US embassy cable - 02ROME5624

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2007 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, ZI, SU, SO, ER, IV, ET, PINR, ZI, SU, SO, ER, IV, ET, IT, ITPREL 
SUBJECT: ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE 
D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POL M C TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASON 1.5 (D) 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  05624  01 OF 02  191607Z 
1.    (U) THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE.  SEE PARA 7. 
 
2.    (C) SUMMARY:  ON NOVEMBER 14, MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR 
AFRICA BRUNO CABRAS GAVE A READOUT OF THE EU-SADC MEETING, 
WHICH FOCUSED ON ZIMBABWE AND MADE NO PROGRESS; REQUESTED 
THAT THE SUDAN "TROIKA" BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE GOI; 
ARGUED FOR GREATER INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOMALIA 
PEACE PROCESS; SHARED CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE 
IVOIRIAN CRISIS ON THE REGION; AND ASKED FOR EMBASSY 
ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING A CONTRACTOR TO TRANSPORT THE 
ETHIOPIAN AXUM OBELISK HOME.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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EU-SADC:  NO REAL DIALOGUE, JUST THEATRE ON ZIMBABWE 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3.    (C) POLMINCOUNS MET WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR 
AFRICA BRUNO CABRAS (AT THE DG'S REQUEST) NOVEMBER 14 FOR AN 
OVERVIEW ON AFRICA DEVELOPMENTS.  CABRAS OPENED WITH A 
READOUT ON THE RECENT EU MEETING WITH THE SOUTHERN AFRICA 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) IN MAPUTO.  CABRAS NOTED THAT 
THE ZIMBABWE ISSUE "CAST A SHADOW" ON THE MEETING THAT 
LIMITED ITS SUCCESS.  THE GOZ REFUSED A TEXT THAT COULD HAVE 
ESTABLISHED AN EU-SADC TASK FORCE TO WORK ON A SOLUTION TO 
ZIMBABWE'S CRISIS, BECAUSE IT WAS "AN INTERNAL AFFAIR." 
CABRAS REMARKED, "THERE WAS NO REAL DIALOGUE, JUST THEATRICAL 
PRESENTATION.  IT DOESN'T AUGUR WELL FOR THE 28 NOVEMBER 
MINISTERIAL IN OUAGADOUGOU, WHICH WILL PREPARE FOR THE EU-OAU 
(EU-AU) SUMMIT IN COPENHAGEN NEXT APRIL." 
 
4.    (C) CABRAS CONTINUED THAT THE EU HAD NO PROSPECTS OR 
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PAGE 03        ROME  05624  01 OF 02  191607Z 
IDEAS ON ZIMBABWE.  THE SITUATION WAS BLOCKED BUT NOT 
NECESSARILY WORSENING, EU STATES BELIEVED.  WHETHER TO INVITE 
ZIMBABWE TO THE MEETING HAD BEEN DEBATED IN THE EU UNTIL THE 
LAST MINUTE, WITH SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FAVORING THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE INVITATION SO AS TO ASSURE CONTINUED EU-SADC 
DIALOGUE.  SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OPPOSED EXCLUSIONS AND 
SANCTIONS AGAINST ANY SADC MEMBER. 
 
---------------------------- 
SHORING UP CAPACITY IN SUDAN 
---------------------------- 
 
5.    (C) CABRAS NOTED THAT THE GOI WAS INCREASING ITS 
CAPACITY IN SUDAN BY SENDING A COLONEL TO JOIN THE ITALIAN 
POLITICAL ADVISOR IN THE NUBA MOUNTAINS CEASE-FIRE MONITORING 
UNIT.  CABRAS SAID THAT THE INFORMAL TROIKA -- NORWAY, THE 
US, AND THE UK -- WAS ACTIVE IN BOTH NEW YORK AND GENEVA ON 
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY, AND ITALY WOULD "LIKE TO GET IN ON THAT."  BOTH 
THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION WERE MORE COMFORTABLE 
WHEN THE GOI WAS INVOLVED. 
 
-------------------------------- 
CEASE-FIRE OBSERVERS FOR SOMALIA 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.     (C) CABRAS UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY TO HELP SOLVE THE SOMALI PROBLEM.  WAHHABISM 
IMPORTED ALONG WITH SAUDI FINANCING FOR NGOS IS "SLOWLY BUT 
SURELY" AFFECTING SOMALIA.  "IF WE ABANDON SOMALIA," HE SAID, 
"IT WILL BECOME A SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORISTS."  HE ADDED THAT 
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PAGE 04        ROME  05624  01 OF 02  191607Z 
THE SOMALIS HAD RESPONDED WELL TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE 
INITIATIVE AND WERE "GENUINELY INTERESTED."  IN ORDER TO 
INCREASE ITS PRESENCE IN SOMALIA, THE GOI HAD SENT TO ELDORET 
AMB. GIACCOMELE, A FORMER AMBASSADOR TO SOMALIA.  IN 
ADDITION, THE GOI WAS WORKING WITH THE EU TO OBTAIN FINANCING 
FOR ADDITIONAL EXPERTS FOR SOMALIA AND EXPECTED TO BE 
SUCCESSFUL.  CABRAS ALSO BELIEVED IT NECESSARY TO SEND 
CEASE-FIRE OBSERVERS TO SOMALIA, PERHAPS FIFTY OR SIXTY 
PEOPLE FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES.  HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE 
WERE "MANY PROBLEMS" SUCH AS SECURITY THAT WOULD NEED TO BE 
ADDRESSED BEFORE SUCH PEACEKEEPERS COULD BE DEPLOYED.  HE 
CHARACTERIZED VIOLATIONS OF THE SOMALI CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION 
AS "VERY LIMITED" AND "OVERCOME NOW." 
 
--------------------------- 
ERITREA LOOKING FOR TROUBLE 
--------------------------- 
 
7.    (C) MEANWHILE, THE UNITED STATES COULD TALK WITH 
ETHIOPIA OR ERITREA ABOUT SOMALIA.  CABRAS EXPRESSED INTEREST 
IN THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF ERITREA.  ACTION REQUEST:  POST 
HAS FOUND BRIEFINGS TO THE GOI BY TDY REGIONAL INTEL ANALYSTS 
TO BE EXTREMELY USEFUL TO BOTH SIDES.  REQUEST THAT 
DEPARTMENT DISPATCH ONE TO TWO HORN OF AFRICA INTELLIGENCE 
ANALYSTS FROM INR OR THE IC FOR EXCHANGES WITH THE GOI 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO5417 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  05624  02 OF 02  191607Z 
ACTION INR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AID-00   INL-00   USNW-00  DINT-00 
      DODE-00  DOTE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EAP-00   EB-00    EUR-00 
      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  L-00     VCE-00 
      AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIG-03   OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SS-00    TRSE-00 
      T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00 
      NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /008W 
                  ------------------0B311F  191622Z /38 
R 191448Z NOV 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6988 
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE 
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 
AMEMBASSY HARARE 
CIA WASHDC 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 005624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2007 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, ZI, SU, SO, ER, IV, ET, IT 
SUBJECT: ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE 
D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA 
 
SERVICES AND THE MFA.  END ACTION REQUEST.  CABRAS NOTED THAT 
YEMEN, ETHIOPIA, AND SUDAN HAD "GANGED UP" AGAINST ERITREA. 
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PAGE 02        ROME  05624  02 OF 02  191607Z 
FURTHERMORE, THE ERITREAN DELEGATION FELT SIDELINED AT 
MACHAKOS.  THESE TENSIONS WERE VERY DANGEROUS, BECAUSE THEY 
COULD DISRUPT THREE REGIONAL PEACE PROCESSES.  CABRAS 
CHARACTERIZED ERITREA AS "LOOKING FOR TROUBLE."  HE ASKED 
WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WOULD EXTEND MILITARY COOPERATION 
TO ASMARA.  WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR POLICY WAS NO EXPANSION OF 
COOPERATION UNTIL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED.  CABRAS 
ADDED THAT PRESIDENT ISAIAS OF ETHIOPIA HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN 
TO THE DANISH EU PRESIDENCY TO SAY THAT ETHIOPIA WAS READY 
FOR DIALOGUE, HOPEFULLY PERMANENT DIALOGUE. 
 
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CRISIS IN COTE D'IVOIRE COURTS REGIONAL DISASTER 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
8.    (C) AS THE KEY STATE IN WEST AFRICA AND AN IMMIGRANT 
MAGNET, COTE D'IVOIRE WAS IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF AFRICA. 
"WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THE WORST THING THAT COULD HAVE 
HAPPENED TO AFRICA," CABRAS OPINED.  IT WAS A VERY COMPLEX 
AND DANGEROUS SITUATION, WITH NO SOLUTION IN SIGHT, WHICH 
COULD DEGENERATE INTO A REGIONAL CRISIS OF SERIOUS 
PROPORTIONS.  NOTING THAT FRANCE HAD OVER 25,000 NATIONALS 
THERE, CABRAS OBSERVED THAT FRANCE WAS DOING THE ESSENTIAL 
JOB OF MANNING THE BORDERS OF THE TWO CONFLICT ZONES AND 
PROTECTING FOREIGNERS.  HOWEVER, BOTH SIDES PERCEIVED FRANCE 
AS BEING SELF-INTERESTED, SO IT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SERVE AS 
A MEDIATOR.  CABRAS WANTED THE EU TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE 
IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND JOINT CANADIAN-EU-US DEMARCHES AND 
CONSULTATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN CARRIED OUT. 
 
9.    (C) CABRAS SAID THE SITUATION COULD EASILY BECOME A 
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PAGE 03        ROME  05624  02 OF 02  191607Z 
DISASTER AFFECTING THE ECONOMY OF THE ENTIRE REGION BECAUSE 
OF ABIDJAN'S IMPORTANCE AS A REGIONAL SEAPORT.  THE REBELS 
HAD A FOLLOWING AND MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE NORTH AND WEST. 
ECOWAS COULD PROVIDE A WAY OUT WITH EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION OR 
MEDIATION, BUT IF IT FAILED, THE RESULT WOULD BE EITHER CIVIL 
WAR OR PARTITION. 
 
10.   (C) ASKED IF THE GOI HAD ANY PARTICULAR INFLUENCE ON 
PRESIDENT GBAGBO, GIVEN THAT HE WAS IN ROME WHEN THE COUP 
ATTEMPT TOOK PLACE, CABRAS SAID YES.  THE GOI HAD TOLD GBAGBO 
NOT TO GIVE IN TO ETHNIC OR REGIONAL PREJUDICE (IMPLICITLY 
CRITICIZING HIS MILITARY'S MOVES TO PURGE ALL OFFICERS FROM A 
NORTHERN ETHNIC GROUP AND TO DESTROY THE RESIDENCES OF 
BURKINABE IMMIGRANTS).  HOWEVER, THE MILITARY HAD DEFEATED 
THE COUP ATTEMPT AND KEPT GBAGBO IN POWER, A FACT THAT MIGHT 
"CONSTRAIN" HIS "GOOD INTENTIONS" TO KEEP IT IN CHECK. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
HOW TO GET THE AXUM OBELISK BACK TO ETHIOPIA 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
11.   (C) HAVING FINALLY AGREED -- NOT ONLY IN THEORY BUT 
ALSO IN PRACTICE -- TO RETURN THE AXUM OBELISK THAT WAS TAKEN 
TO ITALY BY THE FASCISTS IN 1937, THE GOI IS FACING VERY 
COMPLICATED TRANSPORT ISSUES.  THE OBELISK WILL BE CUT INTO 
PIECES AND FLOWN DIRECTLY TO AXUM TO AVOID THE JARRING 
OVERLAND ROUTE THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY IF IT WERE SHIPPED 
BACK.  BECAUSE THE AXUM AIRPORT IS LIMITED, THE GOI IS 
CONSIDERING THE USE OF C5A GALAXY AND/OR C17 AIRPLANES FOR 
TWO LOADS (68 AND 86 TONS).  CABRAS ASKED IF POST KNEW OF A 
CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR FOR THESE TYPES OF PLANES. 
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SEMBLER 
 
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 2002ROME05624 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL