US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6558

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 006558 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE AND PM/DTTC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, PARM, TU, IZ, AF 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
OF DEFENSE PETER FLORY TO TURKEY 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: Your visit to Turkey marks the first High 
Level Defense Group (HLDG) meeting to be held in two years. 
In the absence of this high level bilateral dialogue, our 
political military communication with Turkey since 2003 has 
been dominated by the war in Iraq and its impact on the PKK, 
Turkey and Turkey's perceived constituents, the Iraqi 
Turkmen.  The 19th HLDG provides an opportunity to elevate 
the dialogue beyond Iraq, to underscore our positive 
collaboration in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 
including the logistics hub at Incirlik and the Habur Gate 
GLOC, and to re-focus on our long-term shared strategic 
goals.  It will be important to note U.S. actions to 
implement commitments made during recent high level USG 
visits to help Turkey to combat the PKK, but equally 
important to emphasize opportunities to develop closer 
cooperation in space technology, missile defense and other 
areas of the Global War on Terrorism.  The HLDG also provides 
an opportunity to highlight the renewal of our Special Forces 
collaboration after two years of limited contact.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (S) We aren't out of the woods yet, but our bilateral 
political military relationship is on the upswing from the 
trough that began in 2003 and deepened in fall 2004 with 
MNF-I operations in Talafar and Fallujah, repeated Turkish 
truck driver abductions and killings and Turkey's neglect of 
its relationship with the US while it courted the EU in 
search of an accession start date.  Despite the continued 
unpopularity of the war in Iraq (over 95% of the population 
opposed the war), it no longer completely dominates the news. 
 Following the Dec. 17, 2004 EU decision to begin accession 
talks with Turkey on Oct. 3, and at the initiation of the 
military, Turkish government rhetoric began to shift to a 
more positive tone.  DCHOD Basbug took the first step in a 
January 26, 2005 nationally-televised press conference, in 
which he underscored the importance of the bilateral 
relationship and NSC SecGen Alpogan, FM Gul and others 
scrambled to match his words.  In an April speech to the 
Istanbul War Academy, CHOD Ozkok called the bilateral 
relationship too broad and important to be defined by one 
issue.  With the visits of PM Erdogan, FM Gul and DCHOD 
Basbug to Washington in early June, the Sept. 8-9 visit of 
EUCOM Commander Gen Jones and CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt Gen 
Smith and the Sept. 24 visit of APNSA Hadley, both sides have 
demonstrated their commitment to rebuild our historically 
strong ties.  The HLDG provides a platform to deepen this 
goodwill and, while noting the importance of cooperation on 
the PKK, to broaden our dialogue and press for specific 
actions in other areas of interest. 
 
PKK -- GETTING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3. (S) TGS notified the Embassy that it was prepared to leave 
PKK off the HLDG agenda since the military believes a 
separate mechanism to deal with that issue has been 
established and is working.  However, given the high level of 
attention that this issue has received in Washington, 
including the Deputies Committee (DC) deliberations, 
demarches  to European capitals asking governments to take 
action against PKK support networks, and EUCOM and CENTCOM 
actions to follow through on commitments made during their 
September visit, we believe that TGS should be reminded of 
the US effort to combat this problem within our capabilities, 
and the actions that have been taken toward that end.  We 
should insist that the government does not use this issue to 
pander to a domestic audience. 
 
4. (S/NF) Both EUCOM and CENTCOM remain engaged on the PKK 
issue and have taken steps, or committed to do so, to 
implement the offers made in September.  TGS has rejected 
EUCOM's offer of aerial surveillance along the Turkish side 
of the border with Iraq but welcomed CENTCOM's offer to 
continue aerial overflights of the Iraqi side of the border. 
A program of regular flights is under development.  It 
accepted EUCOM's offer of Information Operations (IO) 
support.  Following an exploratory meeting between EUCOM IO 
officials and TGS on Oct.6, EUCOM is developing a proposal 
for interagency consideration to assist GOT development of a 
comprehensive IO program.  TGS also welcomed a "surge 
capacity" intelligence-sharing program, one stage of which 
has been completed.  CENTCOM offered to expand the list of 
PKK HVI on the CENTRIX system and to facilitate TU/IZ mil-mil 
contacts, which may include joint border patrols.  These 
offers remain under discussion.  In addition to laying out 
these concrete actions, you may wish to emphasize the level 
of attention this issue is receiving in Washington and share 
any additional outcomes from the interagency deliberations. 
 
SPECIAL FORCES RE-ENGAGEMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (S) One of the casualties of the Iraq war was the 
relationship between our Special Forces (SF).  The July 4, 
2003 incident in which US forces hooded and handcuffed 
Turkish SF officers in Suleymaniyah, Iraq has become the 
stuff of folk lore throughout the Turkish military.  The DOD 
Joint Staff invitation to Turkish Special Forces for a US 
visit from Sept. 19-27 began to restore that once close 
relationship, and we fully support a possible SF JCET in 
March 2006.  We understand that TGS has approved the request 
for this JCET and that a EUCOM survey team may visit Turkey 
in December to initiate planning.  This would be the first 
JCET in at least three years.  You may wish to highlight the 
importance the US places in renewing this historically good 
relationship by building on the Sept. visit with a JCET and 
additional visits. 
 
BEHIND THE SCENES SUPPORT FOR IRAQ 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war, Turkey has 
provided significant logistical support to both Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and to OEF in Afghanistan.  Turkey has approved 
multiple requests for the use of Incirlik Air Base, 
including: a tanker refueling operation which has delivered 
28 million gallons since operations began in 2003 and flown 
over 2,600 sorties; the transit of 8,500 US troops on 
rotation from Iraq from January through April 2004; and the 
establishment in May 2005 of a logistics hub which allows 6 
US military C-17 aircraft to move the amount of cargo it took 
9-10 military aircraft to move from Germany.  This hub has 
facilitated the movement of 41,339 tons of supplies since its 
inception; flown 1280 C-17 sorties; received 577 wide-bodies 
cargo aircraft; and houses 150 TDY support personnel.  Turkey 
also approved the use of hub flights for the emergency 
evacuation of US soldiers from Iraq. 
 
7. (SBU) The Habur Gate crossing from Turkey into Iraq has 
facilitated 25% of fuel shipments to Coalition forces in Iraq 
-- approximately 340,000 gallons of fuel every day.  It also 
handles two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments for 
the Iraqi people in the form of three million gallons a day 
in humanitarian fuel shipments.  Significant shipments of 
food and water for coalition forces also pass through the 
border. 
 
8. (SBU) The Turkish government has also demonstrated its 
support through its public announcements of support for the 
January elections, the October Constitutional Referendum and 
the upcoming December elections; provision of training in 
Turkey for Iraqi diplomats and (as part of the NATO training 
mission) for the Iraqi security forces; hosting a seminar for 
Iraqi constitution drafters; hosting a meeting of rival 
Talafar tribal leaders in August for a reconciliation 
dialogue; and delivery of aid to Talafar following the recent 
Coalition operation there. 
 
PARTNER IN GWOT 
--------------- 
 
9. (S) Beyond its support for Iraq, Turkey has provided 
valuable assistance and cooperation to GWOT.  On Aug. 8, 
Turkey completed its second International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) command (II and VII) in Afghanistan, which it 
held for six months and during which time it contributed over 
1,600 troops.  Turkey and France have agreed on a shared 
command of the ISAF Multinational Brigade in Kabul during the 
second half of 2006 and Turkey has also indicated its 
willingness to consider heading or supporting a Provisional 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the future.  Turkey also 
contributes to reconstruction and training efforts in 
Afghanistan.  It is involved in the reconstruction of schools 
and is exploring counter-narcotics training programs for 
Afghan police and alternative livelihood options for poppy 
farmers.  Following PM Erdogan's May visit to Afghanistan, he 
pledged an additional $100M in assistance to the country. 
 
10. (U)  Together with the US, Turkey coordinates military 
assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their 
abilities to protect key energy transport routes.  Turkey 
subscribes to every security arrangement it is eligible to 
join, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
It will host the first PSI combined air, land and sea 
exercise in May 2006. 
 
IRAN AND SYRIA - DIFFERENT MEANS TO THE SAME END 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
11. (S) Turkey's watchword for both Syria and Iran is 
"engagement."  While the government shares our goal of a 
nuclear-free Iran, it doesn't want to jeopardize its nascent 
trade development opportunities, including energy, or its 
renewed intelligence exchange with Iran on the PKK. 
According to TGS, Turkey and Iran began sharing intelligence 
this summer on the PKK, holding regular meetings at the 
border.  As of September, Iran had turned over 40 suspected 
PKK members or sympathizers.  Turkey touts its support for 
the EU-3 dialogue and Turkish officials stress to us the need 
to maintain dialogue and to identify a diplomatic solution. 
The tepid and equivocal response by PM Erdogan and the MFA to 
President Ahmadinejad's Oct. 25 statement about Israel 
demonstrate that Turkey is trying to walk both sides of the 
line on Iran.  Turkey's tact toward Syria is the same. 
Turkish military officials have characterized Syria as a 
"scared cat" that could lash out if "backed into a corner." 
While Turkey supports the UNIIC, the Turkish foreign policy 
establishment fears instability if there is a regime change 
in Damascus.  They and others in the government stress the 
need to support Assad against those in the regime who seek to 
undermine him and regularly urge US engagement. 
 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION WEAK 
--------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Historically the strongest area of our bilateral 
relationship, the bilateral security cooperation 
relationship, is significantly declining.  Under Turkey's 
current policy, being implemented by the Undersecretariat for 
Defense Industries (SSM), the emphasis is on Direct 
Commercial Sales at the expense of Foreign Military Sales and 
American companies are having difficulty competing.  The last 
significant commercial tender won by a U.S. firm was the 2002 
win by Boeing for an Air Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) 
system.  (Note: Boeing recently threatened to take SSM to 
arbitration over protracted contract disputes and just signed 
the Critical Design Review this month.)  In early 2004, SSM 
canceled three tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks and ATAK 
Helicopter).  A second UAV tender was won by the Israelis 
weeks before PM Erdogan's spring 2005 visit to Israel. 
 
13. (SBU) The revised ATAK Helicopter tender (Note: The first 
tender was issued in 1995 and won by Bell Textron.  SSM 
canceled it over technology transfer issues.  End Note.) 
issued in February 2005 was the first to contain new 
"standard" terms and condition.  The three US firms that took 
the tender (Bell, Boeing, Sikorsky) found the new T&Cs so 
onerous that Bell immediately dropped out of contention  and 
Sikorsky soon followed.  Boeing invested considerable time 
and energy to try and work through its concerns with SSM but, 
even after several contract revisions and two postponements 
of the bid due date, was unable to justify participation.  On 
Oct. 13, Boeing notified SSM that it will not submit a bid on 
Nov. 8.  (Note: SSM Undersecretary Murad Bayar is invited to 
the Charge's Nov. 8 dinner in honor of your visit.  End Note.) 
 
14. (SBU) SSM's stated goal is to develop an indigenous 
defense industry that can supply components, such as a 
mission computer system, for integration into foreign 
products, beginning with the ATAK Helicopter, and has 
outlined an aggressive timetable to do so.  To meet that 
schedule, SSM requires companies to sign up unconditionally 
to all T&Cs and to confirm at the time of bid submission the 
host government's willingness to allow transfer of the 
required technology.  ASD Suzanne Patrick and State DAS Greg 
Suchan explained to Bayar in clear terms the USG limitations 
that prohibit such up front guarantees.  SSM has offered to 
exchange side letters with US firms that would clarify SSM 
acceptance of a USG "advisory opinion" but refused to revise 
the tender language to clarify that requirement.  Sikorsky, 
which is considering participating in a tender for 52 utility 
helicopters and, if it wins, establishing in Turkey a global 
production site for its "World Hawk" helicopter, will not bid 
if this condition is not clarified in the tender.  ODC Chief 
MG Sutton has held extensive talks with Service Chiefs, DCHOD 
Kosaner and J-5 head LTG Zorlu about the negative impact of 
the SSM program on US participation in the Turkish defense 
market.  Across the board, they pledged their preference for 
US equipment but professed an inability -- or unwillingness 
-- to influence the process. 
 
SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE - NEGLECTED AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
15. (S) Turkey is interested in finding a partner for the 
initial purchase and eventual co-development of a remote 
satellite sensing system.  In August 2004, the Turkish Air 
Force submitted a questionnaire to six countries (US, 
Germany, France, Israel, UK and S. Korea) to gauge each 
government's willingness to share the required technology 
with Turkey for such co-production.  Subsequently this 
project was passed to SSM as a procurement project.  SSM 
issued an RFI to which over 41 institutions and companies, 
including Lockheed Martin, responded.  It expects to issue in 
Jan. 2006 a tender for the purchase of an initial satellite 
system. 
 
16. (S) At the same time, the US has been working with Turkey 
towards signature of an umbrella space agreement under which 
working groups could be established to explore joint project 
opportunities.  The Turks have been reluctant to establish a 
working group absent a signed agreement.  Your signature of 
this agreement will remove that excuse and we will press 
Turkey to engage with us. 
 
17. (S) Our missile defense cooperation with Turkey is 
limited.  Despite TGS' acknowledged concerns with Iran's 
nuclear program, it does not view Iran as a near-term threat. 
 The USG would like to evaluate Turkey as a potential 
location for a forward based radar site in Europe but it took 
a year of discussions to gain GOT agreement, in July 2004, to 
conduct a missile placement study.  The study will not only 
provide additional input into the sensor placement evaluation 
process, but will hopefully engage Turkey in the process.  To 
gain agreement on this study we had to amend the bilateral 
Ballistic Missile Defense MOU.  After eight months of 
negotiation, on Oct. 22, TGS confirmed its agreement to the 
amended MOU text.  However, the agreement calls for the use 
of FY 05 funding.  With the start of the new fiscal year, we 
lost those funds and will have to identify a new source of 
funding. 
MCELDOWNEY