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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD4511 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD4511 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-11-03 15:05:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL SY LE IZ |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004511 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, IZ SUBJECT: TALABANI VIEWS ON SITUATION IN SYRIA REF: DAMASCUS 5499 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David M. Satterfield, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) On October 31 (other topics septels), President Jalal Talabani commented to Charge that the SARG had been sending emissaries to make its case to foreign governments since the issuance of the Mehlis report. (Note: Indeed, on several occasions prior to the report, Talabani has noted to us "private contacts" via intermediaries with the SARG, all proffering progress on Iraq-related issues in exchange for a Talabani or other senior level Iraqi visit to Damascus. End Note.) Charge underscored the gravity of the information in the report, including direct charges of Syrian regime obstruction of justice, and cautioned strongly against acceptance of any Syrian overtures. Damascus should be isolated, Charge emphasized, until it complied with the will of the international community on Mehlis and on other issues. Talabani assured that he had no intention of responding to any Syrian approaches. 2. (C) Talabani told Charge that he had in fact read the Mehlis report. He expressed amazement that President Bashar al-Asad had threatened Rafik Hariri, having said: "I will break Lebanon on your head and Jumblatt's head." (Charge recounted that Hariri had called him shortly after that meeting, deeply upset, to recount the Asad threat.) Talabani said he knew from his own contacts that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt had been against re-appointing Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, as had been the late Syrian Interior Minister Ghazi Kanaan. It was unlikely, Talabani thought, that Kanaan had wanted Hariri assassinated, but noted that the inner workings of the Alawite ruling clique were very difficult to discern. 3. (C) Talabani asserted that the Damascus Statement (reftel) had helped publicly weaken the SARG and that, with former Syrian COS Hikmat Shahabi and former VP Khaddam now in Paris, the Syrian opposition had an opportunity to demand President al-Asad's resignation. With major players gone from the SARG ranks, the might of the Alawites (Bashar's family and the old guard) had diminished. 4. (C) On the Kurdish front, Talabani reported that the SARG recently gave Syrian citizenship to 250,000 Kurds, allowing them the right to vote in future elections. With two million Kurds living in Syria, they could play a more active role. Talabani added that the Kurds were well organized and were reaching out to moderate Sunni elements in an effort to provide an "alternative" to the current Syrian regime. The extension of Syrian citizenship to formerly stateless Kurds would enable the community to act "as Syrians, not as Kurds or Iraqis." Satterfield
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