US embassy cable - 05VIENNA3463

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 003463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015 
 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, IN, AU 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO AUSTRIA ON U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE 
 
 
CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR 
 
SUPPLIERS GROUP 
 
REF: STATE 190856 
 
Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Gregory E. Phillips.  Reaso 
 
n:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (SBU) EconPolCouns delivered reftel demarche to Dorothea 
 
Auer, Austrian MFA Director (assistant secretary) for 
 
Non-Proliferation, and Alexander Kmennt, Auer's DAS-level 
 
assistant for nuclear non-proliferation, on October 25. 
 
2.  (C) Auer and Kmennt were grateful for the detailed 
 
description of U.S. policy toward India's nuclear program 
 
which we presented.  Kmennt said he had attended AA/S 
 
Rademaker's presentation as well. 
 
3.  (C) Kmennt said Austria remained concerned about the 
 
consequences of the U.S. initiative for the Non-Proliferation 
 
Treaty.  We stressed that our policy would move India closer 
 
to our non-proliferation goals, and both Auer and Kmennt 
 
readily agreed that this would be a desireable outcome, if 
 
workable. 
 
4.  (C) Auer and Kmennt said one of the overriding questions 
 
for Austria and, as far as they could tell through their 
 
contacts, for other NPT states was the question of why the 
 
U.S. pursueed and concluded the arrangements with India so 
 
secretly.  The current policy initiative was in contradiction 
 
SIPDIS 
 
with the outcomes of the 1995 anbd 2000 NPT review 
 
conferences, if we were now saying that making decisions by 
 
consensus did not matter.  We said this was not our position. 
 
5.  (C) Kmennt noted that China was "very quiet" at the 
 
moment.  However, there was a good deal of speculation that 
 
the U.S. was hoping to elevate India to the status of 
 
strategic counterweight to China.  In this connection, Kmennt 
 
asked, how would we answer a Chinese initiative to create an 
 
"exception" for Pakistan?  We pointed out that the U.S.-India 
 
agreement was not about weapons, but about energy, and had no 
 
relevance to the strategic balance in Asia.  As concerns 
 
Pakistan, we said each country deserved unique treatment. 
 
The Indian "exception" would remain one if the international 
 
community kept it as such. 
 
6.  (C) Auer and Kmennt expressed doubt about our ability to 
 
separate the military and civilian sides of India's nuclear 
 
program.  We noted that the agreement with India includes 
 
safeguards, and we would work to implement them as part of 
 
the agreement. 
 
7.  (C) Kmennt asked about the sequencing of the commitments 
 
in the agreement, pointing out that India would deliver on 
 
its obligations only after the U.S. and the international 
 
community had done several important steps.  What would 
 
prevent India from reneging on its agreement after taking 
 
what it could?  We said both sides had taken the negotiations 
 
seriously, and we concluded the agreement in the expectation 
 
that the Indians would deliver on their promises. 
 
8.  (C) Auer and Kmennt thanked us for our presentation. 
 
They said the topic would occupy Austria during its EU 
 
Presidency in January-June 2006, and they asked that we 
 
remain in contact on progress on implementation of the 
 
agreement.  This would also be a topic for Troika meetings in 
 
the course of the Austrian presidency. 
 
van Voorst