US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1831

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001831 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, KPKO, CG 
SUBJECT: NORTH KIVU 5TH BRIGADE OPERATIONS: A STEP FORWARD 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1814 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Reftel reported a new military operation launched 
October 31 in North Kivu province in the area in and around 
Virunga Park, primarily targeting rebellious Mai Mai units 
and Rwandan FDLR.  The operation is significant in that it 
represents the first involving a FARDC integrated brigade in 
either North or South Kivu, the first ostensibly led by FARDC 
units (with MONUC support), and the first FARDC/MONUC 
coordinated operation of significant scale in North Kivu 
targeting "negative forces."  As such, therefore, it is a 
welcome development and represents the kind of operation the 
International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) 
and others have long been encouraging in the Kivu provinces. 
It is our understanding that MONUC, specifically the North 
Kivu MONUC Indian Brigade, provided the new FARDC 5th 
Integrated Brigade with additional training in preparation 
for this operation, complementing Brigade training received 
as part of the transition military integration process.  We 
are informed that the general plan is to leave elements of 
the 5th Brigade stationed in the cleared area(s) to block 
reuse of the area by negative forces in the future following 
the planned two-week operation.  The operation enjoys the 
apparent support of Governor Serufuli, a kingpin in any 
developments in North Kivu province. 
 
2. (C) This operation has its limits, however.  Even if the 
5th Integrated Brigade has better military combat capability 
than non-integrated FARDC units, it is clear that the FARDC 
has clear limits in what it can do.  It is a given that the 
FARDC needs substantial external logistics support to sustain 
any kind of operation, and information regarding the North 
Kivu operation confirms that MONUC is providing major support 
to the FARDC brigade.  It is a safe assumption that MONUC 
also was heavily involved, if not taking the lead, in doing 
the operational planning.  It is also the 5th Brigade's first 
exposure to active operations.  Primarily composed of former 
MLC, RCD-Goma, and "ex-government" forces, the current 
operation is a testing ground for how well the new integrated 
force can function. 
 
3. (C) In theory, the GDRC and the FARDC have unlimited 
authority within Congolese territory.  In other words, the 
FARDC has full authority to engage hostile forces, drive 
foreign forces (i.e., FDLR) across the border, or forcibly 
disarm anyone the Brigade encounters.   The Eighth  Military 
District Commander, General Amisi, announced that the intent 
of the operation is to "evict negative forces" from the 
operation area.  In practice, we think the net effect, 
certainly in this initial operation, may be less than these 
facts suggest.  Given the newness of the Brigade, the 
limitations of FARDC capabilities, and the pattern in South 
Kivu of FDLR militia avoiding open confrontations with 
coordinated MONUC/FARDC forces, we doubt we will see major 
combat, at least initially, nor large numbers of disarmed 
hostiles.  Thus far, we understand that roughly 12 or so FDLR 
prisoners have been captured, and we have no reports of 
casualties at this point which would tend to reinforce this 
impression.  (Note: There have been a number of Mai Mai and 
some FARDC troops reported killed in a nearby operation that 
freed some kidnapped Election Commission workers, being 
reported septel.  It should also be noted that there is often 
a lag in receipt of casualty figures in Kinshasa.  End note). 
 
4. (C) Some FDLR prisoners captured last week in South Kivu 
were turned over to MONUC for DDRRR processing, i.e., 
voluntary repatriation.  We understand that the FDLR captured 
in North Kivu will be similarly processed.  The South Kivu 
FDLR, however, reportedly refused to return to Rwanda and 
were thus given back to the FARDC.  Similar results may be 
seen with FDLR prisoners captured in North Kivu.  It is not 
yet clear what the GDRC will do with its FDLR prisoners who 
resist repatriation.   Forcible repatriation is an option for 
the Congolese, but they may opt to try to use the prisoners 
for some kind of negotiations, seek resettlement in a third 
country, or simply hold the prisoners indefinitely, although 
limited GDRC resources would make this problematic.  Given 
the diffuse nature of Transition government authority, the 
GDRC is likely to find it difficult to reach a decision what 
to do with those refusing repatriation, and we doubt any firm 
decisions have been taken yet. 
 
5. (C) Initial reports suggest that FDLR and/or Mai Mai 
forces are generally retreating in front of the FARDC force, 
with conflicting reports as to the direction retreating 
forces are taking.  Rumors are rampant in Goma that the 
renewed military operations represent new activity by 
dissident (and wanted) General Nkunda, provoking increasing 
tension and fear.  In fact, Nkunda although likely in North 
Kivu, does not seem at this point to be a factor, and we do 
not believe he has much of a force available to him even if 
he desired to be involved. 
 
6. (C) We believe that this operation probably represents the 
first in a series to be coordinated with MONUC, similar to 
patterns seen in MONUC-led activities in Ituri District and 
South Kivu.  The ideal scenario would be that the 5th 
Integrated Brigade forces become more aggressive and 
effective as they gain experience and confidence, making 
significant inroads against FDLR and other negative forces in 
the province.  We believe more likely, however, at least in 
the short to medium term, a disruption of heretofore 
reasonably secure logistics and base structures utilized by 
negative forces, with neither large-scale casualties nor 
large numbers of captured prisoners, especially if the FDLR 
and/or Mai Mai avoid open confrontations.  Deployment of 5th 
Brigade elements will also probably preclude &normal8 
undisturbed use of cleared territory by negative forces, but 
given the size of the territory (note: North Kivu is about 
the size of Rwanda and Burundi combined) and FARDC 
limitations, we believe it unrealistic to believe that a 
total denial of use of these zones by FDLR or other negative 
forces can be achieved, at least in the short-term or absent 
additional capable forces.  It is also conceivable that FDLR 
or Mai Mai could launch raids in the area against the 
civilian population in retaliation for the new operations 
targeting them, which is a long-standing problem in the 
region. 
 
7. (C) The problem of confronting Rwandan Hutu extremists in 
eastern DRC has been around since 1994 without any adequate 
solution.  While the number of ex-FAR/Interahamwe/FDLR 
combatants is certainly reduced from that of the late 
1990,s, they still represent a significant force, with total 
combatant strength in the two Kivus generally estimated at 
around 8 - 10 thousand.  The new 5th Integrated Brigade 
operation does not represent a definitive solution to the 
problem.  Clearly, the Brigade bolstered by a capable African 
or other force working in tandem would substantially add to 
the military pressure being exerted on negative forces in the 
area.  The new operation, however, does represent a 
qualitatively new and needed element, a start to adding a 
FARDC capability to the region that was previously lacking. 
It does step up the pressure, but is unlikely to be 
sufficiently compelling to produce a "tipping point" leading 
to large-scale FDLR disarmament or repatriations, at least in 
the near-term.  More deployments of integrated Brigades to 
North and South Kivu as well as Ituri District, a part of the 
strategic integration plan, will obviously further add to the 
pressure and options available.  We will continue to press, 
along with international partners who are financing and 
conducting FARDC integration training and equipment programs, 
for further timely progress.  This is, however, not a 
short-term, nor a quick and cheap process. 
 
8. (C) The Embassy will continue to monitor closely and 
report developments in the North Kivu operation and in the 
eastern region, and will provide updated analysis as 
appropriate. 
 
MEECE