US embassy cable - 02HARARE2560

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AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION WITH MDC SECRETARY-GENERAL

Identifier: 02HARARE2560
Wikileaks: View 02HARARE2560 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2002-11-18 13:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002560 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION WITH MDC 
SECRETARY-GENERAL 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Classified By: political section chief Matt Harrington.  Reasons: 1.5 ( 
B) and (D). 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1.  (C)   MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube told the 
Ambassador on November 15 that the treason case against him 
and his party compatriots has no legal merit, but it could be 
assigned to a judge who is inclined to give more weight to 
political considerations.  He described growing resentment 
within the MDC about South Africa's stand on Zimbabwe and 
said the party is likely to refocus its lobbying efforts 
within SADC away from South Africa toward Mozambique, Malawi, 
Botswana, and Mauritius.  The MDC likely will contest the 
Kuwadzana parliamentary by-election to replace former MDC 
spokesman Learnmore Jongwe but will make a broader policy 
decision after that on whether to continue to participate in 
elections.  Ncube claimed not to know why the independent 
autopsy results on Jongwe had not yet been made available but 
did not dismiss the possibility of suicide.  He urged the USG 
to impose an asset freeze with haste on Zimbabwe's primary 
decision-makers and said expulsion of their children from the 
United States would have an effect.  End Summary. 
 
Treason trial 
------------- 
 
2.  (C)  In a November 15 conversation with the Ambassador 
and polchief, MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube noted that 
the treason trial in which he, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, 
and MDC MP Renson Gasela are facing charges of plotting the 
assassination of Robert Mugabe had been postponed from 
November to February 2003.  He said the MDC had originally 
sought a shorter delay because the Government has refused to 
provide the defense with a copy of the incriminating 
videotape which is the state's key piece of evidence.  Ncube 
claimed that none of the charges would be sustainable in an 
independent court, but he expressed worry that the case could 
be assigned to a judge who would render a decision based on 
political calculations, not legal merits. 
 
3.  (C) On a separate legal development, Ncube was asked to 
comment on the November 14 Supreme Court decision denying the 
MDC a copy of the electronic version of the voters roll used 
in the March presidential election.  (Note:  The GOZ has 
refused to provide the MDC with either hard copies or 
electronic versions of the voters roll, a thorough analysis 
of which will be crucial to the opposition party's pending 
legal challenge of the presidential election results.  End 
Note.)  Ncube said the presiding Supreme Court justices had 
used a minor legal technicality to deny the MDC's request for 
the electronic version of the roll.  His party would now try 
to obtain hard copies, but Ncube pointed out that scanning 
the information from those into a computer program capable of 
performing analysis would be a daunting, time-consuming task. 
 
 
South Africa 
------------ 
 
4.  (C) Ncube said many members of the MDC's national 
executive felt increasing resentment about South Africa's 
refusal to engage more actively in the search for a lasting 
solution of Zimbabwe's political crisis.  He mentioned a 
recent meeting in Harare with visiting Mbeki advisers who 
said they were well-briefed on the political situation and 
preferred to focus exclusively on the economic crisis. 
According to Ncube, they clearly conveyed the impression that 
they were looking at ways in which South Africa could help 
assuage the economic situation, but were less interested in 
addressing questions of governance.  He said that South 
Africa's passivity raised questions in the MDC about their 
appropriateness in any future mediation.  The MDC was 
considering shifting its lobbying efforts within SADC away 
from South Africa and toward countries such as Malawi, 
Mozambique, Botswana, and Mauritius, which have demonstrated 
a greater willingness to express concern about developments 
in Zimbabwe. 
Contesting elections 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Ncube acknowledged that the MDC national executive 
was currently considering whether to boycott future 
elections, given that ZANU-PF has perfected the art of 
"winning" them by utilizing violence, intimidation, food, and 
fraud.  The party's top six leaders first gave serious 
consideration to this possibility after the ruling party's 
"victory" in the Insiza parliamentary by-election in late 
October.  According to Ncube, they split right down the 
middle, with Tsvangirai, Deputy Secretary-General Gift 
Chimanikire, and national chairman Isaac Matongo favoring a 
boycott, while Ncube, Vice-President Gibson Sibanda, and 
treasurer Fletcher Dulini-Ncube opposing it.  Ncube 
emphasized that it would be difficult to convince the MDC's 
supporters to continue fighting for positive change if the 
party itself decided simply to concede elections.  He thought 
the national executive would decide to contest the upcoming 
(but not yet scheduled) Kuwadzana by-election to replace 
former party spokesman Learnmore Jongwe -- since at leat six 
of its members were interested in contesting the seat.  He 
thought the party would then make a broader policy decision 
on contesting elections after that. 
 
Jongwe autopsy results 
---------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Polchief noted the government pathologist's 
conclusion that Learnmore Jongwe had died of chloroquine 
poisoning and asked why the results of the second, 
independent autopsy commissioned by the MDC had not yet been 
announced.  Ncube replied that he was unsure why the South 
African pathologist retained by the party had not yet 
provided his findings.  He did not rule out that Jongwe may 
have committed suicide, saying that the former MDC 
spokesman's lawyer had painted a bleak picture of his legal 
options about a week-and-a-half before his death, in which he 
had apparently stressed the likelihood of Jongwe's facing the 
death penalty.  Those who visited Jongwe soon after this 
meeting found him to be particularly morose.  At about the 
same time, according to Ncube, Jongwe had asked at least one 
friend to bring him chloroquine, claiming to be suffering 
from malaria and saying that the prison authorities had 
refused to provide the appropriate medication. 
 
Food 
---- 
 
7.  (C) Ncube expressed concern about politicization of 
international food assistance, reporting that he had received 
numerous complaints that ZANU-PF functionaries at the local 
level are involved in selection of beneficiaries.  He added 
that he had received the most complaints about World Vision's 
food distribution efforts, and said the NGO's national 
director had refused to meet with the MDC's shadow 
agriculture minister.  Noting that he had observed many food 
distribution events personally, the Ambassador explained that 
beneficiaries are selected in a rigorous, transparent process 
in which the entire community is involved.  Local authorities 
beholden to the ruling party do not have veto power, he said. 
 The Ambassador encouraged the MDC to establish a liaison 
office whose objective would be to become familiar with WFP's 
beneficiary selection process and to vet complaints 
thoroughly before passing them on to the UN and us.  He 
expressed his surprise that World Vision's director, whom he 
knew well, had refused to meet with MDC officials, but he 
undertook to encourage her to do so. 
 
U.S. Pressure 
------------- 
 
8.  (C) The MDC's Secretary-General thought the targeted 
sanctions imposed by the U.S. to date had been effective in 
turning up the heat on Zimbabwe's primary decision-makers. 
He expressed concern, however, that an asset freeze had not 
yet been implemented and believed the absence of follow-up 
sanctions had diminished pressure for a solution.  Ncube also 
encouraged the USG to expel the children of those on our 
sanctions list, insisting that that move would make ruling 
party insiders think long and hard before continuing with 
their disastrous policies. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C)  One of the MDC's leading intellectuals, Ncube did 
not evince much hope that Zimbabwe's political crisis would 
be resolved in the short term, at least not peacefully.  The 
MDC has invested significant time and resources during the 
past two years in trying to convince South Africa to engage 
more actively in addressing Zimbabwe's political crisis. 
Ncube's remarks suggest a growing feeling among the party 
leadership that that effort has failed, and that it is a 
waste of time to expect South Africa to play the role of fair 
broker.  We believe contesting the by-election in Kuwadzana, 
a high-density suburb in Harare, is the better route. 
Although ZANU-PF will employ its usual comprehensive array of 
tactics to win the seat in this MDC stronghold, the people of 
Kuwadzana will not be as vulnerable to violence and food 
manipulation as rural residents, and the ruling party's abuse 
of the electoral process will be much more visible to outside 
observers.  We plan to send embassy officers regularly to the 
constituency, beginning several weeks before the election, 
and we will encourage other diplomatic missions to do the 
same. 
 
 
 
 
SULLIVAN 

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