US embassy cable - 05HARARE1508

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MDC TALKS INCONCLUSIVE; SPLIT LOOMING?

Identifier: 05HARARE1508
Wikileaks: View 05HARARE1508 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2005-11-03 13:17:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV ASEC SOCI ELAB PHUM PREL ZI MDC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, SOCI, ELAB, PHUM, PREL, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC TALKS INCONCLUSIVE; SPLIT LOOMING? 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Brian Raftopolous, mediator in the opposition MDC's 
efforts to bridge the schism in the party over the Senate 
elections, told poloff on November 2 Party President Morgan 
Tsvangirai had won the battle for popular support for an 
 
SIPDIS 
election boycott but that his opponents in the party 
leadership wanted an apology from him for ignoring party 
procedures and wanted him to discipline his &kitchen 
cabinet8 before agreeing to the boycott.  Raftopolous said 
he had proposed such a compromise at the end of the 
leadership,s October 27 meeting.  However, both factions had 
hardened their positions prior to the October 31 meeting and 
he was no longer optimistic that the compromise would be 
agreed upon.  A reconvened National Council meeting scheduled 
for November 5 would attempt to resolve critical differences 
but could instead result in a &separation8 that could lead 
to a later divorce.  Raftopolous added that civil society 
leaders strongly backed Tsvangirai and were working with him 
on a strategy to ramp up confrontation with the regime.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Ncube Faction's "Rule of Law" Concerns 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In a meeting at his University of Zimbabwe office, the 
UZ political science professor (who is also associated with 
the Zimbabwe Crisis Coalition and Transparency International) 
updated poloff on MDC talks he had been mediating over the 
last two weeks.  Raftopolous said the party,s Ndebele 
leadership could not stomach yielding elected seats to 
ZANU-PF and wanted to reinforce their political power in 
Matabeleland.  That said, they now realized that Tsvangirai 
had popular support on his side.  However, the Ncube faction 
was upset over Tsvangirai's breach of party procedures and 
constitution in overriding the National Council's decision to 
participate in the elections.  This "rule of law" issue was 
especially important to Ncube, a lawyer.  Raftopolous said he 
was convinced that Ncube had absolutely no pretensions to 
national political leadership or to replace Tsvangirai atop 
the party, but needed some accommodation on process concerns. 
 
 
3. (C) According to Raftopolous, most in the Ncube faction 
were still loyal to Tsvangirai but viewed the clique around 
him as unelected, self-serving individuals who exerted 
"undemocratic" influences on the party and sought to counter 
established party structures, especially the authority of the 
National Executive or "Top Six" (Tsvangirai, 
Secretary-General Ncube, VP Gibson Sibanda, Deputy Sec-Gen 
 
SIPDIS 
Gift Chimanikire, Chairman Isaac Matongo, and Treasurer 
Fletcher Dhulini-Ncube).  Tsvangirai allies most 
objectionable to the Ncube faction in this regard were Ian 
Makoni, Dennis Murira and Gandhi Mudzingwa.  Raftopolous said 
he had seen internal party files documenting allegations of 
intra-party intimidation and violence although he could not 
evaluate their veracity.  He said the documents evinced a 
possible plan by Tsvangirai supporters to oust Ncube, 
Sibanda, and Dhulini-Ncube ahead of the Party Congress. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Tsvangirai Impelled by Conviction, Leadership Imperative 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
4. (C) Raftopolous said that for his part Tsvangirai was 
convinced of the wisdom of an election boycott and had been 
taken aback by what he saw as a challenge to his leadership. 
He had been unprepared for the National Council vote against 
the boycott and perceived it as an affront to his authority. 
Intra-party criticism of "his" people and the recent meeting 
between Top Six principals and South African President Mbeki 
only fueled Tsvangirai's suspicions.  Raftopolous expressed 
concern that Tsvangirai was being advised especially poorly 
by his kitchen cabinet, who feared for their future in an 
accommodation and seemed hell-bent on ousting the Ncube 
faction. 
 
5. (C) Raftopolous said that he personally agreed with 
Tsvangirai on the participation issue as did the vast 
 
SIPDIS 
majority of the party,s rank and file.  However, a victory 
on that issue could prove to be Pyrrhic if not achieved 
properly.  Addressing "democracy/rule of law" issues 
meaningfully was essential - in part to keep the Ncube 
faction on board but, more importantly, such issues would 
continue to hamstring the party significantly if not 
corrected.  Raftopolous said he had privately pressed 
Tsvangirai on the matter and had been hopeful that Tsvangirai 
 
SIPDIS 
would be prepared to acknowledge some fault in the interest 
of keeping crucial disaffected constituencies on board and 
assuring the party's long term effectiveness. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Prospective Compromise Yielding to Re-Polarization 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6. (C) In the October 27 meeting, Raftopolous said he had 
proposed a compromise: guided by the Top Six's 
recommendations, the National Council would rescind its 
earlier vote and approve a boycott, and the President would 
acknowledge mistakes in previously bypassing party 
procedures.  All would agree to rationalize party structures 
and lines of authority in accordance with the constitution 
and party elections.  Raftopolous said Tsvangirai and Ncube 
had appeared to want a reconciliation and each side initially 
seemed inclined to accept the compromise. 
 
7. (C) However, Raftopolous said when the leadership 
reconvened on October 31, each side appeared to have hardened 
its position and no longer appeared prepared to compromise. 
As a result, he said he had ceased mediation efforts for now. 
 There was now a real possibility that the National Council 
meeting scheduled for November 5 could result in a 
&separation8 followed by a more formal "divorce" at the 
National Congress later in the year. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
MDC-Civil Society Collaboration Continues 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Raftopolous said most of civil society had sided with 
Tsvangirai in his intra-party travails, supported a boycott, 
 
SIPDIS 
and was willing to overlook procedural improprieties in favor 
of moving forward with more public action.  Tsvangirai had 
been meeting periodically with the National Constitutional 
Assembly's Lovemore Madhuku and the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Union's Wellington Chibebe and Lovemore Matombo to 
reinvigorate plans for a way forward.  Buoyed by his 
intra-party scrap and engagement with civil society, 
Tsvangirai seemed to be gaining energy to confront the regime 
 
SIPDIS 
more forcefully again. 
 
9. (C) Raftopolous said ZCTU was weak and unprepared to 
contribute meaningfully to a confrontation with the regime. 
However, the MDC and NCA, joined by resident associations and 
others in civil society, had enough wherewithal to do 
something.  He reported that the NCA had made substantial 
progress in connecting with rural populations but that urban 
centers still provided the optimal venues for public action, 
provided action was sufficiently diffuse.  Raftopolous 
concluded that the regime was increasingly concerned about a 
resurgence of public opposition. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) While there is considerable risk that personal hubris 
could lead to a real split in the MDC even though the 
principal cause of disagreement has been resolved in 
Tsvangirai's favor, we still believe that the party is going 
 
SIPDIS 
through a necessary catharsis as it struggles to define 
itself.  While there has been much hand-wringing about a 
possible MDC split being "tragic," it should be remembered 
that catharsis and the resolution of impossible tensions was 
the very point of the ancient tragedies. 
 
DELL 

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