US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI4440

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004440 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2030 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TW, CH, US 
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGNING ON CROSS-STRAIT TENSIONS 
 
 
Classified By: AIT Taipei Director Douglas Paal. Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.(C) With the Taiwan-wide elections for mayors and county 
magistrates a little over a month away, two themes are 
dominating the campaign efforts of the DPP and the KMT. The 
first is corruption and governance; the second is 
cross-Strait relations and defense. The KMT and its new 
chairman Ma Ying-jeou have begun attacking the DPP 
administration and President Chen over a series of corruption 
scandals and the continuing weak state of the Taiwan economy. 
They have complemented this with a series of initiatives 
designed to show that they are the only party capable of 
improving cross-Strait political relations and business 
climate. Chen has counter attacked by insisting that the DPP 
has actually taken the initiative in fighting corruption and 
claiming that the KMT control of the Legislative Yuan has 
made it impossible for the DPP administration to govern 
effectively. Chen's emphasis on cross-Strait themes has the 
potential to increase cross-Strait tensions as his rhetoric 
did during the 2004 presidential and legisl 
ative elections. 
 
2.(C) In both the 2004 presidential and legislative 
elections, Chen and his DPP campaign advisors promised that 
their campaign would focus on internal Taiwan concerns and 
avoid cross-Strait or Taiwan independence issues. Each time, 
Chen subsequently decided that the most effective way to 
mobilize the party's core supporters and overcome criticism 
of his government's weak record on economic and other 
governance issues was to emphasize these same provocative 
themes. In this campaign, facing a more effective campaigner, 
Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, leading the opposition, the 
pressure on Chen to return to the themes of cross-Strait 
relations and Taiwan independence is growing once again. 
 
3.(C) Domestically, Chen has been buffeted by accusations of 
corruption and poor governance. Polls and all of our contacts 
state unequivocally that Chen and the DPP's support is 
eroding rapidly. Long before the official campaign began, 
Chen made his initial effort to distract attention from his 
domestic political difficulties by announcing publicly in 
July that he intended to participate in the APEC leaders 
meeting in Korea this November. This was quickly dismissed as 
a publicity stunt. In October, Chen announced that he would 
instead dispatch the KMT President of the Legislative Yuan 
Wang Jin-pyng to APEC. By going public before either South 
Korea or China had agreed to the choice, Chen ensured its 
failure. For his domestic political agenda, that was the 
point: Chen had created another dramatic example of how China 
treats Taiwan and its DPP President unfairly.  The problem 
for Chen so far is that China has wisely not risen to the 
bait and given him ugly statements to use domestically. 
 
4.(C) Chen has echoed this same theme of PRC antagonism is 
raising obstacles to allowing PRC tourists to begin visiting 
Taiwan in large numbers and in blocking the visit of Chen 
Yunlin, the Director of the PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs 
Office. In the past week the DPP has sought to blame the PRC 
for its domestic political woes by claiming that TVBS, which 
has produced some of the most damaging evidence of high-level 
DPP corruption, is controlled by PRC interests. (This has 
already proved counter-productive in Taiwan.)  Chen has 
criticized the KMT for encouraging PRC initiatives on tourism 
and visits to Taiwan that emphasize people-to-people ties 
over contacts with the government. Chen and the DPP have also 
suggested that the KMT's opposition to the Special Defense 
Budget reflects its willingness to encourage ties with China 
that might weaken Taiwan's separate status and hopes for 
eventual independence. 
 
5.(C) The DPP's domestic political situation will likely 
worsen through the remaining weeks of the campaign as 
additional questions and allegations of corruption and 
mismanagement are raised by the media and the KMT opposition. 
Ma Ying-jeou will seek to contrast Chen and the DPP's 
failings with his reputation for personal integrity, his 
calls for clean government, and his efforts to reform the 
KMT. In this environment, it is almost inevitable that Chen 
will focus an increasing portion of his campaigning around 
strident accusations that the PRC is seeking to isolate and 
destabilize Taiwan and the KMT is complicit in their efforts. 
 
6.(C) The challenge will be for the United States and China 
to respond to Chen's campaign rhetoric in ways that diminish 
his efforts to increase cross-Strait tensions for his 
domestic ends.  At the same time, cool disdain for such 
tactics, expressed from officials in Washington, is most 
likely to help control the situation, much as statements from 
State and White House helped blunt Chen's tacics in last 
year's LY elections. 
Keegan