US embassy cable - 05RANGOON1234

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EASTERN SHAN STATE: BURMA'S NON-BURMA

Identifier: 05RANGOON1234
Wikileaks: View 05RANGOON1234 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2005-11-02 04:39:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM PREL PINS ECON BM CM TH Ethnics Human Rights
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, PINS, ECON, BM, CM, TH, Ethnics, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: EASTERN SHAN STATE: BURMA'S NON-BURMA 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1095 
     B. 04 RANGOON 165 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ officer Aaron Trimble for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Rangoon PolEcon Officer and FSN Political 
Specialist recently traveled throughout eastern Shan State, 
visiting the trading crossroads of Tachileik (on the border 
with Thailand) and Mongla (on the border with China), as well 
as the regional capital, Kenteng.  Falling under the 
increasing economic influence of China and Thailand has 
created for some locals an identity conflict and reveals 
limits to GOB authority.  Although former insurgent groups 
retain limited autonomy in several border areas, the GOB 
nonetheless maintains tight political control over the region 
as a whole and democracy activists continue to suffer from 
heavy-handed repression.  End Summary. 
 
Tachileik: Burma or Thailand? 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (U) A September orientation trip to eastern Shan State 
allowed us to observe the substantial and growing economic 
influence of Thailand and China, as well as the limited 
autonomy still enjoyed by former insurgent groups that 
control pockets of territory along the border.  Despite a 
heavy GOB presence in the border city of Tachileik, for 
example, local citizens seemed oblivious to being in Burmese 
territory.  Trade is conducted in Thai baht and our offers of 
Burmese kyat for local and imported products brought odd 
looks.  Thai language was prevalent in Tachileik and local 
members of the elite send their children to schools on the 
Thai side of the border.  As we departed Tachileik, one 
Burmese airport security clerk commented, without irony, that 
she hoped to visit Burma someday, too. 
 
3. (C) In Tachileik, P/E Officer met several local religious 
leaders.  One young Catholic priest cautiously told us about 
the difficulties he encountered with GOB officials in 
attempting to provide basic church services to his 
parishioners.  He stated that as a result of a myriad of 
restrictions, including obstacles to travel, he could not 
address many of his parishioners' social needs.  He also 
noted that the Church carefully documented social problems 
and GOB restrictions and reported them to the Vatican. 
 
4. (C) The Imam at a local mosque professed that everything 
was going well with his members, most of whom are Chinese 
Muslims.  The Imam said that he preaches mutual understanding 
and respect for all religions as the only way to achieve 
communal harmony.  By taking this attitude, the Imam said, he 
has avoided problems from the authorities.  The Imam's 
mosque, for example, was rebuilt in the 1990s with approval 
from SPDC Vice Senior General Maung Aye (Note: The GOB 
frequently prohibits the construction of new mosques or the 
refurbishment of existing mosques. End Note.) 
 
5. (C) P/E Officer also visited a Baptist church where the 
GOB had stymied efforts to enlarge the sanctuary.  The 
preacher's wife explained that the majority of its church 
members were retirees from the Burmese Army's Kachin Rifles 
regiment, who had been stationed in Tachileik in the 1950s. 
After retiring, most returned to Kachin State, but were later 
offered free land by the government as incentive to return to 
Tachileik.  When the small Baptist community outgrew its 
sanctuary, they attempted to enlarge it, but the government 
imposed new restrictions in 2002 so that renovations remain 
incomplete. 
 
Kengteng: Struggling As Long As It Takes 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) In Kenteng, P/E Officer met with four ethnic Shan 
members of the National League for Democracy (NLD).  The 
pro-democracy supporters said that GOB security authorities, 
"who are worse than the former Military Intelligence," 
closely monitor the activities of party members.  The 
authorities, for example, convoked one MP-elect and 
interrogated him about his intentions to attend the 17th 
anniversary of the formation of the NLD in Rangoon (ref A). 
Police Special Branch officers had recently begun entering 
the homes of party leaders without warning.  One NLD member 
calmly described some of the horrors of his recent three-year 
imprisonment and how, after a week of forced starvation, 
authorities offered poisoned coffee to both him and his cell 
mate.  He refused, but his cell mate drank the coffee and 
eventually died.  Despite the abuse, the Shan NLD members 
declared that they would continue to struggle "as long as it 
takes" and asserted that the majority of the Shan people 
support their cause. 
 
7. (C) In Kengteng, we visited with a minority "Ahka Cultural 
Affairs" leader, Peter Noi Naw.  The ethnic leader addressed 
the depressed condition of the Ahka minority, observing that 
since the 2004 ouster of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, no 
one from the GOB appeared interested in assisting the ethnic 
minorities in Shan State, many of whom face economic, social, 
and health problems. 
 
8.  (SBU) While most of our interlocutors described difficult 
situations under the current government, several of the 
people we encountered grudgingly admitted that electrical 
power and services had improved this year.  When P/E Officer 
asked about Chinese influence, several locals became animated 
and praised the Chinese products that are entering the 
region.  They specifically cited small hydro-powered 
generators that the Chinese sell to many of the ethnic 
villagers.  Cheaper than fuel-driven generators meant that 
anyone living near a stream or river can now generate enough 
power to run a television. 
 
Mongla: Gambling Mecca or Ghost Town? 
------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) To reach the Chinese border town of Mongla, located 
within Special Region Four, controlled by the National 
Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), entailed passing through an 
NDAA checkpoint where an entry fee was collected to visit the 
"State of Mongla."  From that point on, only Chinese yuan was 
accepted as currency.  Mongla, a casino town once filled with 
gambling Chinese (ref B), now appears to be little more than 
a ghost town.  Large, extravagant casinos dot the landscape, 
but locals told us they remain closed because the PRC 
government now restricts travel to Mongla over concerns that 
some Chinese government officials were transferring their 
entire salaries into casino accounts. 
 
10.  (U) We toured the local GOB drug museum, which displays 
counternarcotics program photos that include U.S. personnel 
participating in joint opium yield surveys, complete with 
diagrams and life-size models.  Special Region Four 
pronounced itself a drug-free zone in 1997.  Our museum guide 
claimed the area was drug-free because the poppy crops had 
moved to other, more remote areas.  The Mongla morning market 
was bustling during our visit, with one section catering to 
discerning gourmands by offering live monitor lizards, 
cobras, turtles, and woodchucks.  We also observed sale of 
many animal parts from the CITES list that were advertised as 
"guaranteed to improve one's stamina." 
Comment: Back of Beyond 
----------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Our travels to the hinterlands of Burma generally 
reveal a much more heavy-handed presence of the regime's 
security apparatus than one finds in the country's frequently 
visited tourist destinations, such as Bagan and Mandalay. 
This trip to eastern Shan State was no exception.  Security 
personnel followed us throughout the trip and local Burmese, 
from hotel managers to tour guides, exhibited nervousness 
when speaking with us.  Several of our interlocutors also 
mentioned that GOB personnel had told them to limit their 
time with us.  The GOB, however, does not seem capable of 
limiting the ever-expanding influence resulting from trade 
with China and Thailand.  And, as evidenced in Special Region 
Four, there remain several areas in this part of the country 
in which even the GOB has limited authority.  End Comment. 
VILLAROSA 

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