US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1853

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001853 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Elections 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES DIVERGE ON 
PEACE PROCESS; AGREE ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1831 
     B. COLOMBO 1605 
     C. COLOMBO 1558 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) The two main candidates in Sri Lanka's November 17 
presidential election offer radically different approaches to 
the peace process and the economy.  Prime Minister and Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate Mahinda Rajapakse is 
stepping back from a previous Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) 
agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
supporting a federal solution to insist instead on a "unitary 
State," far-reaching changes to the Ceasefire Agreement and 
(presumably) a more circumscribed role for the Co-chairs, 
especially Norway.  Opposition United National Party 
candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe, on the other hand, proposes 
continuing on the same course begun by his government in 
2001--resuming negotiations based on the Oslo Declaration--a 
course already tried that has produced little success.  Both 
Rajapakse's purported "fresh" approach to the peace 
process--which offers little common ground on which to base 
negotiations with the LTTE--and Wickremesinghe's reflex 
reliance on the same old path suggest little hope of progress 
toward peace in the near term.  Both candidates' manifestos 
promise religious freedom for all and make no mention of 
proposed anti-conversion legislation.  Rajapakse stresses a 
non-aligned foreign policy, with special emphasis on improved 
relations in the region and "frank" discussions with the US 
and other co-chairs.  Wickremesinghe, who promises "friendly 
relations with all," cites discussions with the US on 
duty-free access for Sri Lankan garments as a key pillar of 
his administration's foreign policy.  Analysis of the 
respective economic policies outlined in the manifestos will 
follow septel.  End summary. 
 
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"MAHINDA'S VISION" 
VS. RANIL'S "PEOPLE'S AGENDA" 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  On October 18 Prime Minister and Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) presidential candidate Mahinda Rajapakse 
released his party's manifesto, a 95-page document entitled 
"Mahinda's Vision," heavy on populist promises and romantic 
allusions to the nation's rural roots and culture.  (Note: 
The back page of the manifesto contains a haiku-like poem 
describing "My dreams/ An independent nation/A country of 
greenery/A prosperous tomorrow/And a virtuous man  . . .Adore 
challenges/Mother Lanka/Towards a blissful future/We all 
shall step together.")  United National Party (UNP) candidate 
Ranil Wickremesinghe's manifesto, entitled "People's Agenda," 
was released to the public more than two weeks earlier on 
September 27. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The hype preceding the delayed release of the SLFP 
manifesto assured voters the document would provide a rare 
look into the PM's little-known personal thoughts and 
convictions--and would not merely parrot the positions 
spelled out in Rajapakse's electoral pacts with the Sinhalese 
nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela 
Urumaya (JHU). If that is true, "Mahinda's Vision" apparently 
tracks eye to eye with the JVP and JHU on a number of key 
issues, including the peace process, foreign policy and the 
economy, as there is little daylight between the positions 
outlined in the manifesto and those described in the 
electoral agreements with the two Sinhalese nationalist 
parties (Ref B).  Analysis of the economic policies outlined 
in the respective manifestos will follow septel. 
 
------------------------------- 
UNP APPROACH TO PEACE PROCESS: 
LIVING IN THE PAST? 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Harking back to the Oslo Declaration of 2002 in 
which his then-government and the LTTE agreed "to explore a 
solution based on a federal structure within a united Sri 
Lanka," Wickremesinghe's "People's Agenda" proposes to 
"recommence the peace process" more or less where his 
government left off in mid-2004.  He cites the ten criteria 
laid out in the Tokyo Declaration of 2003 as valid benchmarks 
for progress in the peace process without noting that not one 
of them--even the first, which stipulates "full compliance 
with the Ceasefire Agreement by both parties"--has been met. 
Acknowledging that the Ceasefire Agreement must be 
strengthened, he recommends finding "new ways of operation" 
for the Nordic-sponsored Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and an 
unspecified restructuring of "the law and order machinery" to 
address the deteriorating situation in the North and East. 
Emphasizing that his government will "never permit 
separatism," Wickremesinghe vows to "make a close study of 
the Indian example of a 3-tier system of devolution" while 
assuring voters that the final solution will not merely mimic 
India's but include "a system of government that can truly be 
called our own."  To the disgruntled Muslim community (which 
is largely expected to support the UNP in the upcoming 
election), he offers "separate and independent" 
representation at future negotiations with the LTTE 
(something the LTTE has not accepted) and equal status in all 
post-tsunami rehabilitation discussions.  After receiving the 
people's mandate, Wickremesinghe pledges to seek consensus on 
a political solution with the SLFP, the contents of which 
will be approved by the electorate in a referendum and 
included in a new Constitution (also to be put to a 
referendum). 
 
------------------------------------- 
"MAHINDA'S (TUNNEL) VISION" ON PEACE: 
THROUGH A (JVP) GLASS DARKLY? 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Citing continued violence and the protracted 
impasse in peace talks, "Mahinda's Vision" calls for a "fresh 
perspective" and "a new approach"--i.e., one dispensing with 
the previously agreed-upon federalism formula--to break 
through the deadlock.  Criticizing Wickremesinghe's former 
government for concluding the Ceasefire Agreement "in much 
haste and in a short-sighted manner," Rajapakse proposes to 
hold "extensive discussions" on the peace process with all 
political parties, as well as representatives of civil 
society and different religions over the course of three 
months to achieve a national consensus that preserves "the 
unitary structure of the State."  In so doing, Rajapakse 
expects to "arrive at a peaceful political settlement where 
the power of each and every citizen is strengthened to the 
maximum, without being trapped within concepts such as 
traditional homelands and right to self determination." 
Political power will then be devolved to this newly 
strengthened  citizen on an individual level--perhaps 
precluding the need for more formal devolution of power under 
a federal system. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Like Wickremesinghe, Rajapakse vows to put the 
contents of this national consensus forward to the people in 
a referendum, to be followed by a new Constitution.  In the 
meantime, Rajapakse says he will begin "direct talks" with 
the LTTE that include "a specific time frame" during which 
the LTTE is expected to complete such steps as "renouncing 
separatism, demilitarization, entry into the democratic 
process, a discussion towards a final solution and the 
implementation of such a solution."  (Note:  Rajapakse, 
somewhat sagely, does not disclose the parameters of this 
time frame.  It is unclear if this wish list follows 
chronological order and if Rajapakse thus expects the LTTE to 
lay down its arms, become a democratic party, etc., before 
even entering negotiations.  Also left unmentioned:  what a 
Rajapakse government would do if the LTTE declines to embrace 
this ultimatum.)  The Ceasefire Agreement, moreover, will be 
"amended" to ensure acts of terror cease and "regional 
co-operation" in ceasefire monitoring (perhaps in lieu of the 
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) sought.  For tsunami-affected 
areas of the north and east, Rajapakse will implement a new 
"Jaya Lanka" (Victory Lanka) program, instead of incumbent 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga's agreement to coordinate 
tsunami aid with the LTTE (known as P-TOMS).  Details 
 
SIPDIS 
provided in the manifesto on "Jaya Lanka" are thin, other 
than pro forma assurances that it will take into account "the 
views and proposals of the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslims," with 
no mention of how Rajapakse proposes to assess "the views and 
proposals" of those Tamils living in LTTE-controlled 
territory. 
 
------------------------------------ 
FOREIGN POLICY: 
MAHINDA SEES OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE; 
RANIL HOPES FOR GARMENT QUOTAS 
------------------------------------ 
 
7.  (SBU) Rajapakse blames "the short-sighted policies" of 
the Wickremesinghe government for creating "the unfortunate 
situation where we have been compelled to have foreign 
countries unnecessarily intervening in our internal affairs," 
thus causing "immense" bloodshed.  To address this 
"imbalance," Rajapakse proposes to hold "priority" 
discussions with India "and arrive at an agreement in 
relation to regional security and peace."  He will pursue 
greater cooperation with China, Russia and Pakistan, "who 
have been extremely helpful to us."  (He does not specify how 
or when these countries have been helpful.) With the 
co-chairs (who apparently, in his view, have not been as 
helpful as China, Russia and Pakistan), on the other hand, he 
will hold "open and frank discussions."  Pledging to follow 
"a non-aligned, free and progressive foreign policy," 
Rajapakse accords priority to cultivating relations "in the 
political, defense, economic, trade and cultural spheres" 
with Asian countries, such as India, Japan, China and 
Pakistan.  He cautions United Nations agencies and 
International Financial Institutions to be "more democratic 
in their approach" and threatens to "actively intervene in 
this regard."  Finally, Rajapakse notes his support for the 
Kyoto Protocol on global warming. 
 
8.  (U) Wickremesinghe's platform does not address the role 
of the co-chairs in the peace process.  The brief portion of 
his manifesto devoted to foreign affairs promises "friendly 
relations with all countries," most of which, at least as 
spelled out in the manifesto, he appears to see in economic 
terms.  In particular, he pledges to begin or conclude 
economic or trade agreements with the six other SAARC nations 
and promises discussions with the US and EU aimed at securing 
duty-free access for Sri Lankan garments. 
 
-------------------------------- 
EQUALITY FOR ALL RELIGIONS --- 
WITH ONE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS 
--------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Both candidates, while stressing the special status 
of Buddhism, promise religious freedom for practitioners of 
other faiths.  Wickremesinghe vows "to develop all religions 
in the country" and to set up a Religious Advisory Board, 
composed of representatives of all religions, to advise him 
on ways "to create an atmosphere conducive to the promotion 
of spiritual values."  The UNP candidate (who had been 
criticized in the past for not being "Buddhist" enough) 
pledges to make Sri Lanka the center of Theravada Buddhism 
and to build the largest stupa (or "Dagaba") in the world. 
(Note:  Of all the many promises in his manifesto, 
Wickremesinghe caught the most flak for this one.  Critics 
were quick to point out that Sri Lanka already has the 
largest "Dagaba" in the world--citing Wickremesinghe's 
ignorance on this score as just further proof of how 
"un-Buddhist" he really is.)  Rajapakse promises to 
"consolidate" the "preference" given to Buddhism in the 
Constitution while simultaneously ensuring that all other 
religions "will be treated on an equal footing."  Like 
Wickremesinghe, Rajapakse proposes to set up an 
inter-religious council--albeit one headed by Buddhist 
clergy--to offer advice in the event of "any crucial crises." 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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10.  (C) In some ways, the candidates' vastly divergent views 
have made this election a referendum on the peace process.  A 
Rajapakse victory could be interpreted by both the LTTE and 
Sinhalese nationalists as a popular rejection of the peace 
process--a conclusion that could have potentially disastrous 
results for the ceasefire.  The immediate priority, 
regardless of who wins, remains the need to strengthen the 
fast-fraying Ceasefire Agreement (CFA).  The shadow war 
conducted by both sides over the past year and a half 
marginalizes the CFA, suggesting that low-level but 
persistent violence is a phenomenon acceptable to both the 
GSL and the LTTE. 
11.  (C)  As we have noted before, it remains difficult to 
determine how much of Rajapakse's posture on the peace 
process is mere bluster and how much may reflect his actual 
beliefs.  It is hard to say which possibility is more 
worrisome:  that he truly believes a head-in-the-sand, 
hard-line stance on the "unitary state" can alter the fact 
that the LTTE controls large portions of the north and east 
or that he thinks he can pander to Sinhalese nationalism--a 
ploy other politicians like S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and J.R. 
Jayawardene stooped to with disastrous consequences--without 
further jeopardizing an already fragile ceasefire.  We 
suspect the latter--that Rajapakse is playing to his hometown 
audience in the south in the blithe expectation that the 
international community will "interfere" yet again to sort 
things out with the LTTE once he is elected.  Rajapakse has 
indicated to us in the past that he will say anything to get 
elected (Ref B); our and the Norwegians' efforts to impress 
upon him that words have consequences so far appear to have 
had little effect.  His pot shots at foreign "interference" 
notwithstanding, the PM will likely turn to the co-chairs to 
compensate for his own lack of experience and contacts on 
this important issue (neither he nor anyone in his coterie 
was privy to peace process strategizing during President 
Kumaratunga's administration).  Our ability to help, however, 
will obviously depend upon the policies he espouses. 
Rajapakse may be bluffing, but changing the rules of the game 
now--taking federalism and local devolution off the table 
when he has no other chips to put in the kitty--is unlikely 
to convince the LTTE to fold. 
 
12.  (C)  How the LTTE might react to a Rajapakse victory 
remains unclear.  Contacts in the pro-LTTE Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) and NGOs in contact with Kilinochchi indicate, 
however, the Tigers are worried.  If Rajapakse wins, the LTTE 
stance in the near term may harden as well, citing southern 
intransigence/insincerity as a pretext for not re-engaging 
with the GSL.  Absent any positive developments in the peace 
process (and, perhaps, with the added disadvantage of 
vitriolic rhetoric from Rajapakse allies in the JVP and JHU), 
the long-term implications for the ceasefire obviously grow 
increasingly grim. 
 
13.  (C)  If Rajapakse is unrealistic in expecting to offer 
the LTTE nothing, Wickremesinghe may also be deluding himself 
in proposing to resume with the Tigers where he left off when 
he lost the general election in 2004.  Since then, much has 
happened--very little of it good--to influence Tiger 
attitudes, perhaps most significantly the ever-escalating 
"dirty war" being conducted by both sides.  The basic premise 
of the Tokyo Declaration--that economic incentives would 
impel both sides to take political steps for peace--has 
simply not worked.  The initial optimism surrounding the 
ceasefire in 2002 has given way to even greater frustration 
and mistrust in the north and east as Tamils in LTTE-affected 
areas--whether they sympathize with the LTTE or not--have 
begun to suspect that the south has no intention of pursuing 
a permanent solution.  The UNP candidate's assumption, 
moreover, that the international community will automatically 
be as interested as before is probably a mistake as well. 
Efforts by Wickremesinghe to (re)start the peace process with 
a clean slate will be complicated by these factors. 
 
LUNSTEAD