US embassy cable - 05PARIS7399

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LATEST GOF THINKING ON MEHLIS REPORT, SYRIA/LEBANON

Identifier: 05PARIS7399
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS7399 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-10-28 17:45:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL FR LE SY UNSC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007399 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, FR, LE, SY, UNSC 
SUBJECT: LATEST GOF THINKING ON MEHLIS REPORT, SYRIA/LEBANON 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) Summary: On October 28, Herve Besancenot, the MFA's 
DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant, offered latest French 
thinking on the Mehlis report and other related issues. 
Besancenot said France was focused on gaining unanimity for a 
draft resolution in the Security Council, and was willing to 
compromise on certain issues in order to protect French 
redlines, such as invoking Chapter VII and threatening 
sanctions.  He emphasized that FM Douste-Blazy would only go 
to the UN on October 31 if agreement on a text had been 
reached.  In regards to both the Mehlis and Larsen reports, 
Besancenot said it was critically important for future 
reports to stay within their mandates and avoid bringing in 
other issues, even if they were linked in reality.  Focusing 
exclusively on their respective mandates was essential to 
maintaining their credibility, said Besancenot.  End summary. 
 
----------------- 
THE MEHLIS REPORT 
----------------- 
 
2. (C) Poloff raised President Chirac's October 27 statement 
at the informal European Summit at Hampton Roads in which he 
said he was in favor of an "international tribunal" in 
accordance with what he termed Saad Hariri's wishes.  (Note: 
It was later reported as Chirac "calling" for an 
international tribunal.  End note)  Besancenot said President 
Chirac had clearly stated that even if he believed an 
international tribunal was a good idea, France would respond 
to the Lebanese government's wishes.  France was ready to 
contribute in any way necessary, but would follow Lebanon's 
lead regarding the trial of those involved in PM Hariri's 
assassination. 
 
3. (C) Besancenot also offered his take on the draft UNSCR to 
respond to the Mehlis report.  He said France's firm 
conviction was that the resolution should be unanimous; to 
settle for a majority would harm international efforts to 
respond to the Mehlis report.  He said he understood the USG 
argument that UNSCR 1559 had passed with a majority instead 
of unanimity, but he said the GOF regretted in that case that 
unanimity had not been achieved.  In order to reach 
unanimity, France was willing to be flexible on some issues, 
such as a call on Syria to cease all interference in Lebanon 
and the invoking of the terrorist clause, in order to protect 
its redlines: invoking Chapter VII (which Besancenot called 
"indispensable") and the threat of sanctions.  These two 
concepts were absolutely key for any resolution, said 
Besancenot.  However, he said France would focus on abiding 
by strict judicial processes, to avoid charges that sanctions 
against individuals would be levied for political reasons. 
Syria was trying its hardest to divide the Security Council, 
said Besancenot, and it was therefore essential that the U.S. 
and France work towards unanimity within the council. 
 
4. (C) The key was the actual Mehlis report, said Besancenot. 
 It is accepted by all countries, including those in the Arab 
world.  Given its credibility, the international community 
should strictly follow the report's recommendations and not 
go any further, again to avoid charges of political 
opportunism.  It was for this reason, said Besancenot, that 
France would not insist on including in the draft resolution 
a clause that called on Syria to cease all interference in 
Lebanon.  This was related to the Mehlis report, but not a 
focus of it.  France had no interest in a "melting pot" 
resolution, either for the Mehlis report or in reaction to 
the Larsen report, said Besancenot.  The GOF believed it was 
not sellable to Arab countries or to the UNSC.  Given the 
success up to this point of the Mehlis report, it would be 
counter-productive to overreach, said Besancenot.  France was 
very willing for Mehlis to continue his work (and even to 
give him an extension to the December deadline), in order 
that he might "transform suspicion into proof," said 
Besancenot. 
 
----------------- 
THE LARSEN REPORT 
----------------- 
 
5. (C) Turning to the latest report from UN Envoy Terje 
Roed-Larsen regarding compliance with UNSCR 1559, Besancenot 
said Larsen was well within his mandate to focus on the PFLP 
and Hezbollah as two organizations that continue to hold 
weaponry in defiance of 1559.  Returning to a point he made 
on the Mehlis report, Besancenot emphasized that Larsen 
should keep to the strict confines of the mandate.  It was 
not useful, said Besancenot, to raise the presence of 
Palestinian extremist groups in Damascus or Syrian-Iraqi 
border issues, because to do so would diminish the report's 
credibility and also diminish the credibility of any 
subsequent resolutions. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
White 

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