US embassy cable - 05MANAMA1594

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MFA GOES PUBLIC ON IMPENDING TRANSFER OF BAHRAINI GTMO DETAINEES

Identifier: 05MANAMA1594
Wikileaks: View 05MANAMA1594 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Manama
Created: 2005-10-31 13:20:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER KAWC PHUM PINR BA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

311320Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2015 
TAGS: PTER, KAWC, PHUM, PINR, BA 
SUBJECT: MFA GOES PUBLIC ON IMPENDING TRANSFER OF BAHRAINI 
GTMO DETAINEES 
 
REF: A. MANAMA 1553 B. SECSTATE 199146 C. MANAMA 1547 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T.Monroe.  Reason: 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
1. (U) Unidentified "sources" at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs told the Bahraini press on October 30 that some of 
the six Bahrainis detained at Guantanamo would return to 
Bahrain shortly, possibly over the upcoming Eid holidays. 
This story became a lead front-page news in both the English 
and Arabic press on October 31, with extensive reporting on 
how the detainees might be handled upon their return and 
interviews with families of all six detainees as well as 
their American lawyer and a human rights activist.  One 
article quoted a senior official as saying the returned 
detainees would be turned over to the Bahraini authorities so 
that they could be sent to their respective families, and 
doubting that they would be tried or placed under house 
arrest. Another source was quoted as saying that, although 
the returned detainees would not necessarily be held in 
prison by the Bahraini authorities, there would be a security 
arrangement or agreement between the government and the 
detainees.  The source did not give specific details, but 
said it would include conditions and certification that the 
returned detainees not resume any communications or 
connections with any group associated with Al-Qaida or other 
terrorist movements. 
 
2. (U)  Relatives of all six detainees expressed joy at the 
news of the possible return of their family members, but 
worried whether their own family member would be in this 
group coming back.  American lawyer Joshua Colangelo-Bryan 
said he had not heard of the impending release, but would not 
have expected the USG to inform him in any event.  A Foreign 
Ministry source said that the release of the detainees from 
Guantanamo was the result of "strenuous efforts" by the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior as well as the 
families' attorneys.  Nabeel Rajab of the now-dissolved 
Bahrain Center for Human Rights also claimed credit for 
applying pressure that led to the release.  A representative 
of the Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society, apparently miffed 
at also not being able to claim credit, called the Embassy to 
complain that the Ambassador had not informed them of the 
impending return in a meeting earlier this month (ref C). 
 
3. (C) The Embassy first learned that the MFA had gone public 
with the news of the impending return when it was called for 
comment by the press on the evening of October 30.  The 
Ambassador immediately called Minister of 
Information/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed 
Abdul Ghaffar (our point person on the detainees) as well as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Khalid Al-Khalifa to 
register concern that premature release of information about 
the transfer could create legal complications that could 
jeopardize the transfer.  Shaikh Khalid said that the 
decision to release information about the return was made on 
the margins of the October 30 Cabinet meeting.  The public 
pressure to get results on the Bahraini detainees had just 
grown too great, and the leadership felt it had to say 
something. 
 
4. (C) The Ambassador took the opportunity to impress upon 
Shaikh Khalid the importance of handling the detainees in a 
way that, consistent with our exchange of notes, ensured that 
the returned detainees were prevented from posing a 
continuing threat.  Before returning them to their families, 
for example, it was essential that they be fully questioned. 
If no charges were to be brought, it was important for the 
government to develop a system of monitoring and 
surveillance.  It is in our strong mutual interest that any 
returned detainees not be discovered renewing contacts with 
terrorist elements or engaging in terrorist-related 
activities.  Shaikh Khalid assured that the Government of 
Bahrain shared that view, and would put in place systems to 
prevent that from happening. 
 
5. (C) The issue of the returning detainees was also 
discussed in an October 31 meeting between the Ambassador and 
Deputy Prime Minister (and former Foreign Minister) Shaikh 
Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa.  Shaikh Mohammed said that 
the whole town was talking about the possible return of the 
detainees.  The Ambassador raised concerns about press 
reporting from unidentified sources suggesting that the 
detainees would not be tried or put under house arrest.  He 
cautioned that Washington will be watching closely how the 
Bahraini detainees' return is handled.  He passed a copy of 
the diplomatic note outlining USG conditions for the transfer 
(ref B), and stressed the importance of developing a system 
whereby the detainees are interrogated, monitored, and 
rehabilitated on their return.  The worst thing that could 
happen, he stated, would be to learn that they were in 
contact with suspected terrorist elements in Bahrain or 
elsewhere.  Shaikh Mohammed pledged that the government would 
take all steps necessary to prevent that possibility. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador raised his concern that the detainees' 
return could result in their being treated as heroes.  These 
are not benign individuals, he noted.  Shaikh Mohammed 
responded that, even if some Bahrainis support them, they are 
a minority voice and do not represent the majority opinion. 
He concluded by saying that Bahrain does not want to see new 
groups breeding in Bahrain.  "We need to keep our eye on all 
these elements," he stated. 
 
7. (C) Comment: The MFA's decision to release information 
about the planned upcoming return of three of the six 
Bahraini detainees in the coming days comes in the context of 
a steady barrage of press reporting of alleged mistreatment 
of one of Bahrain's detainees, Juma al-Dossari (not one of 
the three approved for release), beginning on October 19 and 
continuing regularly since then (ref A).  These articles have 
only intensified the clamor from the press, parliamentarians, 
and NGOs for a return of the detainees.  Concern over the 
detainees has even led to a rare criticism of the U.S. Navy's 
presence in Bahrain.  An op-ed writer on October 31 called 
departing Admiral Nichols' recent press statement that the 
Fifth Fleet had no intention of leaving Bahrain bad news for 
Bahrain because, while the U.S. uses Bahrain to protect its 
interests, Bahrain has not been able to use its good 
relations with the U.S. to get its detainees back. 
 
8. (C) Comment continued.  The Ambassador, in recent meetings 
and discussions with Minister of Interior Shaikh Rashid, DPM 
Shaikh Mohammed, Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Khalid, 
and MFA Minister of State Abdul Ghaffar, has stressed the 
importance of handling the detainees in a way that prevents 
them from becoming a threat once again.  All officials have 
given their assurances that they will do so, while 
acknowledging that they face certain legal and resource 
constraints that make it difficult to hold them for any 
length of time, prosecute, and provide continuous 
surveillance and monitoring.  Embassy's best guess is that 
the GOB will detain the returning detainees for the up to 48 
hours allowed under Bahrain law without charges, release them 
to their families, and embark on a program of rehabilitation 
and calibrated monitoring to ensure that they don't go astray. 
MONROE 

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