US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK6855

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OPPOSITION WINS 3 0F 4 THAI BY-ELECTIONS, BUT DOES IT MATTER?

Identifier: 05BANGKOK6855
Wikileaks: View 05BANGKOK6855 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bangkok
Created: 2005-11-01 09:58:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV TH Political Parties Chart Thai Party Democratic Party Mahachon Party
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006855 
 
SIPDIS 
 
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS 
HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI 
CIA WASHDC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, TH, Political Parties, Chart Thai Party, Democratic Party, Mahachon Party 
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION WINS 3 0F 4 THAI BY-ELECTIONS, BUT DOES 
IT MATTER? 
 
REF: A. A) BANGKOK 00980 
     B. B) BANGKOK 06119 
     C. C) BANGKOK 06798 
     D. D) CHIANG MAI 00229 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton For Reason 1.4 (C,D) 
 
1.    (C) Summary.  Opposition parties may have won enough 
seats in the October 30th parliamentary by-election to 
initiate impeachment and censure moves against the ruling 
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party government.  Unofficial tallies 
have the opposition winning three of the four seats at stake 
despite intense campaign support from Prime Minister Thaksin 
for local TRT candidates, leading local press to portray the 
election results as a dramatic slap in the face for the PM 
and his party.  While this is an important morale boost for 
the usually hapless opposition, these victories may have 
hinged more on local politicking than anger with the PM, and 
may yet be invalidated by fraud charges.  Moreover, 
Thaksin,s majority in parliament remains unassailable and 
the opposition does not appear to have a clear plan for using 
the impeachment or fraud motions to regain broader power. 
End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
DO OVER ELECTIONS FOR FOUR SEATS 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Thailand held by-elections on Sunday, October 30th for 
four MP seats in Phichit, Uthai Thani, Singburi, and Satun. 
The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) had concluded that 
questionable election practices occurred during the February 
2005 general election in these constituencies, necessitating 
special by-elections for each (Reftel B).  A few days before 
the by-election, a high-level opposition party member told 
Polcouns that he was very pessimistic about the upcoming 
elections (reftel C).  Embassy Poloffs used this occasion to 
visit Uthai Thani and Singburi to meet with candidates, local 
officials, and NGOs involved, while Poloff from Consulate 
Chiang Mai did the same in Phichit (reftel D). 
 
----------------- 
WHY SO IMPORTANT? 
----------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Given TRT,s dominant performance in the February 
election*netting 377 of the 500 seats*the contest for these 
four slots would hardly seem to be critical to the balance of 
power in Thailand.  However, if the opposition coalition of 
the Chart Thai, Democrat, and Mahachon parties were able to 
pick up three of the four seats at play, they could have the 
125 votes necessary to initiate censure or impeachment 
motions against TRT government ministers. 
 
4. (SBU) With these stakes in mind, both Thaksin and 
opposition leaders poured their time, attention and other 
support into these races.  The PM visited Uthai Thani twice 
in the weeks preceding the contest, including hosting a 
Friday night rally that drew between ten to twenty thousand 
people.  Opposition leaders tried to mirror these efforts, 
with noteworthy MPs from around the country streaming into 
Singburi and Uthai Thani to campaign for their compatriots. 
These rallies were of noticeably smaller size and sparkle, 
reflecting opposition concerns that they could not compete 
against the slick, massively funded TRT campaign machine. 
Indeed, opposition candidates in both Singburi and Uthai 
Thani told us that their chances of victory were, at best, 
even. (Note, TRT did not field a candidate in the Democratic 
Party stronghold of Satun. End Note.) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
INITIAL RESULTS SUGGEST OPPOSITION WIN 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The unofficial results of the by-elections were a 
surprise to many observers, with the opposition parties 
capturing 3 of the 4 constituencies by considerable margins, 
and the TRT winning back their lone seat in Singburi by a 
mere 750 votes.  Clearly the biggest surprise was in Phichit 
(reftel D), but nearly on par is the result from Uthai Thani, 
given the tremendous amount of TRT resources poured into that 
constituency.  Below are initial vote counts for each race: 
 
Phichit 
 
--Siriwat Kachornprasart (Mahachon) 39,412 
--Nawin Boonset (Thai Rak Thai) 22,000 
 
Uthai Thani 
 
--Thirapan Wirayuthawattana (Chart Thai)  40,259 
--Prasaeng Mongolsiri (Thai Rak Thai)  30,259 
 
Singburi 
 
--Payap Panket (Thai Rak Thai) 53,669 
--Chaiwut Thanakamanusorn (Chart Thai) 52,919 
Satun 
 
--Horsaree Marem (Democrat) 46,296 (unopposed) 
 
------------------------------------------- 
WHAT WAS THE ELECTION ABOUT FOR THE VOTERS? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Issue politics remains a mythic creature in Thai 
politics.  Although the local media has cast the election as 
a public backlash against the TRT juggernaught and a 
humiliating defeat for PM Thaksin, our meetings in Uthai 
Thani and Singburi suggest that there were many other factors 
at work, including tactics, money, and local personalities. 
Both are overwhelmingly rural communities dependent on local, 
small-scale farming.  Those voters working the land tend to 
vote for TRT, while those in the small cities and &urban8 
areas lean towards the opposition.  The public rallies we 
attended underscored these impressions.  At both the 
opposition and TRT rallies in Uthai Thani, the loudest 
audience applause was saved for promises of new 
infrastructure projects and money for the community.  Any 
mention of broader, national issues was met with tepid 
hand-clapping, at best. 
 
7. (C) Personality and tactics matter too.  In Uthai Thani, 
the TRT candidate barely squeaked out a victory in the 
February election against three divided opposition candidates 
before the race was voided by the ECT.  This time, the 
opposition pooled their resources behind a single candidate, 
noticeably improving his chances.  Moreover, neutral NGO 
pollwatchers explained that the TRT candidate Prasaeng was 
generally disliked for his aloofness and long residency in 
Bangkok.  A Chart Thai official added in a separate 
conversation that Prasaeng hadn't even tried to meet with the 
voters in the first few weeks of the campaign. 
 
8. (SBU) In Singburi, opposition candidate Chaiwut focused 
most of his public presentations on the need to hold the 
current government accountable thru the magic 125 opposition 
seats.  We accompanied Chaiwut, trailed by a handful of 
helpers and a couple of grim-faced Democrat MPs from other 
provinces, as he walked through a city neighborhood, quietly 
explaining his background in finance and making his case 
face-to-face with voters. 
 
9. (SBU) When we caught up with his opponent, Payap, we were 
treated to a slightly different style.  Riding on the back of 
a custom pick-up truck trailed by several other vehicles and 
wielding a bullhorn, Payap was trumpeting his long service to 
the community as a farmer, local official and MP.  He proudly 
told us that his convoy would number nearly 100 vehicles the 
day before the election.  Payap also explained that over 80% 
of Singburi,s voters were farmers and that their top 
concerns were water for irrigation and development projects. 
 
--------------------------- 
BUT THE GAME ISN,T OVER YET 
--------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Accusations of election irregularities may delay the 
official results by up to several weeks and could force yet 
another do-over election.  In both Phichit and Uthai Thani, 
each candidate filed complaints against the other for illegal 
campaigning activities, which are referred to the ECT in 
Bangkok.  The ECT will take anywhere from a few days to a few 
weeks to consider the charges, and then decide whether or not 
to penalize a candidate or uphold the election results.  That 
said, NGO pollwatch officials in Uthai Thani told us that the 
ECT would only invalidate the election there if the TRT 
candidate won; if Chart Thai took the seat, the ECT would let 
the election stand. 
 
11. (SBU) No complaints of illegal activities were filed in 
Singburi, but the opposition parties have asked for an 
examination of the invalidated ballots.  The vote counters 
invalidated nearly 5,600 ballots (4.9%) in Singburi, which is 
higher than expected. (Note, in the February election nearly 
9% of ballots were voided, in large part to the problems 
senior citizens had making a correct mark on their ballot. 
Local officials switched to rubber stamps to avoid this 
problem this time around. End Note.)  Given the narrow gap 
between the two candidates, it is remotely possible that the 
opposition may yet capture the fourth seat. 
 
12. (C) Finally, the ECT is on the brink of announcing a 
second round of violations stemming from the February 2005 
parliamentary elections, putting the exact number of 
opposition controlled seats in doubt. Our contacts suggest 
that the ECT will invalidate elections (i.e. hand out 
"yellow" or "red" cards, per the soccer terminology used by 
the ECT) for five more MP,s, three of whom are opposition 
party members. 
 
------------------- 
SO WAS IT WORTH IT? 
------------------- 
 
13. (C) Opposition candidates made their crusade for 125 
seats a central tenet of their campaigns, suggesting that 
this authority would allow them to hold the TRT government 
accountable for mismanagement and corruption.  If the 
opposition bloc is able to hold on to enough seats to hit the 
125 mark, it remains unclear how much effective their new 
powers will be.  When a censure or impeachment measure 
against a government minister passes, it then goes to the 
nominally non-partisan Senate for a vote that is the final 
determinant of the outcome.  However, a majority of the 
Senate tends to be TRT-leaning.  When queried on what the 
opposition planned to do with this new power, if successful, 
none of the MP,s we spoke to were able to elucidate a clear 
plan, or explain which ministers would be targeted. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14.   (C) The opposition parties' success in the by-elections 
arms them with a potentially significant power that is, in 
reality, more bark than bite.  Although they now have the 
power to initiate impeachment and censure proceedings, the 
likelihood of actually pushing these measures to completion 
is slim, given that much of the officially non-biased 
Senators are unofficially TRT-leaning.  We have no doubt that 
the election results have prompted some frustration in TRT 
(at the rally in Uthai Thani the PM said that he would likely 
lose his mind if the TRT candidate lost there*we have seen 
no evidence of such, yet) but it is hardly the serious public 
backlash presented in the press.  Thai Rak Thai remains very 
popular nationwide, and still holds the largest single-party 
majority in Thai political history.  That said, the next 
round of red and yellow cards will probably force yet another 
round of by-elections soon and with that, another chance for 
the opposition to irritate the Prime Minister. 
BOYCE 

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