US embassy cable - 05PARIS7461

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 007461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KPKO, SU, FR, UNSC, UNGA 
SUBJECT: UNGA-SC FRICTION FESTERING, FRENCH WARN A/S 
SILVERBERG 
 
REF: A. PARIS 7305 B. STATE 199305 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt.  Reas 
 
ons 1.4b,d 
 
1. (C)  Summary: A/S Silverberg, joined by DCM and 
PolMinCounselor, met with IO A/S-Equivalent Ripert and a 
French IO team October 25 for an exchange of views on UN 
reform.  Ripert urged the U.S. to stake out a more visible 
position on the Peace Building Commission and to lay down 
"red lines," though he thought reform would require a package 
deal.  Without concessions on the PBC, he worried that the 
reform process was turning irremediably into an UNGA 
confrontation with the Security Council.  He worried that the 
draft Swiss UNGA resolution to revise SC procedures, if 
tabled, would close the door on SC enlargement by shifting 
the debate.  IO PDAS-Equivalent Lacroix believed the 
stalemate on SC enlargement was eroding momentum generally on 
UN reform.  Lacroix said the UN Secretariat needed quickly to 
pony up its proposals on management reform to galvanize the 
process.  Ripert defended 5th Committee efforts to register 
displeasure that the Capital Master Plan would not be 
financed by an interest-free loan, maintaining France, too, 
shared responsibilities as a Host Country to a UN body. 
 
2. (C) At a separate luncheon meeting, IO DAS-Equivalent for 
Human Rights Le Fraper reported EU agreement that a new Human 
Rights Council (HRC) should be a standing body; however, the 
EU had not reached a position on election criteria. There was 
a preference for "positive" criteria, though "negative" 
exclusionary criteria also remained a possibility.  Ripert 
insisted Geneva be the seat of the HRC.  Le Fraper argued 
that the HRC, once launched, should make a clean break with 
the Human Rights Commission.  Ripert urged U.S. attendance at 
a February 2006 ministerial at which France and others would 
launch the International Airplane Ticket surcharge to promote 
funding on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.  He presented 
a case for a "light" and "flexible" UN Environmental Agency 
in lieu of UNEP in order to coordinate relevant UN 
activities.  Discussion of Syria-Lebanon in reftel.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
PBC Faltering, U.S. Must Speak Up 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) A/S Silverberg expressed concern that UNGA President 
Eliasson's road-map for UN reform risked losing momentum on 
management reform and on remaking the Human Rights Council by 
suggesting that progress on those issues could happen only 
after resolution on the Peace Building Commission (PBC). 
While agreeing that the PBC Commission was proving a more 
difficult issue than anticipated, Ripert voiced 
disappointment at U.S. hesitation to engage more vocally. 
Others -- for instance Pakistan but also unspecified European 
Union members -- felt emboldened in their resistance on the 
PBC (e.g. Security Council oversight of the PBC), Ripert 
said.  Without P-5 buy-in, the PBC would flounder.  The U.S. 
should lay out its "red lines" for a reform package, he 
advised, in order to forestall the "disaster" of a vote on 
the Egyptian draft resolution.  IO PDAS-Equivalent Lacroix 
observed that some in the African Group were anxious that 
establishing the PBC through "a bad UNGA resolution" would 
"lead to its irrelevance."  However, Ripert speculated that 
Egypt, having given up hope for a permanent SC seat, was now 
set on weakening the SC, namely by setting up the PBC as an 
UNGA counterweight.  Some concession was necessary on the 
PBC, Ripert argued, because the reform process was 
deteriorating into an UNGA-SC confrontation.  Could the USG 
accept sequential reporting by the PBC to ECOSOC and the SC, 
he asked. 
 
-------------------------- 
Worsening UNGA-SC Friction 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The Swiss UNGA resolution on Security Council 
procedures was a further sign of the poor atmosphere in New 
York, Ripert remarked (Ref B).  France had had a "very frank" 
exchange at senior levels with the Swiss, explicitly 
requesting Switzerland refrain from tabling the resolution. 
But the Swiss evidently saw challenging SC preeminence, and 
specifically P-5 privileges, as a cultural and moral 
obligation, reflecting the Confederation's commitment to 
"pure democracy."  Ripert predicted SC expansion would be 
stillborn, should the Swiss table their resolution, and that 
the resulting UNGA - SC collision would last a decade. Ripert 
categorically rejected the draft resolution, but he offered 
that, in line with the draft's objectives, France was open to 
making a statement pledging to refrain from use of the veto 
in cases of massive human rights abuses or genocide. 
 
5.  (C) Ripert reiterated French commitment to SC expansion, 
including the G-4 resolution "if it still exists."  Lacroix 
opined that the deadlock was prompting "erosion" across the 
board on UN reform.  Ripert stated definitively that there 
would be "no SC enlargement without Germany."  To that end, a 
Council of 21-22 members was not enough.  While conceding 
that the African Group had to resolve its position, Ripert 
believed that, absent a consensus, individual African members 
would nonetheless take part, should the G-4 force a vote. 
African Group solidarity remained a factor, yet many newly 
responsible African democracies were seeking a voice, Ripert 
commented, and were "fed up with the UN" system and its 
protections for extremist African governments. 
 
-------------------------- 
Reviving Management Reform 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Management reform was losing momentum, Lacroix 
stated.  It was vital that the UN Secretariat offer its 
proposals soon, and the Secretariat should at least identify 
who had the lead, whether Burnham or Malloch Brown.  Upcoming 
budgetary discussions were a further opportunity to launch a 
"new approach."  Regarding the calls for periodic review of 
PKO mandates, Lacroix suggested establishment of an expert 
group to conduct evaluations in advance of renewals.  Ripert 
suggested a three-person group drawn from ACABQ, which might 
offer a collateral advantage of facilitating discussion of 
assessed contributions beyond the appeals of the Geneva 
Group.  There would be no rise in the overall EU 
contribution, Ripert insisted, adding that France was 
pressing the issue with Russia, China, and Brazil; the G-4 
nations in particular should assume their budgetary 
responsibilities. 
 
---------------------- 
Interest-Free Whinging 
---------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Regarding funding for the Capital Master Plan, Ripert 
thought it understandable that UNGA members would "express 
regret" that the Host Country was not offering an 
interest-free loan.  The U.S. Congress, in effect, was 
imposing an additional fiscal burden on the entire UNGA 
membership.  A/S Silverberg made clear that any language that 
takes the U.S. to task constituted a gratuitous attack and 
was unacceptable.  5th Committee assent was moreover not 
necessary in order to accept the loan.  Ripert countered that 
France would not be in the fight, but believed the Host 
Country had clear responsibilities, a principle France sought 
to respect with regard to UNESCO.  He complained about 
inappropriate rhetoric on the UN by New York City Council 
Members, underscoring that the UN presence was worth billions 
to the local economy. 
 
-------------------- 
Human Rights Council 
-------------------- 
 
8.  (C) At the luncheon, Beatrice Le Fraper, IO 
DAS-Equivalent for Human Rights, reported the EU had reached 
three common positions regarding the establishment of a Human 
Rights Council (HRC):  1) the HRC should be a standing body, 
even if not always in session; 2) HRC should be able to 
address especially urgent HR situations, as necessary; 3) 
there should be NGO participation.  Regarding HRC election, 
Le Fraper said that the EU had shied away from any position 
on election criteria, particularly the 2/3 majority 
threshold, which France understand could be problematic for 
the U.S.  She suggested a preference for "positive" criteria, 
though exclusionary criteria remained a possibility.  To A/S 
Silverberg's suggestion that candidates provide nomination 
letters from within their own bloc, Ripert worried about 
interference with the procedures of regional groups but 
averred that the concept merited consideration.  Ripert 
insisted Geneva be the seat of the HRC.  France was flexible 
on the size, a considerable shift, Ripert said, since France 
originally supported universal membership.  Le Fraper 
stressed agreement about HRC "subsidiarity" in relation to 
the UNGA, prompting a caveat from Ripert on the need for a 
division of labor between the HRC and the 3rd Committee.  Le 
Fraper argued for a clean break between the Human Rights 
Commission and the future Council, recommending a wrap-up 
session for the Commission and starting the Council with a 
clean agenda. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Counter Anti-Israeli Initiatives 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Le Fraper claimed France was engaging to reduce 
anti-Israel UN initiatives, and had sought to exert pressure 
on Lebanon in particular.  France withdrew its candidacy to 
the World Heritage Committee to facilitate Israel's election, 
she said, and similarly supported a clean WEOG slate, 
including Israel on the Biosphere Committee at UNESCO. 
 
------------------------------ 
CPC:  A Nuisance, Live With It 
------------------------------ 
 
 
10.  (C) Ripert concurred that the Committee on Programs and 
Coordination (CPC) had lost its value, however he urged 
caution on seeking its dissolution.  Contrary to the UK and 
Italy, which favor withdrawal, France does not support an 
"open seat policy" with regard to UN bodies.  Moreover, "the 
South" continues to see the CPC as a useful "organ of 
expression," he claimed.  Reforming UN bodies was easier than 
shutting them, he opined.  Lacroix suggested the CPC was 
becoming irrelevant, but, again, head-on criticism would only 
generate "useless friction." 
 
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Airplane Tickets and "Innovative Financing" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Raising the International Airplane Ticket surcharge 
for development, Ripert recognized U.S. opposition, yet hoped 
the U.S. would nonetheless participate in a late February 
ministerial to inaugurate the initiative.  He reasoned that 
the international community should show solidarity on any 
effort to combat HIV/AIDS, allowing partners to construct a 
"free menu" of options from which to choose.  He stated that 
France and Chile were looking at a common fund for the 
purchase of medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria; the UK, while supportive of the overall initiative, 
would not participate in that fund.  Christophe Guilhou, a 
Cabinet adviser to FM Douste-Blazy, estimated the surcharge 
would generate circa 700 million euro in its first year of 
implementation. 
 
------------- 
UNEP's Future 
------------- 
 
12. (C)  Ripert made a pitch for converting UNEP into a 
"light" UN agency through a gradual transformation of 
scaled-down ambition that would emphasize mission 
flexibility.  France did not want to create a "monster" with 
thousands of positions, but wanted to coordinate disparate UN 
activities on the environment and bolster early warning 
capabilities.  "Heads of UN agencies don't know what others 
are doing," he argued.  Ripert noted UNEP Director Toepfer 
was resigning and asked if the U.S. had a candidate a mind. 
------------------------------------------- 
DPKO Overstretch:  Is Darfur a Poison Pill? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
13. (C)  Ripert noted demand for UN peacekeeping was 
exceeding capability.  Cost efficiency was now an important 
criterion in French thinking, he added, since new 
parliamentary controls, similar to U.S. Congressional 
oversight, would kick in as of January 2006.  Lacroix urged 
working together to reduce PKO force size, when appropriate, 
and he called for more consultation by the UN Secretariat in 
planning and reviewing mandates.  He suggested that UNMIL may 
be ripe for cautious reduction.  Sudan, in particular, 
required a prudent approach, and Ripert said there were 
internal MFA divisions on whether to expedite an AU hand-over 
to the UN.  U/SYG Guehenno was reluctant to see DPKO take 
over AMIS, absent a peaceful settlement.  Pushing a skittish 
UN ahead on Darfur would lead to the launching of a massive 
PKO, given UN security concerns.  Ripert chided against 
pushing the UN to take on missions that exceed its 
capabilities.  IO DAS-Equivalent Simon-Michel said the DRC 
posed a similar concern; U.S. interest in expanding MONUC's 
mandate to include the disarmament of eastern militia went 
beyond the traditional parameters of the Brahimi Report. 
(Comment: There is an AF-IO split at the MFA on Darfur, with 
IO sharing Guehenno's own reticence.  AF DAS-Equivalent Le 
Gal indicated to Africa Watcher 10/26 that Director General 
for Political Affairs Laboulaye had adjudicated the feud in 
AF's favor.  End Comment.) 
 
14. (C)  Probing on thinking on the SYG's successor, Ripert 
commented that France was not keen on the automatic selection 
of an Asian and distrusted the principle of regional 
rotation.  However, the next SYG should be francophone, 
whether Eastern European or Asian. 
 
15. (C)  On Iraq Lacroix volunteered there was a clear 
rationale for maintaining the MNF, however there was a need 
to provide a context for its perpetuation, in consultation 
with an Iraqi government, and not as an SC fiat.  He said the 
French understood from their meeting with Under Secretary 
Burns that a drafting solution might be possible, and were 
interested in the U.S. timeline for renewal.  Discussion on 
Syria-Lebanon in Ref. A. 
 
16. (C)  Comment:  Ripert and company presented a familiar 
French refrain that tactical concessions are necessary in 
order to advance UN reform.  There was considerable reference 
to the fallout of the abortive campaign for SC expansion, 
which, in the French view, had done collateral damage to 
achieving consensus on any future HRC and PBC.  Resentment of 
the SC was now an entrenched fact in the UNGA; a sharp 
contest for prerogatives would now color the reform process. 
 
17.  (C) Comment Cont'd:  Ripert's mention of both the 
International Airplane Ticket surcharge and UNEP, both Elysee 
pet projects, was an obligatory exercise, since he clearly 
understood U.S. opposition.  However, we took his request for 
U.S. presence at a February 2006 ministerial as a formal 
request, warranting a USG response.  It is hard to see, 
however, how such a ministerial could stick to a generic call 
for creative financing of development rather than proclaim a 
chorus of hallelujahs for Chirac's "voluntary" aviation 
taxation scheme. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
Stapleton