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| Identifier: | 05GENEVA2629 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05GENEVA2629 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | US Mission Geneva |
| Created: | 2005-10-31 08:01:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ETRD USTR WTRO Trade |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 002629 SIPDIS PASS USTR FOR DWOSKIN, HAFNER STATE/EB/OT FOR CRAFT USDA/FAS/ITP FOR SHEIKH, MTND/HENKE, FAA/SE/WILSON USDOC FOR ALDONAS, SPETRINI, JACOBS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD, USTR, WTRO, Trade SUBJECT: WTO REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: ENABLING CLAUSE TRANSPARENCY 1. On October 3, 2005, the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules held an informal meeting devoted to discussing to the extent to which new transparency procedures being considered in the Doha Round for regional trade agreements (RTAs) should also cover RTAs entered into between developing countries under the rubric of the so-called Enabling Clause (the 1979 GATT Decision on "Differential and More Favorable Treatment" of Developing countries (L/4903)). Paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause explicitly permits developing countries to derogate from GATT's fundamental most-favored-nation treatment requirement for "regional or global arrangements" among developing countries "for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs." Such agreements now account for a large portion of mutual tariff remission agreements around the world, are rarely notified, and receive scant, if any, review in the WTO's Committee on Trade and Development (CTD). Previous discussions of the issue in the Rules group had been highly political, with developing countries seeking an a priori exclusion of such agreements from any new notification, information-sharing and multilateral review procedures. 2. This particular meeting appeared to move beyond the previous polemics. Developing countries such Brazil, Malaysia, Egypt, China, Ecuador, Thailand, Barbados, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines continued to rely on general arguments that Enabling Clause agreements should not be subject to review in the WTO's Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), but most conceded that increased transparency would be valuable with respect to all RTAs. 3. India elaborated its position at length. After stating that it supported increased transparency generally, India identified several "sensitivities." It claimed that in contrast to the requirements of GATT Article XXIV governing customs unions and free trade agreements, the Enabling Clause did not necessarily require a mandatory or multilateral review. It also argued that since most Enabling Clause agreements cover a small percentage of world trade, those countries should not be subject to any burdensome review process in the CRTA, particularly given the CTD mandate that grants jurisdiction to the CTD over all issues concerning development. India also argued that if the CRTA were to be the forum for Enabling Clause agreements, it should also provide a forum for review of GSP programs, which are allowed by virtue of another paragraph of the enabling clause, be subject to the transparency provisions under discussion. (Note: We understand this concern stems from frustration with the lack of transparency concerning multiple EU GSP programs. End Note.) 4. Korea stressed that the task of increasing transparency was not to change the legal nature of the Enabling Clause, and sought clarification on the practical difference between procedures contemplated under GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause. The European Communities, Chile, Columbia, Japan, New Zealand, Hong Kong, China and Chinese Taipei joined the United States and Korea in supporting reviewing Enabling Clause agreements in the CRTA and sought further information on developing countries' specific, practical objections to the particular transparency elements being considered in the Rules Group. Argentina also supported reviewing Enabling Clause agreements in the CRTA to increase efficiency and transparency. Canada took issue with some of India's points, noting that the Enabling Clause does have an obligation to consult, that although "south-south" RTAs may have a minimal impact on the global market, they can impact regional markets as well as neighboring markets, and that steps could be taken to lessen the burden on developing countries. Australia suggested discussing the types of information needed for transparency. Barbados, an ACP country, notably, notably did not join India in arguing for CTD jurisdiction, wondering what the great burden was in notifying agreements to the CRTA. 5. Toward the end of the discussion, India argued that any improvements in transparency for Enabling Clause agreements should be negotiated in the CTD, to which the Chair vehemently objected as an improper delegation of negotiating authority. He reminded Members that the Rules meetings were open to all Members, including members of the CTD, and that they were welcome to attend future discussions. In concluding the discussion, the Chair acknowledged that Members generally agreed that additional transparency would be helpful, but expressed disappointment that the discussion had not focused more on the practical concerns of the developing countries regarding the specific elements under consideration in the negotiations. Accordingly, he plans to continue the informal discussions by focusing on the specific new procedures being discussed in the Rules Group for RTAs, whether any raise particular concerns regarding developing country rights and obligations under the Enabling Clause, and if so, how to address such concerns. In approaching this problem, he underscored that the intent was by no means to change the legal rights and obligations of developing countries under the Enabling Clause, but rather to explore the extent to which certain proposed procedural reforms might or might not be appropriate for all agreements. 6. Comment: The United States sees coverage of Enabling Clause agreements as an essential element of an eventual Rules Group agreement on transparency. All WTO Members have an interest in being better informed about RTAs between developing countries, whether their neighbors or competitors. The WTO reforms being contemplated for regional trade agreements envisage greater Secretariat responsibility in collecting and presenting SIPDIS information. Accordingly, there seem to be few if any legitimate practical reasons for developing countries to resist having Enabling Clause RTAs covered. End Comment. Allgeier
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