US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4506

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004506 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2010 
TAGS: ASEC, ECON, ENRG, EPET, ETRD, EWWT, KCOR, KCRM, KHLS, MCAP, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, PTER, NATO, Energy Sector, Petrolium 
SUBJECT: ACTIONS TO ASSURE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTEGRITY 
 
REF: SECSTATE 182688 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) SUMMARY:  Failures of Iraq's critical 
energy infrastructure have reached unprecedented levels 
which are seriously hindering the Iraqi Transitional 
Government's (ITG) ability to raise desperately needed 
revenues and to deliver basic services such as electricity, 
fuel, and water to the Iraqi people.  Post has initiated a 
multi-agency Critical Infrastructure Integrity Task Force 
that has developed an enhanced infrastructure integrity 
plan (exact details SEPTEL), based on the original plan 
submitted to Washington last summer.  This cable describes 
the current status of Iraq's fragile infrastructure 
(REFTEL) and lays out the immediate steps we are taking in 
the context of this plan to fix the problem.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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CURRENT SITUATION 
----------------- 
 
2. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) Acts of sabotage against Iraq's oil 
and electricity infrastructure occur regularly.  Many of 
these attacks are low-tech, fairly inexpensive to execute, 
and relatively easy to plan.  They usually involve toppling 
electricity towers or piercing crude or refined product 
pipelines.  Such attacks further weaken Iraq's 
already-fragile infrastructure systems.  They also dampen 
public support for the ITG with continued electricity 
shortages and blackouts. 
 
3. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) As of Oct 31: 
 
- Refineries in Iraq are operating below capacity due to 
the effect of a series of blackouts (each lasting less than 
12 hours) on Oct 14, 17 and 18, as well as interruptions in 
the supply of crude oil; 
 
- The Oct 13 explosion at the al-Fathah crossing of the 
Tigris near Bayji forced the Ministry of Oil (MoO) to move 
an increasing amount of crude oil by truck in order to keep 
the refineries working.  Security concerns by contractors 
at al-Fathah have resulted in a large number of them 
walking off from their jobs; 
 
- The interdiction of the Kirkuk-Bayji crude oil line on 
Oct 20 and resulting fire halted pumping of crude oil 
across al-Fathah, cutting off the supply to Bayji refinery 
(previously operating at 88% capacity) and exports to 
Turkey for the second time in the past month; Bayji 
refinery is now out of fuel but is expected to become 
operational again in late November; 
 
- Southern exports continue at a seasonally weather reduced 
rate.  In October, an average of almost 1.6 million barrels 
were exported daily, with Basra refinery operating at 99% 
capacity.  However, Basrah will soon shut down for 30-60 
days because proper preventive maintenance has not been 
accomplished in past years and systems are now approaching 
criticality; 
 
- Electricity supply to Baghdad fluctuates erratically 
(averaging between 7 to 13 hrs per day); 
 
- Attacks on oil production not only reduce the revenues 
that today's high oil prices would generate, but also lead 
to increased product imports at world market prices to meet 
domestic demand for fuels. 
 
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IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 
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4. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) With the direct participation of MNC-I 
Deputy Commander MG Parker in our Task Force, Corps has 
demonstrated the priority it places on infrastructure 
security, following only fighting the insurgency and 
assuring safe and secure electoral processes.  Five energy 
supply corridors must be protected to maximize the 
provision of essential services and revenue production. 
Our approach will be to execute the enhanced plan 
immediately and comprehensively in discrete geographic 
segments in the priority order below: 
 
  1.  Kirkuk-Bayji pipeline 
  2.  Musayyib-Salman Pak electric power corridor 
(new) 
  3.  Bayji-Baghdad refined product and electric 
power corridor 
  4.  Bayji-Turkey pipeline 
  5.  Basrah's oil exports and internal distribution 
system 
 
5. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) The Kirkuk-Bayji pipeline is the top 
priority for immediate execution of the plan for three 
reasons.  First, securing significant additional oil 
exports from the Kirkuk fields is the fastest way to raise 
Iraq's revenues substantially.  Second, considerable 
protective work has already been done in this region, to 
include training of the first five Security Infrastructure 
Battalions (SIBs).  The projected training of 11 SIBs will 
be in three phases (five SIBs in Phase 1, four SIBs in 
Phase 2, and two SIBs in Phase 3).  The ITG has allocated 
$80 million for Phase 2 training and sustainment costs. 
Third, we expect to be able to complete this segment of the 
plan relatively rapidly, thus creating a tangible and 
successful model for the Iraqi government, military, and 
society to use as a template for the successive segments. 
 
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NEXT STEPS 
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6. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) The infrastructure protection plan 
includes seven operational aspects with timelines: 
Coordination; Security; Counter-Sabotage; MOI Capabilities; 
Rule of Law; Rapid Repair Response; Resiliency and 
Redundancy.  The steps for the next nine months are: 
 
COORDINATION 
- Nov 05: Enhancing Iraqi interagency coordination at the 
provincial level, urging Ministry of Defense (MoD), 
Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Electricity (MoE), 
MoO participation in the Provincial Joint Coordination 
Cells (PJCC) in Kirkuk. 
- Nov 05: A command post exercise on Nov 8 in Kirkuk to 
demonstrate the full and effective use of the PJCC. 
- Nov 05: Address coordination requirements in Musayyib- 
Salman Pak energy corridor. 
- Jan 06: Implement effective coordination system 
nationwide within existing resources. 
 
SECURITY 
- Nov 05: Enhance Kirkuk-Bayji corridor security. 
  -- Begin tribal engagement discussions. 
  -- Integrate new SIBs along the corridor. 
  -- Contingency plan to stockpile fuels for Baghdad to 
avert energy crisis in case a shortage occurs. 
- Dec 05: Firmly establish infrastructure security within 
Iraqi Army C2 network with clear roles and responsibilities. 
- Dec 05: Engage influential tribal leaders across this 
region to foster a better economic, social, and security 
environment, and to strike the appropriate balances in 
 
establishing security solutions so that all principal 
tribes have a stake in the success of the process. 
- Jan 06: SIB Phase 2 training (second tranche of 4 SIBs) 
completed. 
- May 06: SIB Phase 3 training (third tranche of 2 SIBs) 
completed. 
- Jul 06: MoD to complete construction of 72 guard towers 
in the Kirkuk to Bayji corridor. 
 
COUNTER-SABOTAGE 
- Mar 06: Demonstrate an effective intelligence gathering 
system. 
- Mar 06: Iraqi Army offensive operations conducted through 
actionable intelligence. 
 
MOI CAPABILITIES 
- Dec 05: Automated data base implementation. 
- Jan 06: Intelligence gathering systems developed. 
- Jan 06: Assume law enforcement/criminal investigative 
capacity role. 
- Mar 06: Increase police/investigator training in Jordan 
and locally. 
- Mar 06: MOI under permanent Iraqi government begins 
counter-sabotage ops. 
 
RULE OF LAW 
- Jan 06: Legal systems begin to form from new 
constitution. 
- Jan 06: Accountability systems devised in new ministries. 
- Feb 06: First new DOJ courthouse (Karkh) complete. 
- Mar 06: Functioning courts begin being established, 
followed by investigations, warrants, arrests and 
prosecutions. 
- Apr 06: First prisons (Khan Bani Saad & Nasiriya) 
complete. 
 
RAPID REPAIR RESPONSE 
- Dec 05: MoO begins stockpiling of spare parts and 
establishes a budget to effect energy infrastructure 
repair and maintenance. 
- Jan 06: MoO assumes Rapid Repair Response burden. 
- Jan 06: CF role reduced, but CF continues support and 
mentorship. 
 
RESILIENCE AND REDUNDANCY 
- Jan 06: Revenue sources identified to fund maintenance 
and upgrade of energy infrastructure. 
- Jan 06: Budget established to fund energy infrastructure. 
- Feb 06: Training begins of managers to maintain 
infrastructure. 
- Mar 06: Hardening completed along the al-Fathah crossing, 
including fences, walls and towers along vulnerable areas. 
 
7. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) Once we initiate the implementation of 
this plan in the Kirkuk-Bayji corridor, we plan to move 
rapidly to replicate the effort in the Musayyib-Salman Pak 
corridor, adjusting for individual conditions extant in 
that region.  We will continue down the list until all 
geographic regions are covered.  While we are accomplishing 
this intensified plan in specific regions, we intend to 
maintain all of the current security efforts and 
infrastructure enhancement programs in the regions not yet 
touched by the plan. 
 
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BASRAH - THE CROWN JEWEL OF IRAQ'S ECONOMY 
------------------------------------------ 
 
8. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) Without a doubt, Basrah's oil 
infrastructure is the crown jewel of the Iraqi economy. 
MND-SE is coordinating improvements to the security 
infrastructure, and although violence has not been directed 
at these facilities in a long time, they are still 
vulnerable and a priority for the Mission. 
 
9. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) The lower frequency and intensity of 
infrastructure attacks in the South is likely due to the 
fact the Shia populace has vested economic as political 
interests in keeping oil exports flowing, and as well as 
the smaller physical extent of the region's infrastructure, 
compared to that of the central and northern Iraqi 
regions.  The Shia in the Basrah region have an economic 
interest in keeping the oil flowing.  Much of the violence 
in southern Iraq has revolved around Muqtada al-Sadr's 
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), which has generally abided by 
cease-fires reached last year after its two uprisings. 
Although some JAM elements have conducted sporadic indirect 
fire attacks against CF, JAM probably has largely refrained 
from attacking the southern oil structure to avoid 
provoking a backlash from the Shia public and harming the 
Sadr Movement's potential political aspirations.  The 
infrastructure attacks that have occurred in the Basrah 
area have been of lesser sophistication and less frequency 
compared to northern and central Iraq.  We will, of course, 
continue to monitor very closely the situation in the 
Basrah province. 
 
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US-IRAQI STEERING GROUP 
----------------------- 
 
10. (C/REL MCNI/IRAQ) Beyond these immediate steps, we have 
created a steering group with the ITG to monitor the 
implementation of this action plan.  The steering group, 
chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Chalabi, meets bi-weekly. 
Chalabi is joined by the Ministers of Oil, Electricity and 
Finance.  For the Coalition side are the Political-Military 
Counselor, Deputy Commanding General of MNC-I, and the 
Director of Operations IRMO.  In addition to the steering 
group, Chalabi chairs the National Energy Council, a 
ministerial-level group, whose meetings are attended by 
representatives from the Ministries of Oil, Electricity, 
Water Resources, Finance, Defense and Interior.  Finally, 
the Ambassador, the DCM, and the Commanding Generals of 
MNF-I and MNC-I frequently meet with Chalabi and members of 
the Iraqi military to discuss infrastructure security and 
how to successfully address the problem. 
Satterfield