US embassy cable - 05RANGOON1215

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, DRL/IL; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ELAB, PHUM, BM 
SUBJECT: ILO WILL ANNOUNCE BURMA'S INTENTION TO WITHDRAW 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1174 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. RANGOON 1094 
     C. RANGOON 897 AND PREVIOUS 
     D. RANGOON 246 
     E. STATE 195514 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: A/DCM W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The International Labor Organization (ILO) 
will issue on October 28 what its representative in Burma 
calls an "explosive" report that reveals the GOB's intention 
to withdraw from the organization, only the second time in 
recent decades that a member state has quit the ILO over 
labor-related criticism.  The report--issued on the basis of 
a recent, un-publicized two-day visit to Burma by a senior 
ILO advisor aimed at resuming a dialogue on forced 
labor--will also make public a series of death threats 
directed at the ILO's Liaison Officer in Rangoon, note the 
GOB's failure to take action on those threats, and draw 
attention to the regime's anti-ILO propaganda campaign and 
overall unresponsiveness on forced labor issues.  A senior 
GOB minister told the ILO envoy that the regime is no longer 
worried about ILO pressure, but rather is deeply concerned 
that the UN Security Council could decide to address Burma 
issues.  End Summary. 
 
AN "EXPLOSIVE" REPORT 
 
2. (C) On October 27, Richard Horsey, the ILO's Liaison 
Officer, a.i. in Burma, called on the acting Charge and 
Emboffs to inform, in confidence, that the ILO in Geneva will 
release a report that summarizes findings of an un-publicized 
Oct. 18-19 visit to Rangoon of the ILO Director General's 
Burma advisor Francis Maupain.  According to Horsey, the 
report will be posted on Friday October 28 at 10:00 a.m. 
local time in Geneva. 
 
3. (C) Horsey said that Maupain had visited Rangoon at the 
invitation of the GOB.  In recent weeks, there have been 
signs that the Burmese regime was stepping back from an 
intense anti-ILO campaign, undertaken in the wake of the June 
International Labor Conference (refs A-C).  Minister of Labor 
U Thaung, who had shunned the ILO for months, met recently 
with Horsey on two occasions to discuss labor issues, and the 
regime's mass-member organization, the Union Solidarity and 
Development Association (USDA), ceased its massive anti-ILO 
rallies.  The ILO, said Horsey, went ahead with the Maupain 
visit as a low-key effort to resume a dialogue with the GOB, 
de facto in suspension since the failed mission of a 
high-profile senior ILO mission to Burma in February (ref D). 
 
4. (C) According to Horsey, the ILO report on Maupain's 
visit, which did not succeed in resuming a dialogue, will be 
"explosive" and will make public ILO information regarding: 
 
--the GOB's apparent decision to withdraw from the ILO (as 
communicated in no uncertain terms to Maupain and Horsey by 
the Minister of Labor); 
--the regime's anti-ILO campaign, undertaken since June, 
including mass rallies conducted by the USDA; 
--a series of death threats directed at Horsey and the GOB's 
failure to investigate those threats or take protective 
measures (ref B); and, 
--the GOB's overall unresponsiveness on forced labor issues. 
 
A NOISY START TO A QUIET VISIT 
 
5. (C) Horsey recounted that he and Maupain met twice with 
the Labor Minister during Maupain's "very quiet" October 
18-19 visit (the ILO reps and the Minister separately 
consulted with their respective hierarchies overnight, 
between the two meetings).  Minister U Thaung shocked the ILO 
envoy at the outset of the initial meeting by informing him 
that senior SPDC authorities had already decided that Burma 
would withdraw from the ILO.  U Thaung claimed that he had 
"gone out on a limb" with his superiors to delay official 
notification of the decision, pending Maupain's visit and any 
prospect that the ILO mission could offer other options. 
Horsey said that news of a withdrawal was a complete surprise 
since the visit was expected to lead to progress on a way 
forward for the GOB to work with the ILO. 
6. (C) Maupain told the Labor Minister that withdrawal from 
the ILO would be a negative step and send a very bad signal, 
not that the GOB was upset with the ILO, but rather that it 
was not willing or able to eliminate forced labor.  U Thaung 
responded that the GOB was no longer worried about ILO 
pressure, but rather was deeply concerned that the UN 
Security Council would decide to address Burma issues (ref 
E).  The ILO reps countered that a GOB decision to withdraw 
from the ILO could, in fact, spur potential UNSC action, 
given that forced labor issues formed part of the basis for 
such action.  "If you quit the ILO," Maupain advised the 
Minister, "you will embarrass the very countries that have 
supported you at the ILO and are trying to keep you off of 
the UNSC agenda."   Maupain added that some countries had 
defended Burma because they had seen some positive steps on 
forced labor and wanted to encourage the GOB, but pulling the 
plug on the ILO would make such support more difficult. 
 
CONVINCE US OTHERWISE 
 
7. (C) Minister U Thaung said that all relevant GOB agencies 
had been consulted in making the withdrawal decision, but he 
asked if the ILO could offer anything to convince the senior 
SPDC leadership to do otherwise.  Horsey said the ILO wanted 
the GOB to look beyond the November Governing Body meeting in 
Geneva and that a longer-term strategy was necessary to deal 
with individual complaints of forced labor and other labor 
issues.  Horsey said the ILO offered that the joint Plan of 
Action on forced labor, developed in 2003 but tabled after 
the Depeyin attack against Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy, 
would be the best way forward.   Minister U Thaung, however, 
rejected the Plan of Action and declared that it was no 
longer a viable option (in what Horsey described as the GOB's 
first acknowledgment that it had no intention of resurrecting 
the Plan of Action). 
 
8.  (C) In the absence of a long-term strategy, Horsey said 
the only existing mechanism for cooperation on forced labor 
was his own ILO Liaison Office.  There are serious 
shortcomings with this mechanism, he said.  First, it is an 
ad hoc process, subject to allegations of bias and with no 
guarantees of confidentiality for individuals who report 
labor abuses.  His role, Horsey said, should be to liaise 
with the parties on forced labor issues, not to resolve 
specific labor complaints.  Second, the GOB has showed no 
support for the ILO Liaison Office, but rather issued 
diatribes against the ILO, condoned USDA anti-ILO rallies, 
and ignored multiple death threats against Horsey and his 
family.  Therefore, the ILO reps told the Labor Minister, 
using the Liaison Office mechanism would require three 
conditions: a clear intent by the GOB to investigate the 
death threats; a public GOB statement of support for the ILO 
process to mitigate the anti-ILO rallies; and a full GOB 
commitment to a meaningful dialogue with the ILO on forced 
labor issues. 
 
SEVERAL WAYS TO SKIN THE CAT 
 
9. (C) Over the course of the two-day Maupain visit, said 
Horsey, the GOB would not agree to undertake any of the three 
conditions and the ILO concluded there was nothing further it 
could recommend to the Labor Minister to convince the 
"authorities" to reverse the withdrawal decision.  Maupain 
again cautioned the Minister against leaving the ILO and 
advised that the GOB should avoid a "worse case scenario" 
that involved withdrawal notification, closing the Liaison 
Office, and eliminating dialogue during the mandatory 
two-year period before withdrawal officially takes effect. 
 
10. (C) Maupain told the Labor Minister that the GOB could 
"minimize" the damage of a withdrawal by indicating in its 
notification letter an intent to continue a dialogue with the 
ILO.  It would be better, Maupain added, to continue 
discussions during the two year period to try and find a way 
to resolve labor issues.  Horsey noted that the GOB would 
still need to address the current constraints facing the 
Liaison Office, otherwise the "intent to cooperate" would not 
be credible and would be perceived as simply buying more 
time.  Horsey told Emboffs that the ILO Director General 
views his mandate as seeking to engage the GOB in a dialogue 
and the ILO leadership doesn't support terminating Burma's 
membership.  Horsey observed, however, that if the Governing 
Body (GB) viewed the ILO's efforts in Burma as obstructed, 
members of the GB would most likely take action and seek to 
pull the plug on the Liaison Office. 
 
11. (C) Horsey acknowledged that Burma's withdrawal from the 
ILO is "hypothetical," given that the GOB has not yet 
submitted a formal letter of notification.  He underscored, 
however, that the October 28 ILO report would be entirely 
factual, to include the Minister of Labor's unambiguous 
statements to Maupain, over the course of two days, that 
senior SPDC leaders had already made the decision to 
withdraw.  Minister U Thaung, Horsey said, fully understood 
that the ILO would issue a report on the visit and that the 
report would reveal the GOB's intentions to withdraw from the 
ILO. 
 
COMMENT: THE CONFIDENT MESSENGER 
 
12. (C) Although the SPDC could react to the imminent ILO 
report in unpredictable (and illogical) ways, to include 
reneging on its notice to the ILO envoys, we note that Labor 
Minister U Thaung has the basis to speak on behalf of the GOB 
with some authority.  A retired Colonel, and former 
Ambassador to the United States, he is the longest serving 
member of the GOB cabinet (since 1996) and is very close to 
SPDC Chairman Than Shwe.  Horsey observed that U Thaung spoke 
with "extreme confidence" during the two sessions with the 
Maupain and gave every indication that he was reflecting 
senior SPDC thinking on the ILO issue.  End Comment. 
STOLTZ