US embassy cable - 05SANAA3171

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REACTIONS TO MEHLIS REPORT: MOSTLY NOT THERE

Identifier: 05SANAA3171
Wikileaks: View 05SANAA3171 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2005-10-31 14:46:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KPAO YM SY UNSC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 003171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KPAO, YM, SY, UNSC 
SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO MEHLIS REPORT: MOSTLY NOT THERE 
 
REF: SINGH EMAIL OCTOBER 24 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) Summary: Government newspapers took the lead, covering 
and commenting on the October 20 UN Mehlis report implicating 
Syrian and Lebanese security officials in the assassination 
of former Lebanese Prime Minster Rafiq Hariri.  While op-eds 
in the official press took no stance on the report, the 
independent press expressed doubt over Mehlis' findings.  The 
Yemeni street seemed mostly indifferent to the report 
although interlocutors conveyed that there was some 
apprehension over the USG's possible reaction.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
The ROYG: No (Official) Comment 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Although there was no official public ROYG reaction to 
the report, Deputy FM Mohiedeen Al-Dhabi, discussed it at 
length during an October 24 meeting with Ambassador.  Dhabi 
observed that Syria's "aggressive action" was unacceptable 
and he anticipated that the report would have a great impact 
on the Arab world since it seemed that "everyone was upset" 
with Syria.  Referring to the USG's actions thus far, the DFM 
commended the USG for a "well-played game," but stressed the 
importance of letting the UN process move forward without USG 
pressure since it would force Arab countries to rally behind 
Syria. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
The Press: Some Coverage and Little Insight 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) Government and ruling party-backed papers covered the 
report extensively, usually without comment.  The official 
government newspaper, "Al-Thawra," published two op-ed pieces 
that merely reiterated Mehlis' implication of Syrian security 
forces in Hariri's assassination.  In its October 24 op-ed, 
"Thawra" remarked that the USG was likely seeking regime 
change in Syria, but did not attribute the report's outcome 
to USG actions. 
 
4. (U) Only three newspapers in the independent and 
opposition press carried op-eds on Mehlis. In an October 24 
op-ed, carried by the independent English weekly Yemen Times, 
commentator Hassan al-Haifi wrote that the Hariri 
assassination was no doubt the work of the Israeli 
intelligence service, Mossad.  Haifi asserted that 
implicating the Syrian Government was another method that 
Israel was using to force the USG into a confrontation with 
Hezbollah's allies.  "Al-Wahdawi," newspaper of the Nasserite 
opposition party, carried an op-ed the same day calling for 
unification against Mehlis, which it warned was a "pretext" 
to punishing both Syria and Lebanon. 
 
5. (U) On October 30, the opposition political party Islah's 
Internet news service, "Al-Sahwa.net," reported on an 
unofficial poll of 218 persons showing that 73% of Yemenis 
felt that Syria would face economic sanctions as a result of 
the report, 19% thought that the report was a prelude to a 
military invasion, and 8% hoped that diplomacy would resolve 
the issue.  (Note: Sahwa polls are unofficial and 
nonscientific.  End Note). 
 
------------------------------------ 
The Street: Just Don't Invade Syria! 
------------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) The topic was also noticeably absent during numerous 
Ramadan late-night social sessions attended by emboffs and in 
Friday mosque sermons attended by embassy staff.  On the 
Yemeni street, there were no public reactions.  Hammoud 
Munasar, chief correspondent for the "Al-Arabiya" news 
channel, noted that, despite this, many people -- 
particularly among the Yemeni intellectual community -- were 
following the report.  Munasar also said that many Yemenis 
"from Sheikhs to teachers" are livid at Syria, but equally 
suspicious of the USG's intentions to use Mehlis as "another 
pretext to invade yet another part of the Arab world." 
 
7. (C) Comment.  Thus far, overall reaction to the report's 
findings can be characterized as indifferent.  Yemenis seem 
preoccupied with the 2006 Presidential election, Saleh's 
upcoming visit to Washington, and the Muslim holiday season. 
The one common theme that does emerge is a fear that the 
United States will use the Mehlis report as a prelude to 
invading Syria.  The mood was best articulated by a mid-level 
bureaucrat at the Ministry of Education who told poloff, 
"There is not much talk of the report since we are all busy 
with Ramadan and Eid. It is not like you (USG) actually 
invaded Syria or anything."  End Comment. 
Krajeski 

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