US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2912

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002912 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, EB/ESC/IEC, INR/EC, DS/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015 
TAGS: EPET, ETRD, EWWT, PTER, PINR, ASEC, KHLS 
SUBJECT: ROTTERDAM VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: STATE 182688 
 
Classified By: GLOBAL ISSUES SECTION CHIEF SUSAN GARRO FOR REASONS 1.4 
(e) and (g) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The sprawling port of Rotterdam and its 
substantial petroleum refining and storage facilities is 
critical to the European economy.  The Dutch government 
considers the port one of seven "critical infrastructure" 
sectors in the Netherlands, and considerable public and 
private sector resources have been devoted to enhancing 
security at the port and related industrial complex.  The 
port is widely recognized as having high security standards. 
Port management and security is the responsibility of the 
Rotterdam municipal government, which conducted a risk 
assessment in 2004 for the port, including the petrochemical 
complex.  The GONL has not performed an independent 
vulnerability assessment for the port or refineries.  The 
refineries in Rotterdam produce approximately 1.1 million 
barrels per day (bpd).  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Rotterdam is the second largest port in the world and 
a vital component of the Dutch and European trade and 
transportation system.  It is also one of the most important 
petrochemical centers and the largest oil transshipment port 
in the world.  Nearly 102 million metric tons of crude oil 
passed through the port in 2004.  Shell, ExxonMobil, 
BP/ChevronTexaco and Kuwait Petroleum Corp all have major 
refineries in Rotterdam; together they produce approximately 
1.1 million barrels per day (bpd).  The port and industrial 
complex cover 40 kilometers; the refineries are concentrated 
in three locations along the port, Pernis, Botlek and 
Europoort. 
 
3.  (C) The Rotterdam municipal government conducted a risk 
assessment for the port and industrial complex, including the 
petrochemical refineries, in 2004.  The city government 
manages the port through a government corporation known as 
Rotterdam Municipal Port Management, and is responsible for 
ensuring the security of the port.  The Rotterdam public 
security department, the port authority, police and fire 
departments all participated.  The assessment divided the 
port infrastructure into a variety of different 
infrastructure facilities, and assigned one of three levels 
of risk to each.  According to Jolanda Trijselaar of the 
Rotterdam public security department, all of the 
petrochemical facilities were determined to be in the highest 
category of risk, calculated as a factor of the perceived 
risk and the potential impact of an attack.  Trisalaar noted 
that the refineries generally exceed GONL security 
requirements, because they follow the security guidelines of 
the parent company,s home country, which tend to be more 
stringent than the GONL,s own requirements. 
 
4.  (C) Following the risk assessment, the municipal 
government provided recommendations for security 
enhancements, tailored to the type of facility and level of 
risk.  Trijselaar noted that implementation of the security 
recommendations is voluntary on the part of private firms, as 
the municipal government cannot mandate implementation. 
 
 
5.  (C) Trijselaar stated that, apart from the risk 
assessment conducted by the municipal government, 
International Maritime Organization and European Union 
regulations require port facilities to comply with the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. 
The port has voluntarily extended the provisions of the ISPS 
Code to cover inland barges and terminals in addition to 
terminals and oceangoing ships involved in international 
trade.  Altogether, 140 different port facilities, including 
the refineries, have ISPS-consistent security plans in place; 
all meet or exceed ISPS requirements. 
 
6.  (C) The port and refinery complex, considered as single 
sector, is one of the seven critical infrastructure sectors 
in the Counter-terrorist Alert System managed by the GONL,s 
National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTB).  The alert 
system establishes a uniform communication structure for 
relaying threat information and agreed security measures to 
be taken to protect critical infrastructure.  The system 
establishes four levels of alert:  baseline, or basic level; 
low threat; moderate threat; and high threat.  The Rotterdam 
port and petrochemical complex is currently rated at the 
basic level.  Because the municipality is responsible for 
security at the port, the national government has not done an 
independent vulnerability assessment.  National 
Counter-terrorism Coordinator Tibbe Joustra told Charge 
October 21 that he was confident that the risk assessment 
conducted by the municipal government was adequate to ensure 
the security of the port, and that the Alert System provided 
an effective mechanism to alert the port and related 
facilities about emerging terrorist threats. 
 
 
BLAKEMAN