US embassy cable - 05ALGIERS2222

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 002222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, AG, National Reconciliation, Terrorism 
SUBJECT: STATUS OF TERRORISM ONE MONTH AFTER PASSAGE OF 
CHARTER ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reasons 1.4(c) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 
---------------------- 
 
1. (C) One month after the favorable September 29 referendum 
on the Charter for National Peace and National Reconciliation 
-- which offered a broad but partial amnesty for those 
involved in the violence of the 1990s -- monthly civilian 
deaths, military deaths and causalities, and terrorist 
surrenders have all increased.  Reported terrorist deaths in 
October reached 53, considerably higher than the monthly 
average of 24 over the past six months and 10 over the past 
twelve months.  Based on press reporting, September and 
October, when the focus was on the referendum vote, 
respectively saw 10 and 13 civilian deaths, more than double 
the monthly average for the year.  With the exception of 
April, when there were 26 civilian deaths (most of them in 
one grim attack), eight out of the last twelve months saw 
only zero to five civilian deaths.  In terms of 
military/security force deaths, September saw 28 (the highest 
number of such deaths over the previous twelve months) and 
October saw 25 (higher than the monthly average).  We 
conclude from these trends that: 1) hard-core terrorists have 
stepped up attacks presumably to demonstrate they will not be 
cowed or coopted by the partial amnesty offer; 2) the 
military and security forces continue to press the campaign 
against terrorist remnants with some success and to sustain 
substantially more terrorist-related casualties than 
civilians; and 3) the partial amnesty offer is having a 
positive effect on terrorist surrenders but apparently little 
effect on the terrorist hard-core, at least for now. (End 
summary and comment) 
 
HISTORY OF TERRORISM 
-------------------- 
 
2. (C)  Algeria's "dark decade" began in 1991 after the 
constitution was amended allowing the formation and 
legalization of political parties, other than the ruling 
National Liberation Front (FLN).  The militant Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS), whose program included the creation of 
an Iranian-styled theocratic state was formed and won a solid 
majority of the vote in the first stage of the national 
legislative elections in December 1991.  Most observers 
believe the vote was mainly a protest vote against the ruling 
political and military elite rather than a sign of broad 
support for creating an Islamic state.  In early 1992, the 
government responded to the perceived Islamic militant threat 
posed by the FIS by dissolving the National People's 
Assembly, canceling the second round of elections, outlawing 
the FIS, and declaring a state of emergency.  These actions 
set off a ten-year cycle of turmoil and violence which saw 
the assassination of the Algerian President, increasingly 
random acts of violence committed against police, military 
and civilians, and ever increasingly lethal responses from 
Algerian security forces trying to quell the unrest. 
 
 
3) (C) In a 2002 speech to the International Conference on 
Terrorism held in Algiers, General Major A. Maiza, First 
Regional Military Commander, said that at the high point of 
terrorist violence in 1994, there were over 27,000 terrorists 
active in Algeria.  During the late 1990's and continuing to 
today, the Algerian security services and military have 
inflicted serious damage to Algerian terrorist groups, nearly 
dismantling the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and significantly 
reducing the operational effectiveness of the GIA splinter 
group and now primary terror group threat, the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).  President Bouteflika's 1999 
Civil Concord plan was a key step toward uniting the country, 
and an estimated 6,000 terrorists laid down their arms in 
response.  After last month's successful vote on the Charter 
for Peace and National Reconciliation, Interior Minister 
Yazid Zerhouni officially estimated that approximately 1,000 
active terrorists still operated in the country - 840 GSPC, 
100 Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salafia (DHDS), and 40 GIA. 
 
IMPROVING SITUATION 
------------------- 
 
4. (C) Though Algerians still live under a state of emergency 
evidenced by the ubiquitous security presence throughout the 
country, the overall security situation has vastly improved. 
Analysts at the African Union Counter-Terrorism Center (AUCT) 
informed the Embassy that Algeria no longer views terrorist 
violence as a threat to national security.  However, it 
remains a serious domestic issue and an ongoing threat to 
public safety.  Most of the larger Algerian cities, such as 
Algiers, Oran and Constantine, have not experienced 
significant terrorist attacks for over a year.  Terrorism 
still is a limited problem in the more rugged and rural 
regions, where small scale terrorist attacks and military 
action against the GSPC remain somewhat commonplace. 
 
TERRORIST FIGURES 
----------------- 
 
5. (C)  Since October 2004, 251 terrorists, 99 civilians and 
186 military and security forces have been killed in 
terrorist related violence.  Over this same time frame, 263 
terrorists have been captured.  October 2005 was a 
particularly deadly month with 53 terrorists, 19 civilians 
and 25 military and security forces killed.  This upswing in 
violence, also seen in August and September, is most likely 
the negative response by GSPC and other elements to 
Bouteflika's national reconciliation.  In order to show that 
the GSPC is more resolute than ever in continuing its 
struggle, the GSPC in particular has increased the lethality 
of its operations due to a shift from classic ambush tactics 
to increased use of road-side improvised explosive devices 
(IED).  Since the announcement of the national 
reconciliation, around 25 terrorists have laid down their 
arms.  After the introduction of the laws implementing the 
national reconciliation later this year, many more terrorists 
are expected to do the same.  We expect the figure of 1,000 
terrorists cited by Zerhouni to decrease. However, those 
remaining will be the most hardened and dangerous terrorists 
and the least likely to give up without a fight. It is a 
paradox that as Algeria makes progress on the security front, 
spikes in violence occur because fewer and fewer "moderate" 
elements who might lay down their arms remain in the fight. 
 
6. (C) The following figures represent the monthly totals of 
killed terrorists, civilians and military/security forces 
from October 2004 to present: 
 
    MONTH  Terrorists  Civilians    Mil/Security 
 
    OCT     16             17             8 
    NOV      7              4            12 
    DEC     17              4             3 
    JAN     16              5            18 
    FEB     20              0            13 
    MAR     11              0             4 
    APR      9             26            13 
    MAY     25              2            19 
    JUN      8              3            25 
    JUL     33              2            12 
    AUG     27              7             6 
    SEP      9             10            28 
    OCT     53             19            25 
 
ERDMAN