bashar's family and the old guard) 
had diminished. 
 
4. (C) On the Kurdish front, Talabani reported that 
the SARG recently gave Syrian citizenship to 250,000 
Kurds, allowing them the right to vote in future 
elections.  With two million Kurds living in Syria, 
they could play a more active role. Talabani added 
that the Kurds were well organized and were reaching 
out to moderate Sunni elements in an effort to provide 
an "alternative" to the current Syrian regime.  The 
extension of Syrian citizenship to formerly stateless 
Kurds would enable the community to act "as Syrians, 
not as Kurds or Iraqis." 
 
Satterfield 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04