US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1859

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001859 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, CE, Elections 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  CO-CHAIRS PREVIEW POSSIBLE ROLE 
POST-ELECTION; CHECK PULSE ON PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: COLOMBO 1853 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) On October 25 the Ambassador convened a meeting of 
Heads of Mission of the co-chairs of the 2003 Tokyo 
Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka to 
reassess the co-chairs' role in the wake of developments over 
the past two years.  Pointing out that many of their original 
operating assumptions have since not held true, the 
Ambassador urged his colleagues to consider the need for a 
fresh approach--regardless of who wins the November 17 
presidential election.  While co-chair representatives were 
reluctant to declare the Tokyo process finished, they 
acknowledged the need for new ideas to reinvigorate the 
stalled initiative.  Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar 
voiced particular concern that Prime Minister and Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate Mahinda Rajapakse, if elected, 
might continue his polarizing rhetoric and look to the 
international community to pick up the pieces of an 
increasingly fragile Ceasefire Agreement.  UK High 
Commissioner Stephen Evans suggested that co-chairs consider 
a "contingency plan" in the event that a victorious Rajapakse 
"blunders into a resumption of hostilities."  While the 
discussion produced no immediate answers, we hope this 
meeting will stimulate more creative and critical thinking 
about how the co-chairs can help re-energize the peace 
process in a new administration.  End summary. 
 
 
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IS TOKYO DEAD OR STILL TWITCHING? 
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2.  (C) On October 25 the Ambassador convened fellow 
co-chairs (heads of the EU, Japanese, Norwegian and UK 
Missions) of the 2003 Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and 
Development of Sri Lanka to reassess the vitality of the 
peace process andthe validity of the co-chairs' operating 
assumptions in the wake of developments since the conference. 
  The Ambassador opened the meeting by noting that the 
assumptions underpinning the so-called "Tokyo process"--(a) 
that both sides were serious about a negotiated settlement 
within the framework of a united Sri Lanka; (b) that both 
sides, especially the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), would respond to economic incentives to continue the 
peace process; and (c) that the Tigers would change from a 
military organization to a political one--have not been 
realized.  The co-chairs have not adapted their role to fit 
this reality, he observed, raising questions about their 
ability to influence progress toward peace.  Reviewing the 
co-chairs' role is especially timely in view of the November 
17 presidential elections, he stressed, since no matter who 
wins there must be a new start to the long-stalled peace 
process.  Prime Minister and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) 
candidate Mahinda Rajapakse is advocating a completely 
different approach--one that steps back from already 
agreed-upon principles of federalism and blames outside 
"interference" for the lack of positive progress--while 
United National Party (UNP) candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe 
seems to believe he can just pick up the peace process where 
his government left off after its defeat in the 2004 general 
elections.  Neither approach is realistic, the Ambassador 
said. 
 
3.  (C)  Newly arrived EU Ambassador Julian Wilson cited the 
consensus from the past month's co-chairs' meeting in New 
York--that the co-chairs still have a valuable role to play 
in supporting Norway's role as facilitator and in keeping the 
spotlight on Sri Lanka.  Japanese Ambassador Akio Suda 
responded that the Tokyo process may not be working as 
originally envisioned, but it is not finished. 
Characterizing the process as "broken but not dead,"  Suda 
pointed to developments on the reconstruction/rehabilitation 
front in the north and east as evidence of its 
still-lingering vitality, suggesting that the long-term 
positive impact on the peace process of such assistance 
remains unknown at this time.  Suda also said that Japan had 
never believed in a linkage between assistance and the peace 
process.  Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar said he saw two 
essential problems in the Tokyo process.  First, the LTTE did 
not attend the conference--and thus its views were not taken 
into account.  Second, the effectiveness of economic aid as 
an incentive on either party was exaggerated.  The process 
envisioned in the Tokyo Declaration would be effective if 
things were already going well, he commented, but is not be a 
good way to kick-start a stalled initiative or launch a new 
one. 
 
4.  (C) The Tokyo process had originally been envisioned as a 
way to influence both parties, not just the LTTE, Brattskar 
said.  Over the past few months the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) "has been stepping up the pressure," he reported, 
adding that he had been convoked several times recently to 
receive warnings about Norway's "undue influence" in the 
peace process.  To preserve credibility, the co-chairs must 
avoid being perceived as an instrument of the GSL, he 
cautioned, and thus should review "how independently we can 
act" under current conditions.  "We should take a few steps 
back to define the role of the co-chairs and not let anyone 
else define it for us," Brattskar urged.  Ambassador Lunstead 
observed that the LTTE's refusal to renounce terrorism had 
restricted the co-chairs' ability to engage with the 
organization.  (The US, of course, does not directly engage 
with the LTTE.)  As a result, he continued, the co-chairs 
have drifted from a situation in which they were meant to 
engage with both sides to the current asymmetry of engaging 
with the GSL alone--which gives the GSL an asymmetrical 
ability to exert pressure. 
 
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POST-ELECTION STRATEGIES 
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5.  (C) The participants discussed what steps, if any, the 
co-chairs might take before and immediately after the 
November 17 presidential election.  They agreed that an 
active role before the election--whether in the form of a 
statement or calls on the two candidates--might not be wise, 
but concurred that a statement soon after the polls 
(congratulating the victor, expressing support for a peace 
process) and a call on the winner shortly thereafter could be 
helpful.  Brattskar said the co-chairs' pre-election message 
to the LTTE must stress the need to stop political killings 
and to allow people to vote without intimidation.  He added, 
however, that the Tigers are likely not the only actors this 
time around that could be guilty of interfering in free and 
fair elections--the anti-LTTE Eelam People's Democratic Party 
(EPDP) and Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP) might do so as well.  Noting that it remains difficult 
to discern whether Rajapakse plans to match his 
anti-federalism, anti-foreign "interference" rhetoric with 
corresponding action should he win, the Ambassador urged his 
colleagues to think about what a Rajapakse victory might mean 
for the co-chairs' continued involvement in the peace process. 
 
6.  (C) Whoever wins, Brattskar said, the co-chairs should be 
leery of assuming too much responsibility for the peace 
process.  Effecting real change in the peace process means 
making unpopular political decisions that both candidates may 
find difficult to do, he cautioned.  "It is very easy for 
both (candidates) to leave it all to us."  Both candidates 
have adopted positions somewhat divorced from reality, he 
indicated.  The Norwegian said he found Wickremesinghe's 
outlook on the peace process unaccountably "sunny," based on 
the (likely incorrect) assumption, as Ambassador Lunstead 
noted above, that a UNP government can resume where it left 
off when the LTTE unilaterally broke off negotiations in 
2003.  With a Wickremesinghe victory, Brattskar commented, 
the co-chairs would have to "worry about complacency" and his 
failing to take into account the downward trend in the peace 
process since 2003.  Brattskar sees two possible scenarios if 
Rajapakse were to win.  First, he might act on his campaign 
rhetoric and reject the peace process.  Second--and in 
Brattskar's view more likely--he might try to "muddle 
through," continuing his hard-line rhetoric and counting on 
the international community to do the heavy lifting on the 
peace process on the GSL's behalf.  Brattskar reported that 
he has met with Rajapakse several times to express concern 
about his electoral rhetoric, but he believes the discussions 
have had no impact.  Instead, Rajapakse seems to believe he 
can say anything--however unpalatable to the LTTE--"and hope 
someone can make (a successful permanent resolution of the 
conflict) happen." Brattskar said he has tried to make 
Rajapakse understand the Norwegian government does not want 
to be in the position of being "allowed" to continue as 
facilitators in a Rajapakse government as a convenient 
scapegoat in the event the peace process fails. 
 
7.  (C)  Noting the sharply different approaches to the peace 
process espoused by the two candidates, Brattskar observed 
that the election has become essentially a referendum on 
peace.  A victory for Rajapakse will be interpreted by the 
LTTE as a popular rejection of the peace process, he 
predicted.  The co-chairs must find some way "to soften that 
message."   He added that he found it "very sad" that 
Rajapakse's campaign rhetoric and party manifesto take the 
peace process "back to sometime in the 1990s," even to the 
point that in some circles it has become acceptable to talk 
about resuming hostilities.  UK High Commissioner Stephen 
Evans suggested that co-chairs consider a "contingency plan" 
in the event that a victorious Rajapakse "blunders into a 
resumption of hostilities." 
 
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INDIAN PARTICIPATION? 
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8.  (C) The Ambassador asked participants' views on whether 
India should be offered some role in the co-chairs' group. 
The participants concurred that the Indian High Commission 
has evinced no noticeable interest in joining the group but 
agreed to invite Indian High Commissioner Nirupama Rao for 
tea and a discussion about the peace process in the near 
future. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9.  (C) Co-chairs recognize (even if they do not like to 
admit) the need to take a hard new look at the relevance of 
the Tokyo Conference assumptions in the wake of the (largely 
negative) developments since 2003.  What that revamped role 
might be, especially in the event of a Rajapakse victory, no 
one has clearly thought through.  (The reflex reaction to the 
standby co-chair default--issuing a statement after the 
elections--suggests to us that fresh ideas on productive next 
steps right now are few.)  At the same time, the two 
candidates' approaches--Rajapakse's start over from scratch 
or Wickremesinghe's start where we left off--seem equally 
short-sighted.  Not only is the peace process not where it 
was in 2003--it is losing ground every day with each 
ceasefire violation and political assassination.  The 
co-chairs must begin thinking quickly and creatively about 
where to go from here--regardless of which candidate wins. 
This meeting was intended to start that process on the ground 
in Colombo. 
LUNSTEAD