US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA10060

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, CO 
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER REPORTS ON DISCUSSIONS WITH AUC 
LEADERSHIP ON REACTIVATING DEMOBILIZATIONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
Reftel: Bogota 9566 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) On October 21, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo 
briefed Ambassador and WHA/AND Director Phil French on his 
discussions with AUC leaders regarding conditions for 
reinitiating negotiations on future demobilizations.  AUC 
negotiators were skeptical of resuming negotiations if the 
GOC treated them as it treated AUC leader Diego Murillo, AKA 
"Don Berna."  In response to the AUC negotiators' petition 
for Don Berna to attend the next meeting, Restrepo thought 
that Don Berna's presence at the negotiating table would help 
reestablish confidence among the leaders.  Restrepo warned 
that once demobilizations were rescheduled, they would likely 
extend to January or February.  The Ambassador pushed back on 
inviting Don Berna back to the negotiating table and 
cautioned against allowing demobilizations to extend beyond 
the December 31 deadline since it would risk the credibility 
of and support for this process.  End Summary. 
 
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REBUILDING TRUST WILL NOT BE EASY( 
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2. (C) Peace Commissioner Restrepo reported to the Ambassador 
and WHA/AND Director French that the October 20 meeting with 
AUC leaders was tense.  AUC negotiators (Ramon Isaza, Julian 
Bolivar, and Ivan Roberto Duque, AKA "Ernesto Baez") were 
skeptical of the advantage of continuing talks given the 
GOC's decision to send Don Berna to a maximum-security 
prison.  AUC negotiators said they no longer trusted 
President Uribe and considered his "stubbornness" worrisome. 
Restrepo also said that Uribe, in turn, had been unhappy with 
the Ambassador's criticism of the decision to suspend Don 
Berna's extradition. 
 
3. (C) Restrepo explained that it has been hard to recover 
from the distrust sparked by Don Berna's imprisonment. 
Expressing frustration over all the work to convince the 
blocs to demobilize, Restrepo said he had finally managed to 
gather the paramilitaries and start "herding them to the 
corral" when Uribe "cracked the whip" and sent them 
scattering, and it was going to be hard to bring them "back 
into the fold."  For example, one of the biggest groups left 
to demobilize is the Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB), but its 
leader, Lorenzo Gonzalez, AKA "Macaco," while still 
interested in demobilizing, was nervous about what would 
happen to him and believed that the USG is "after him." 
North Bloc leader Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, AKA "Jorge 40," Hernan 
Giraldo, and Elmer Cardenas Bloc leader Luis Alfredo Berrio, 
AKA "El Aleman," are also ambivalent about demobilizing their 
blocs, worried that they will end up in prison if they do. 
 
4. (C) Restrepo said he was concerned about the AUC's 
leadership, including its second-tier structures.  His 
sources say that Jorge 40 had written a fatalistic letter to 
Macaco and other AUC leaders saying that the AUC negotiating 
hand is weak and Jorge 40 feared a rebellion by subordinate 
commanders, which could undermine the process.  The AUC's 
historical leader and commander of the Mid-Magdalena Bloc 
Ramon Isaza has also indicated that his subordinates are 
fearful of what will happen to them and are therefore 
reluctant to demobilize. 
 
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(BUT DON BERNA AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE MAY HELP 
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5. (C) In response to the AUC negotiators' petition for Don 
Berna to attend the next meeting, Restrepo thought that his 
presence at the negotiating table, at least for one session, 
would help reestablish confidence among the leaders.  He told 
the group that he would consult with Uribe before approving 
Don Berna's participation.  Restrepo said that in his last 
conversation with Don Berna, the AUC leader expressed his 
 
willingness to announce public support for the peace process 
and would make it clear to AUC negotiators that 
demobilizations must continue.  Even though the GOC would be 
taking a risk by allowing Don Berna to participate 
temporarily, Restrepo thought the risk was small since Don 
Berna still has significant influence over the process and 
could help get the negotiations back on track. 
 
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PRISON CONDITIONS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED 
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6. (C) Restrepo said during the meeting with AUC leaders, he 
mentioned the GOC's recent trip to Switzerland to research 
alternative prisons that are based on a "dignity and 
rehabilitation" model.  The AUC negotiators expressed 
interest in the model.  Restrepo said that Organization of 
American States Verification Mission Director Sergio 
Caramagna, who attended the meeting, was astonished since it 
was the first time in his experience that prison conditions 
were discussed openly during such a delicate time of peace 
negotiations. 
 
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LIMITED REACTION ON IMMEDIATE REELECTION 
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7. (C) Restrepo mentioned that the Constitutional Court,s 
approval of immediate reelection earlier that week was barely 
discussed.  Despite the overall atmosphere of pessimism and 
mistrust during the meeting, Restrepo reported that a feeling 
of resignation reigns and that there is no other option but 
to move forward.  It is preferable to negotiate with Uribe 
than the other current presidential candidates, the AUC 
leaders said. 
 
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DEMOBILIZATIONS DEADLINE LIKELY TO BE POSTPONED 
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8. (C) Turning to the timeline for demobilization, Restrepo 
told the Ambassador and French that it would be unrealistic 
to think that in less than two months they can demobilize the 
rest of the paramilitary blocs; once demobilizations are 
rescheduled, they are likely to extend to January or 
February.  Restrepo explained that what would determine the 
last date for demobilizations would be the election calendar 
and the availability of public forces to secure the areas 
where demobilizations take place.  He reiterated the need for 
assistance in increasing security personnel by 10,000 in 
areas left by paramilitaries (reftel). 
 
9. (C) Restrepo recognized the political cost of postponing 
the December 31, 2005 deadline, which he imposed during the 
Ralito talks in July 2003, but credited the deadline for the 
demobilization to date of over 11,000 paramilitaries.  To 
hold to the deadline at this stage would hinder the GOC more 
than the AUC, in his view.  Restrepo's biggest concern was 
the possibility that AUC leaders would strengthen their 
negotiating hand by banding together in the aftermath of Don 
Berna's incarceration.  He emphasized that it was important 
to avoid giving them reasons to refuse to demobilize. 
 
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AMBASSADOR RESPONDS TO CHANGE IN DYNAMICS 
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11. (C) The Ambassador agreed with the need to prevent the 
AUC from re-forming a united front, but disagreed with 
bringing Don Berna back to the table or postponing the 
December 31 deadline for completing demobilizations.  The 
Ambassador was also concerned with the attitude of "third 
generation" or subordinate commanders.  It is important to 
salvage the negotiations to demobilize the paramilitaries, he 
said, but the government should not negotiate conditions as 
soft as for imprisoned ELN leader Francisco Galan in the hope 
of engaging every irreconcilable into the process. 
Postponing the December 31 deadline would risk the 
credibility of and support for this process. 
 
12. (C) The Ambassador also warned that domestic and 
international tolerance for postponement of the peace and 
justice components of the process could undermine all the 
hard work to date.  He reminded Restrepo that international 
assistance for this process is not just on demobilization, 
but verification, reinsertion, reparations, and justice. 
Extending the deadline opens the door for an indefinite 
delay.  It is important, therefore, that the GOC try to do a 
better job of simultaneously treating peace and justice 
together.  French recognized the difficulty of negotiating 
peace with the AUC while imprisonment and extradition hangs 
over their heads, but international confidence in the process 
is needed to avoid the perception that the process was 
allowing impunity. 
WOOD