US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6543

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EU, TU, CY 
SUBJECT: AT THREE, TURKEY'S AKP GOVERNMENT SHOWING ITS AGE 
 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
1.  (C) After three years in power, Turkish PM Erdogan and 
his Justice and Development Party (AKP) government remain 
atop Turkey's political heap in popularity, and in control of 
the Turkish parliament and Turkey's municipalities.  Yet the 
AKP government is beginning to show its age:  it has receded 
from its high-water mark in parliamentary power, and lost 
momentum against nationalist opposition on EU accession, 
Cyprus and issues affecting Turkey's Kurds.  Opposition has 
also blocked AKP government attempts to advance issues 
important to Turkish Islamists.  The AKP government faces two 
long-term threats:  persistent allegations of AKP internal 
corruption and AKP's failure to ameliorate Turkey's 
unemployment. 
 
2.  (C) For three years, Erdogan has been the glue that has 
held the AKP party together -- an umbrella party encompassing 
different ideological tinges and ambitious personalities. 
Some MPs resent Erdogan's authoritarian leadership; ambitious 
AKP members, DPM/FM Gul foremost among them, seek more 
prominent roles.  Given Erdogan's popularity, AKP's current 
dominance, and the current lack of any viable opposition, 
AKP's now-quiescent dissidents are biding their time. 
Individual issues are unlikely to rock the AKP ship in the 
short term.  But if and when a viable political alternative 
finally emerges, a chunk of AKP will be sorely tempted to 
jump the AKP ship. 
 
AKP, Erdogan Still Most Popular 
------------------------------- 
 
3.  (U) After three years, PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan remains 
Turkey's most popular political figure, and Erdogan's AKP 
remains Turkey's most popular party.  Neither has fallen from 
first place since AKP came to power in the November 3, 2002 
elections, and no other person or party currently appears 
capable of challenging them. 
 
AKP's Parliamentary Majority Slowly Eroding 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) AKP won 363 of parliament's 550 seats in November 
2002.  From July 2004 until February 2005, thanks to 
transfers from other parties, AKP reached what will probably 
be its high-water mark of 367 seats, a two-thirds majority, 
enough to pass constitutional amendments without a 
referendum. 
 
5.  (C) Since then, AKP has slipped to its current 356 seats, 
80 more than the majority required to pass legislation, and 
26 more than the three-fifths majority needed to amend the 
constitution and then submit amendments to a referendum. 
Barring a political crisis, AKP will continue to hold a 
majority of seats over the next year, although further MP 
defections will slowly erode AKP's majority. 
 
6.  (C) AKP stanched a round of MP defections earlier this 
year; its parliamentary group has fared better than main 
opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), now down to 154 
of the 178 seats it won in 2002.  The newly-formed 22-member 
Motherland Party (ANAP) parliamentary group is a diverse 
collection of refugees from other parties and currently poses 
no threat to AKP. 
 
.  (C) Erdogan and the AKP leadership have done a remarkable 
job of holding together AKP's mix of pious, nationalistic and 
pragmatic MPs.  After stumbling badly in the March 2003 vote 
on whether to allow U.S. troops to pass through Turkey en 
route to Iraq, AKP's parliamentary group has held together in 
every subsequent vote.  Erdogan personally oversaw the 
October 2003 vote on sending Turkish troops to Iraq, 
resulting in a slam-dunk approval. 
 
8.  (U) AKP consolidated its 2002 general election victory in 
March 2004 municipal elections, capturing 1,949 of Turkey's 
3225 municipalities.  AKP mayors now govern 12 of Turkey's 16 
biggest cities, including seven of Turkey's eight biggest 
 
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cities. 
 
Feckless Opposition; AKP's Good Grassroots Organization 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
9.  (C) Turkey's feckless opposition is one major reason for 
AKP's success.  Main opposition CHP, initially the party of 
Ataturk and once the bulwark of Turkey's center-left, suffers 
from abysmal leadership and lack of a compelling message. 
Ultra-nationalist MHP has not yet capitalized on Turkey's 
rising nationalism, and Islamist Saadet remains a fringe 
party.  No other political party has approached AKP's success 
in building grassroots organizations and support; many 
Turkish politicians still do not comprehend the need for such 
an approach. 
 
AKP Stalled on the EU, Kurds and Cyprus 
--------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Across the board and despite the AKP government's 
dominance, it appears to have stalled.  Since its 
extraordinary success in passing EU-related reforms in 2004, 
it has accomplished little on the EU front.  Turkey's 
commencement of accession talks in October resulted largely 
from prior momentum -- and nearly failed.  FM Gul complains 
that he is currently the only cabinet member doing the heavy 
political lifting on EU questions.  The AKP government has 
done little to counteract a decline in public support for EU 
accession, instead finding itself on the defensive against 
charges that it is sacrificing national interests for the 
sake of accession. 
 
11.  (C) Erdogan has also failed to follow words with deeds 
after his August speech in Diyarbakir in which he proclaimed 
that Turkey has a "Kurdish problem."  Erdogan has not even 
repeated the phrase, and his AKP government has no plans for 
any follow up.  Public discourse on the Kurdish problem is 
back to hackneyed talk about employment and education; even 
so, the AKP government is taking no initiatives in those 
areas.  The most significant government effort in the 
heavily-Kurdish Southeast is the military effort against the 
resurgent PKK.  Faced with its own inaction and blowback from 
nationalists on PKK violence, the GOT has fallen back on 
blaming the U.S. (in northern Iraq) for the PKK problem. 
 
12.  (C) And after a bold 2004 initiative to resolve Cyprus, 
the GOT has abandoned PM Erdogan's vow to stay "one step 
ahead" of the Greek Cypriots.  Lack of measures to help 
Turkish Cypriots has left the AKP government without 
ammunition against domestic Cyprus hardliners.  The GOT now 
insists that their 2004 effort, and Turkish Cypriot approval 
of the Annan Plan, relieves them of responsibility to move 
forward either on settlement or lesser measures.  The AKP 
government is delaying bringing the Ankara Agreement 
extension protocol to parliament for ratification partly out 
of concern that this perceived concession on Cyprus risks 
splitting the AKP parliamentary group. 
 
Little Success in Advancing Islamist Agenda 
------------------------------------------- 
 
13. (C) Amid continuing debate over whether AKP has a hidden 
Islamist agenda, Erdogan's government has had little success 
in advancing Islamist causes.  Over the past three years, the 
AKP government has repeatedly floated proposals on 
headscarves, religious (imam-hatip) schools, and other 
Islamist causes, only to pull them back in the face of 
secular opposition.  The headscarf ban remains in place in 
schools and government workplaces.  Imam-hatip graduates are 
still handicapped in university admissions. 
 
14.  (C) The Saadet Party, on AKP's Islamist flank, has 
constantly criticized AKP's failures, but has so far failed 
to draw away AKP strength.  No AKP MP has yet resigned and 
gone over to Saadet, and even Saadet party contacts admit 
they have not drawn disaffected AKP members. 
 
Corruption, Unemployment Threaten AKP Power 
------------------------------------------- 
 
15.  (C) AKP's loss of momentum and failed Islamic agenda do 
not currently threaten its domestic dominance.  Two other 
 
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issues could, should the opposition ever gain steam:  AKP's 
internal corruption and AKP's failure to ameliorate 
unemployment. 
 
16.  (C) AKP's image as a clean party was a major reason for 
its November 2002 victory.  However, since coming to power, 
some AKP politicians persistently have been alleged to be as 
corrupt as their predecessors.  Concrete examples are 
multiplying.  The AKP government has failed to address -- or 
even acknowledge -- such persistent allegations of corruption 
within the party.  The average Turk accepts that while there 
may be some corruption in AKP, AKP corruption is far less 
than previous governments'.  However, the issue remains a 
time bomb.  One AKP MP recently prepared an internal party 
report saying that corruption in AKP is eroding its popular 
support.  PM Erdogan's only reaction was to tell AKP MPs in 
October that the party "is not explaining itself well." 
 
17.  (C) Before the 2002 election, AKP and Erdogan famously 
promised to ease Turkey's unemployment problem in three 
years.  Despite substantial growth in employment, job 
creation cannot keep up with the increase of new entrants 
into the labor force.  After three years, ordinary Turks 
still say unemployment remains Turkey's most serious problem. 
 Opposition parties have not yet been able to cut into AKP's 
popular support using the unemployment issue, and the AKP 
government has so far resisted the urge to break fiscal 
discipline in order to create jobs.  However, in the long 
run, the issue has traction and may force the AKP government 
into tough choices between fiscal discipline and popular 
support. 
MCELDOWNEY