US embassy cable - 05ROME3597

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UN REFORM, IRAN: VISIT OF IO A/S SILVERBERG

Identifier: 05ROME3597
Wikileaks: View 05ROME3597 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rome
Created: 2005-10-26 16:34:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KUNR XF IT UNSC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 003597 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KUNR, XF, IT, UNSC 
SUBJECT: UN REFORM, IRAN: VISIT OF IO A/S SILVERBERG 
 
REF: ROME 03538 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor David D. Pearce, reasons 1. 
4 (b) and (d) 
 
---------- 
Summary 
---------- 
 
1. (C) Summary. Italian officials told visiting A/S 
Silverberg they would look at any UNSC reform proposal except 
national permanent seats, such as the G4 proposal.  They 
agree on the importance of moving forward before the end of 
the year on UN Secretariat reform, the Peace Building 
Commission, and the Human Rights Council.  MFA officials 
pledged to work to close the gap between the U.S. and EU on 
UNESCO's cultural diversity convention, which they saw as a 
difference in interpretation, not substance.  A/S Silverberg 
delivered a clear message to both MFA and prime ministerial 
officials on the importance of unity and clarity on the 
U.S.-EU message to Iran.  Italian officials stressed the 
political importance to them of such high-level 
consultations, especially on issues like Iraq, Iran, and UN 
reform, where Italy's interests are heavily engaged. Iraq 
portion of conversation reported reftel (notal). End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) Assistant Secretary for International Organizations 
Kristen Silverberg met with senior officials from the Italian 
MFA and PM Berlusconi's office October 21 to discuss 
multilateral issues including UN reform, Iraq, Iran, Syria, 
the UN logistical base in Brindisi, and the UNESCO cultural 
convention.  She was accompanied by Rome Political M/C, 
poloff, and IO senior adviser. 
 
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UN Reform 
------------ 
 
3. (C) "Not that we're obsessed" said a senior MFA official, 
but UN Security Council expansion continues to be a key issue 
for Italy.  Director General for Political and Multilateral 
Affairs Giulio Terzi and PM Berlusconi's Deputy Diplomatic 
Advisor Francesco Talo both emphasized that they are happy 
with the current U.S. position on UNSC changes.  They 
reiterated Italy's opposition to the G4 proposal, since it 
would give Germany a permanent UNSC seat and relegate Italy 
to a second-tier among European powers.  A/S Silverberg said 
the United States only expressed specific support for an 
additional Japan seat, although our general thinking was in 
terms of a possible two or so permanent and three or so 
non-permanent seats.  Terzi indicated that it might be 
possible to re-examine the definition of "permanent", but 
Italy was not interested in making P5 veto rights part of the 
debate.  Talo said that Italy would be willing to look at any 
formula except national permanent seats. 
 
4. (C) Terzi and Talo agreed with A/S Silverberg on the 
importance of moving forward before the end of the year on 
Secretariat reform, the Peace Building Commission, and the 
 
SIPDIS 
Human Rights Council. A/S Silverberg highlighted the need for 
progress on management reform before the December budget 
deadline and Terzi agreed to build consensus to move up the 
timetable to November.  Italy supports a peer review process 
for the Human Rights Council, but Terzi commented that 
membership criteria might be hard to work out with important 
players like China that have human rights problems.  The EU 
is discussing membership criteria that would allow a large 
majority of UN members to qualify while avoiding the "bad 
composition" of the current membership.  Members could 
possibly be approved based on a 2/3 vote of UNGA members and 
a commitment, before UNGA, to abide by the highest standards 
of human rights protection.  A/S Silverberg indicated the GA 
should also adopt minimal criteria--like excluding countries 
currently under UN sanctions for human rights abuses--to 
exclude truly bad actors. 
 
5. (C) Italy's main concern in establishing a Peace Building 
Commission (PBC) is its position in the UN hierarchy, with 
Italy preferring a commission that recognizes ECOSOC's role, 
although Terzi recognized the UNSC role during the crisis 
phase of an operation.  He felt the PBC should answer to 
ECOSOC in the latter, developmental stages of a crisis. thus 
avoiding some of the current misunderstandings and friction 
between peacekeeping and  humanitarian operations.  A/S 
Silverberg pointed out the potential difficulties in having a 
Peace Building Commission with two masters. 
 
------- 
Iran 
------- 
 
6. (C) A/S Silverberg emphasized to Terzi, Sessa, and Talo 
the importance of maintaining a united front on Iran and not 
allowing Tehran to engage in its usual effort to play on 
perceived differences among the positions of the U.S. and 
various EU member states.  Sessa, noting that he had served 
as ambassador in Iran, said the government situation in 
Tehran was very complex.  The supreme leader had given new 
powers to Rafsanjani; this worked to undermine the power of 
the new president.  Internal tensions could follow.  It was 
important to use both sticks and carrots with Iran, but in 
the right way.  A/S Silverberg replied that this was just the 
time when it was most important that Iran see unity and firm 
resolution by the U.S. and EU.  It was essential that no 
individual countries offer Iran any "carrots" under the table. 
 
7. (C) Sessa said Italian contacts with both Iran and Syria 
was at ambassador level.  There is cohesion and this is 
essential, but to achieve what?  The first concern in Iran is 
the stability of the regime.  And Iran, unfortunately, can 
play a negative role in the stability of the region.  Pol M/C 
put in that the Iranians do not respect weakness, they seek 
to exploit it.  They do understand clarity.  Sessa responded 
that only our country--the United States--can contribute to 
an Iranian policy change.  The EU has only limited influence. 
 Dialogue with the U.S. would be "very disruptive" for them, 
he said.  "You are the only ones who can legitimate the 
regime, and this is their real target." 
 
8. (C) Terzi and Sessa noted that Italy had concerns with the 
EU3 negotiating format (which it would never voice publicly), 
which they say is problematic within the EU context.  Terzi 
explained that, holding the EU presidency at the time, Italy 
did not feel it was appropriate to join the EU3 when it 
initially formed.  Now that the EU3 is more than a temporary 
format, Italy would like to be in close consultations with 
the group, as the United States and Russia are.  Italy has 
been left out of the picture repeatedly, according to Terzi, 
which places them in a difficult position as Iran's main 
European trade partner.  Terzi commented that Italy often had 
to ask the Russians for information on Iran talks because it 
heard nothing from the EU3. 
 
-------- 
Syria 
-------- 
 
9. (C) In response to that morning's release of the Mehlis 
report on Syrian involvement in the Hariri assassination, 
Sessa said it was important to renew the commission's UN 
mandate.  Italy shares the U.S. view of Syria, according to 
Berlusconi's diplomatic advisor Marco Carnelos, but wants to 
avoid what it views as an even worse situation: regime 
collapse and Sunni extremists or the Muslim Brotherhood in 
charge in Damascus.  Change is fine, but it should be 
well-calibrated. 
 
--------------------------------- 
UN Logistical Base in Brindisi 
--------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Terzi reiterated Italy's concern with DPKO's plans to 
build a back-up communications center in Valencia, Spain, for 
functions now located in the UN Logistical and Communications 
Base in Brindisi.  Italy feels any back-up capabilities that 
might be built in Valencia could be more efficiently 
incorporated into the existing Brindisi operation. Terzi also 
expressed concerns that Italy was not consulted in the 
decision-making process and only found out about the 
initiative from the press.  A/S Silverberg assured Terzi that 
we value the Brindisi operation.  We were not sure what DPKO 
had in mind, but would look into it. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention 
--------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) A/S Silverberg raised U.S. concerns regarding 
potential misuse of the UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention, 
especially in light of recent announcements by the French. 
Adolfo Barattolo, head of the Cultural Affairs Office, 
responded that Italy viewed the convention positively.  The 
Italians share our view that the convention should not be 
misused in trade negotiations, but do not think this misuse 
is likely.  Terzi recognized the importance of keeping the 
United States in UNESCO and promised to work within the EU on 
interpretation of the document.  (On October 24, Terzi called 
DCM to report that Italy had been working hard on this issue, 
both in Rome and with Brussels, and he felt the result would 
be clarification of the interpretation of Article 20, "in a 
way you like.") 
 
Comment 
---------- 
 
12. (C) In each of A/S Silverberg's meetings, Italian 
officials stressed the value to them of consultations on 
issues where they are heavily involved, whether bilateral or 
multilateral.  The MFA clearly took A/S Silverberg's message 
on UNESCO's cultural diversity convention to heart, and 
understood well the substance of U.S. concerns.  The visit 
was also a timely opportunity to deliver USG views on the 
need for a clear and unified message on Iran to senior 
policymakers of one of Tehran's major trading partners.  End 
comment. 
 
13. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Silverberg. 
SPOGLI 

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