US embassy cable - 05HARARE1490

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001490 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC, ZANU-PF 
SUBJECT: MDC LEADERS LOOKING TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES, TAKE 
FIGHT TO ZANU-PF 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) In an evening meeting on October 27, MDC President 
Morgan Tsvangirai told the Ambassador that his meeting 
earlier that day with the MDC,s other leaders had gone well. 
 They had not resolved as yet the issue of participation in 
the Senate elections but had agreed that the struggle against 
President Mugabe outweighed their internal differences.  The 
leadership was to meet again after the weekend at which time 
he expected a &face-saving8 solution to the dispute that 
would include agreement on an electoral boycott as the first 
step in a national program of action.  The Ambassador 
encouraged Tsvangirai to prepare in advance for President 
Mugabe,s counter-moves, such as using food to get out the 
vote.  He warned that Mugabe might also try to distract 
attention from GOZ failures through some radical new 
initiative for which the MDC needed to be prepared.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Intra-MDC Negotiations: Saving Face 
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2. (C) Tsvangirai told the Ambassador that the MDC,s six 
senior leaders had met for over four hours earlier in the day 
to try to iron out differences over participation in the 
upcoming Senate elections.  He said that from his perspective 
the meeting had gone well.  The MDC leadership had not yet 
resolved their differences over participating in the Senate 
elections but they had agreed that the dispute must not 
outweigh their collective determination to stay united in the 
struggle against Mugabe. 
 
3. (C) Moreover, Tsvangirai said that Brian Raftopoulos, a 
well-respected leader of Zimbabwe,s civil society who had 
mediated the meeting, told the six that while Tsvangirai 
might have committed some technical breaches of the party,s 
constitution, his view represented the true wishes of the 
party,s rank and file.  The other six, all of whom favored 
participation, had not disputed this, particularly in the 
wake of the nomination process, when nine of the twelve MDC 
provinces had backed Tsvangirai.  Tsvangirai said the 
leadership had agreed to meet again on Monday next week and 
to agree on a face-saving way out of their current 
disagreement. 
 
4. (C) The Ambassador said he hoped such a solution would not 
obscure for the other leaders the reality that Tsvangirai,s 
had prevailed and that MDC supporters wanted the party to 
fight the regime not cooperate with it.  Tsvangirai said he 
hoped his &Bulawayo colleagues8 would realize just that 
following the weekend.  They were clearly feeling pressure 
from public opinion, even in Matabeleland, and really had no 
other good options.  The Ndebele people would never 
countenance an alliance with ZANU-PF or Jonathon Moyo, and 
forming a party on their own made little sense.  He also 
agreed with the Ambassador,s assessment that they had hurt 
their image further by their trip to Pretoria to see 
President Mbeki.  It had made them look both weak and 
disloyal. 
 
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Reenergized MDC,s First Step: An Election Boycott 
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5. (C) Tsvangirai said the dispute had actually helped 
galvanize the party and its supporters and the key now was to 
agree on a national program of action against the regime. 
The first step in that national program should be a 
successful boycott, which would deny Mugabe the legitimacy he 
hoped to attain from the Senate elections.  The Ambassador 
noted that in that regard that the 26 MDC candidates who had 
filed had done Tsvangirai a favor, since otherwise there 
would have been no election to boycott.  The ZANU-PF 
candidates, running unopposed, would simply have been 
declared the winners, as had happened in nineteen districts. 
The best outcome now, to which Tsvangirai agreed, would be to 
convince the candidates themselves to actively campaign for a 
boycott. 
6. (C) The Ambassador also noted that ZANU-PF was likely to 
use any means at its disposal to prevent a successful boycott 
and that the MDC needed to be ready.  In particular, there 
were reports that the ruling party would use food as a weapon 
to encourage voters to turn out.  A purple thumb would result 
in a bag of maize.  He suggested that a hunger strike by 
Tsvangirai and other MDC leaders might be one way to 
 
SIPDIS 
counteract that tactic.  Tsvangirai said he had also given 
this thought and that another approach would be to encourage 
voters to take the food but then to spoil their ballots. 
 
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After the Election 
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7. (C) The Ambassador said the MDC also should try to 
anticipate Mugabe,s next moves after the election.  In that 
regard, the Ambassador noted the increasing number of reports 
that the military and police were demoralized by their poor 
salaries and were being downsized to save money.  Mugabe 
might, for instance, look for a way to distract people from 
his government,s failures by &discovering8 some sort of 
coup attempt or other conspiracy and in the process try to 
get rid of subordinates he considered disloyal. 
 
8. (C) Tsvangirai said the reports were true and that the 
situation was becoming increasingly dangerous as discontent 
within the ranks increased.  He was convinced, however, that 
if the MDC took to the streets many of the police and 
military would refuse orders to break up the demonstrations. 
The Ambassador noted that Tsvangirai,s recent speech, in 
which he had criticized the government for not providing for 
the welfare of the troops, doubtless helped build that sort 
of good will. 
 
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Comment 
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9. (C) Tsvangirai was relaxed and confident that he has 
carried the day.  With nine of twelve provinces clearly 
backing him, we would agree.  He believes his rivals within 
the MDC, principally the Ndebele leaders, are now in an 
untenable situation and will have to climb down from their 
position and to that end he is prepared to agree to an 
agreement that allows them to do so without being humiliated. 
 However, his generosity risks being misconstrued by some of 
his rivals, who are also committed to fighting the Mugabe 
regime, but from within a political system that is rigged 
against them.  As we have noted before, the regime may be 
fragile but the opposition is in no position to capitalize on 
its weakness until it resolves its own internal debate over 
how best to confront the regime.  That debate may finally be 
over next week. 
DELL