US embassy cable - 05CAIRO8321

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TAKING AL-MANAR OFF ARAB SATELLITES

Identifier: 05CAIRO8321
Wikileaks: View 05CAIRO8321 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Cairo
Created: 2005-10-31 08:25:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER PGOV KISL EG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 008321 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, KISL, EG 
SUBJECT: TAKING AL-MANAR OFF ARAB SATELLITES 
 
Classified by Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) This is an action message.  Please see paragraph 7. 
 
------- 
Summary 
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2. (C) Embassy Cairo has been engaging the GOE, the Arab 
League, and Cairo-based foreign diplomats, to take action to 
remove Hizballah's Al-Manar TV from the GOE-owned Nilesat. 
Building on efforts already made by Embassy Beirut, and 
drawing from materials compiled by the U.S. Foundation for 
the Defense of Democracy (FDD), we have been arguing to the 
GOE that Al-Manar's inflammatory programming, which glorifies 
acts of terror and spreads disinformation, poses an 
unacceptable threat to the security of the region and the 
wider world.  To date GOE and other interlocutors have been 
responding positively but we have detected no effective 
action.  We believe a sustained regional approach could 
produce better results.  We suggest that Washington agencies 
report interagency action on Al-Manar to NEA posts, provide 
us needed technical and legal expertise, and set up formal 
monitoring of Al-Manar and other broadcasters inciting hatred 
and terror.  Our ensuing regional advocacy work could also 
target local advertisers or banks dealing with Al-Manar, 
complementing efforts by Embassies Cairo and Riyadh to 
persuade the GOE and the SAG to take Hizballah TV off Nilesat 
and Arabsat.  End summary. 
 
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Taking the Case to Cairo 
------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Among the Embassy's priorities in the past month has 
been engaging the GOE on the need to drop Al-Manar, 
Hizballah's noxious and terror-inciting satellite channel, 
from GOE-owned Nilesat, which has a footprint that covers 
much of North Africa, the Middle East, and southern Europe. 
Al-Manar's slickly produced and inflammatory programming 
poses a serious threat to international security.  The 
Ambassador has raised the issue directly with the Foreign 
Minister, the Minister of Information, and Intelligence Chief 
Omar Soliman, showing them several clips exemplary of 
Al-Manar's continuous incitement of terrorism from a DVD 
compiled by the U.S. NGO Foundation for the Defense of 
Democracy (FDD).  The Ambassador also raised Al-Manar with 
Arab League SYG Amre Moussa on October 26, leaving with him, 
too, a copy of the DVD. 
 
4. (C) During a mid-October visit to Cairo, Staffdel Rickman 
raised the issue of Al-Manar with the Chairman of the 
Egyptian Government's State Information Service.  Emboffs 
have also been raising the issue with working-level GOE 
contacts as well as with contacts in the Arab League and with 
counterparts in western Embassies in Cairo.  In our 
discussions with European colleagues, we have stressed the 
direct interest their countries have in preventing this 
incitement from reaching Muslim audiences resident in their 
respective countries. 
 
------------------------- 
GOE Response: A Mixed Bag 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The GOE response has been mixed to date.  Our Egyptian 
interlocutors have expressed agreement with our position, but 
we have detected no effective action yet to remove Al-Manar 
from Nilesat.  Some Egyptians at first claimed dismissively 
that al-Manar's viewership in Egypt is low, adding that 
Al-Manar's Shi'a character would continue to limit its appeal 
among Sunni Arab audiences.   The Egyptians' interest level 
increased markedly after personally viewing the 
clips--especially one urging viewers to contribute to 
Hizballah through accounts of Egyptian (and other regional) 
banks.  Our GOE contacts have also taken note that France, 
laudably, has already led the way by removing Al-Manar from 
Hotbird, which reaches all of Europe and much of North 
Africa.  We have also helped our GOE contacts focus by noting 
that Congress was increasingly interested in the Manar issue, 
and aware of the GOE's ownership of Nilesat. 
 
6. (C) Minister of Information Anas al-Fiqqi, a polished 
member of Gamal Mubarak's reformist circle, has told us he 
"has been looking for any means" to pull the plug on 
al-Manar, but claimed that the GOE's legal scope to revoke 
Al-Manar's Nilesat contract is limited.  Fiqqi, and other GOE 
contacts, have opined that the issue would have to be pursued 
through Arab political channels and have expressed a strong 
preference that, rather than going first, Manar be 
simultaneously dropped from Saudi-owned Arabsat (a view the 
State Information Service Director repeated to Staffdel 
Rickman).  Fiqqi also pointed to Hizballah's influence in 
Lebanon, and asked for unspecified U.S. help with the GOL. 
Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit, who was visibly impressed after 
the Ambassador showed him the clips (ref B), assured A/S 
Welch in a subsequent meeting that he "was working on it." 
 
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More Action Needed 
------------------ 
 
7. (C) We recommend the Department and other U.S. national 
security agencies consider further steps to advance the goal 
of taking Al-Manar off the air.  These steps could include: 
 
--Broader diplomatic engagement with European and Arab 
governments.  This campaign should also aim to inform posts 
and regional governments on the legal and national security 
policy issues at stake.  Adverstisers dealing with Al-Manar 
need to be explicitly warned that they are doing business 
with a terrorist organization. 
 
--Interagency counter-terror finance scrutiny of Arab banks 
cited in Manar's fundraising solicitations, and instructions 
to the field for appropriate follow-up actions with those 
banks and their host governments. 
 
--Increased American and/or cooperative international 
monitoring of Al-Manar and of any other satellite broadcasts 
and webcasts that constitute incitement to terrorism. 
 
 
RICCIARDONE 

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