US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2942

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA: FIRST STATE VISIT SINCE THE CZAR

Identifier: 05THEHAGUE2942
Wikileaks: View 05THEHAGUE2942 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2005-10-28 12:47:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PHUM EPET NL RS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002942 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS AND EUR/UBI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, EPET, NL, RS 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/RUSSIA:  FIRST STATE VISIT SINCE THE 
CZAR 
 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Described as the first Russian state visit 
to the Netherlands since Czar Nicholas II, the Dutch plan to 
receive Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 1-2 with 
full "pomp and circumstance."  The MFA expects a positive 
visit with "good atmospherics" but little progress on 
substantive issues.  Investment, energy, and the fight 
against terrorism will top the list of bilateral issues, 
although the Dutch hope to broaden the discussion to include 
human rights and integration of ethnic minorities.  Putin's 
trip will highlight several Dutch-Russian cultural themes, 
although the recuperation of the Koenigs Collection remains a 
sore point.  Foreign Ministers Bot and Lavrov also will meet 
on the margins to discuss a range of issues, including 
Belarus, post-Soviet frozen conflicts, the Balkans, and Iran. 
 End Summary. 
 
Nominal Putin Itinerary 
----------------------- 
 
2. (C) Henk Voskamp, Deputy Director of the MFA's Office of 
Southeast and Eastern Europe, told Poloff on October 26 that 
Putin's upcoming whirlwind visit to the Netherlands marks the 
first formal state visit by a Russian head of state since 
Czar Nicholas II.  Putin will arrive in the Netherlands the 
morning of November 1 and spend the majority of the day in 
Amsterdam.  Following the signing of a Road Transport Treaty, 
Putin will meet the mayor of Amsterdam and then have lunch 
with heads of industry.  Putin will then visit the house in 
which Peter the Great resided during his years in the 
Netherlands, and end the day with a state dinner hosted by 
Queen Beatrix at Noordeinde Palace in The Hague.  A bilateral 
meeting between PM Balkenende and Putin will take place on 
November 2, followed by a visit to the Peace Palace and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). (Note: Czar Nicholas II 
was instrumental in the formation of the ICJ.  End note.) 
Putin will then depart the Netherlands in the early evening 
of November 2. 
 
Investment and Energy 
--------------------- 
 
3. (C) On October 21, Rob Swartbol, PM Balkenende's Senior 
Foreign Policy Advisor, told Charge that investment and 
energy would be the two most important issues on the 
bilateral agenda for the visit.  According to Voskamp, Russia 
considers the Netherlands its second largest investor, after 
Cyprus, but added that this perception might be a bit skewed 
as Russia views many multinational corporations with 
headquarters in the Netherlands and investments in Russia as 
"Dutch" companies.  Nevertheless, Dutch investment in Russia 
is quite large, Voskamp said.  (Note: Shell's Sakhalin II gas 
project may cost as much as USD 20 billion alone.  End note.) 
 Swartbol said Putin will try to make the case during the 
lunch with industry heads that Russia's investment climate 
has changed for the better. Voskamp said Putin also will 
argue that Russia's accession to the WTO conflicts with its 
bilateral investment treaty with the Netherlands.  The Dutch 
strongly disagree on this, and will push Russia to take steps 
to better safeguard Dutch investments, Voskamp said. 
 
4. (C) On energy, Voskamp noted that discussions continue on 
long-term deals between Gazprom and Dutch counterparts.  He 
explained that these discussions are independent of the state 
visit, and while he did not expect any movement, these 
negotiations will provide "good atmospherics" for the visit. 
Voskamp did not expect Putin to "play the bilateral card" to 
divide EU members on energy issues during his visit.  He 
suggested that Russia has been fairly predictable when it 
comes to energy issues as it seeks to obtain lucrative deals 
or to diversify transport routes. 
 
Terrorism or Something Broader 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Voskamp said Putin has requested an exchange of views 
on fighting terrorism and religious extremism.  Such a 
perfunctory exchange would have limited utility -- no one 
should doubt the Netherlands' commitment to fight terrorism, 
especially as Putin's visit falls on the one year anniversary 
of Theo Van Gogh's murder, he averred.  He said the Dutch 
welcome the exchange but suggested that PM Balkenende may 
attempt to broaden the discussion to include human rights, 
corruption, poverty, and discrimination -- issues that 
certainly feed terrorism and religious extremism in Chechnya. 
 Voskamp expected a continuation of Putin's tough message -- 
terrorists are terrorists -- which has proven popular with 
Russian voters.  However, he pointed to recent statements in 
the Duma emphasizing the integration of ethnic minorities in 
the fight against terrorism; Balkenende might use these 
statements to try and broaden the discussion beyond a simple 
affirmation to fight terrorism. 
 
6. (C) Swartbol also suggested that Balkenende may raise UN 
reform, Georgia, and reform progress in Ukraine in addition 
to the planned exchange on terrorism. 
 
Cultural Issues 
--------------- 
 
7. (C) Voskamp characterized the cultural aspect of Putin's 
visit as overwhelmingly positive full of "pomp and 
circumstance," albeit with one glaring sore spot.  He said 
Russia has expressed appreciation for the Netherlands' role 
in promoting cultural exchanges and contributing toward the 
recent commemoration of St. Petersburg.  He emphasized 
Dutch-Russian cultural ties, pointing to the branch of the 
Hermitage in Amsterdam, and noted that the Dutch have a good 
relationship with the highly-influential director of the 
Hermitage in Moscow. 
 
8. (C) The sore spot involves restitution of the Koenigs 
Collection.  (Note: Dutch businessmen Franz Koenigs collected 
2671 drawings and paintings by old masters including Rubens. 
He lost the collection in 1940 when he was unable to repay a 
bank loan; the paintings were resold to various owners by the 
bank. A quarter of the collection was illegally taken by the 
Nazis out the Netherlands during World War II, and eventually 
ended up in Russia as war spoils.  End note.)  Voskamp 
explained that Russia has acknowledged the Dutch legal 
procedure regarding the return of the stolen art, and even 
informally agrees that the Dutch have a strong legal case. 
However, Russia continues to view the collection as German -- 
and not Dutch -- and therefore is not obligated to return the 
collection to either the Netherlands or a former enemy 
combatant such as Germany. Voskamp suspected that Putin would 
continue to stress sensitivity in the matter, and doubted any 
resolution would be achieved during the visit. 
 
Lavrov-Bot Bilat: Belarus, Frozen Conflicts, Balkans, Iran 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
9. (C) During Putin's visit, Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Bot 
will also meet to discuss Belarus, "frozen conflicts" in the 
post-Soviet states, and Iran.  (Note: Bot and Lavrov last met 
on the margins of the UNGA in September, and earlier during 
Lavrov's visit to the Netherlands in June 2005.  End note.) 
Voskamp noted that the Netherlands hoped to coordinate 
further with Washington on a strategy with Belarus, but added 
that the EU was split over engaging Russia on the question of 
further sanctions.  He doubted much progress would be made 
during the visit.  Voskamp was more optimistic that Russia 
might be cooperative regarding Transnistria, suggesting 
resolution of the conflict was a common EU-Russia goal. 
 
10. (C) On the Balkans, Voskamp noted that the Russians often 
draw parallels "with a smile" between Transnistria and the 
final status question in Kosovo.  He said that Dutch policy 
on the Balkans should be viewed in conjunction with the EU's 
policy, and referred to the importance of the Eide report. 
The Russian position on Kosovo seems very clear, he said: 
while Moscow did not want to block progress on the 
comprehensive review, progress should nevertheless be 
determined by benchmarks and results -- and not an artificial 
timetable. 
 
11. (C) Voskamp anticipated a "clear cut" discussion on Iran 
as Moscow obviously has commercial interests to protect.  He 
said the Netherlands fully supports the efforts of the EU3; a 
"clear case" of non-compliance should be referred to the 
UNSC.  While Russia has supported the threat of referring 
Iran to the UN Security Council, Voskamp noted the Russians 
are afraid an actual referral would only serve to bolster the 
regime in Tehran and possibly lead to regional instability. 
 
12. (C) Voskamp said Bot might raise Uzbekistan, and that the 
Netherlands and the United States share the same analysis of 
the political situation in Central Asia.  He added that the 
Netherlands tends to look more closely at Kazakhstan due to 
its stronger political and commercial presence.  But it was 
also clear that Moscow supports actions by the Uzbek 
government as consistent with its own efforts to fight 
terrorism.  Voskamp doubted Georgia would be raised, and 
Ukraine only tangentially. 
 
SCHOFER 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04