US embassy cable - 05KATHMANDU2327

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 002327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM 
DEPT FOR CA/EX 
DEPT FOR CA/P 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PREF, PHUM, NP, U.S-Nepali Relations 
SUBJECT:  REVIEW OF STATE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH 
VICE-CHAIRMEN GIRI AND BISTA 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 2318 
     B. KATHMANDU 1090 
     C. USUN 2431 
     D. KATHMANDU 2209 
 
Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
 Summary 
--------- 
 
1. (C)   In separate meetings with Vice-Chairmen Dr. Tulsi 
Giri and Kirti Nidhi Bista, the Ambassador expressed concern 
about recent developments in Nepal.  The Ambassador shared 
the Department's October 24 statement on "The Government of 
Nepal's Seizure of Radio Equipment," stressing that the U.S. 
worried that the seizure and the recent media ordinance 
appeared at odds with the King's recent announcement of 
elections.  Both Vice-Chairmen defended the government's 
actions, and Dr. Giri said that His Majesty's Government of 
Nepal (HMGN) would have to take more action against the 
Kantipur media group.  The Ambassador expressed concern that 
HMGN, in seeking weapons from China, Russia and Pakistan, was 
giving the impression that it rejected the international 
community's call to reconcile with the political parties and 
reach agreement on the way back to democracy, and instead had 
decided to rely on other sources for weapons and use military 
might to stay in power.  Both Vice-Chairmen countered that 
HMGN agreed that reconciliation was necessary and that it 
continued to hope the West would resume assistance.  The 
Ambassador also raised the question of travel documents for 
Tibetan and Bhutanese refugees resident in Nepal, in light of 
recent information that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
instructed the Home Ministry not to issue travel documents. 
The Vice-Chairmen said they were unaware of this and took the 
issue on board.  End Summary. 
 
Concern about Media Freedoms ... 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) on October 25 The Ambassador shared with both 
Vice-Chairmen the Department's October 24 statement on "The 
Government of Nepal's Seizure of Radio Equipment" expressing 
disappointment and concern about the October 21 seizure of 
radio equipment from Kantipur FM radio station (ref A).  Dr. 
Giri defended the government's action, claiming that Kantipur 
had illegally relayed its broadcast.  V-C Bista asserted that 
the government acted because Kantipur was doing things 
prohibited by the ordinance.  Both Vice-Chairmen cited 
India's prohibition against FM radio stations broadcasting 
news.  Giri also stated that HMGN had to stop FM stations 
from broadcasting news in order to prevent the Maoists from 
taking advantage of the FM broadcasts.  The Ambassador pushed 
back strongly, suggesting that it served Nepal to have 
centralized FM news broadcasts out of Kathmandu, and that a 
large conglomerate like Kantipur would be less susceptible to 
Maoist pressure.  Giri demurred and stated that the 
government would have to take more action against Kantipur 
because it was "doing unwanted things at the moment."  Bista, 
however, asserted that Nepal continued to have a free and 
open press and pointed to the English-language daily 
Kathmandu Post, part of the Kantipur conglomerate, as proof 
positive.  HMGN had issued the new media ordinance to break 
up a monopoly, he claimed. 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador cautioned that no matter its intention, 
implementation of the new media ordinance would affect how 
people viewed it.  Midnight raids on media furthered the 
impression that the ordinance was intended to limit press 
freedoms.  He added that the issuance of the ordinance at 
approximately the same time as the announcement of elections 
seemed to imply that the government sought to prevent a level 
playing field for the elections.  Giri explained that the 
Cabinet had approved the ordinance four months ago (ref B), 
but had not released it at that time because of the outcry 
against the draft.  He claimed the timing was coincidental 
and had nothing to do with the elections. 
 
... And Elections 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that a free media was 
necessary for free and fair elections.  He disputed V-C 
Bista's claim that the national news agency, controlled by 
the government, could provide objective, fair information 
about the candidates and elections over radio broadcasts. 
Noting that HMGN had requested international assistance with 
elections (ref C), the Ambassador explained that we would 
need to see indications that the elections would be free and 
fair.  The government would have to take steps to encourage 
the political parties to participate before we could provide 
assistance.  Bista argued that it was in the interest of 
peace to have elections and that the U.S. and the 
international community should help Nepal and ensure that 
elections were conducted freely. 
 
Following the Burma Model? 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Noting reports of a recent large arms purchase from 
China, the Ambassador raised concerns that Nepal was giving 
the international community the impression that the current 
government did not care about the international community's 
view that reaching out to the political parties was the best 
way forward.  (Both Vice Chairmen also acknowledged Nepal's 
recent efforts to become closer with Russia and Pakistan.) 
The Ambassador worried that HMGN could back itself into a 
corner, becoming an international pariah relying on weapons 
alone to stay in power.  Was Nepal following this sort of 
Burma model, because if it was, at some point the security 
services would need to fire on unarmed demonstrators to 
retain control? 
 
6. (C) Both Vice-Chairmen hotly contested this concern.  V-C 
Bista told the Ambassador that he should "dismiss it 
outright."  Bista stated that Nepal still believed the U.S. 
was its good friend and was expecting assistance to resume in 
the future.  Giri asserted that Nepal was different from 
Burma because there had not been a military coup.  He also 
doubted that there would be mass protests, stating that the 
people did not support the political parties and the Parties 
could not afford to pay people indefinitely to come out into 
the streets.  Giri stressed that if a crisis occurred, he 
would blame the West  for creating the situation.  He 
bemoaned the lack of understanding for what the King was 
trying to do.  Giri stressed that the King would be happy in 
the future if he were provided some sort of veto power over 
legislation -- he did not want autocratic powers. 
 
King has No Objection to Meeting the Political Parties 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
7. (C) Both Vice-Chairmen said they agreed that 
reconciliation between the political parties and the Palace 
was necessary.  They asserted that the King was willing to 
meet the political party leaders, although Giri was 
apprehensive that the Party leaders might reject any advance 
from the King.  The Vice-Chairmen placed the onus on the 
Parties to take the initiative, however, saying that the King 
had already opened the door.  Giri noted his belief that the 
King would likely be more willing to talk with Nepali 
Congress President GP Koirala than CPN-UML General Secretary 
MK Nepal.  Giri also discounted the Maoist threat; he said 
that the human rights offices were a bigger problem.  He 
stated that he did "not take the Maoists as a political 
force."  Both Vice-Chairmen appealed to the Ambassador for 
assistance in conveying to the political parties that the 
King was open to dialogue. 
 
Travel Documents for Refugees Resident in Nepal 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador expressed our concern to each of the 
Vice-Chairmen over recent reports that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had instructed the Home Ministry not to issue 
travel documents to refugees resident in Nepal.  He explained 
that there were several issues at play, with both the Tibetan 
and Bhutanese refugee populations.  The United States had 
pending requests for 282 "following-to-join" cases of Tibetan 
refugees, where the applicants need travel documents to 
permit them to travel to join an immediate family member who 
has been granted asylum in the United States.  In addition, 
we had discussed with Foreign Minister Pandey a USG proposal 
to resettle about 5,000 Tibetan refugees who were long-term 
residents of Nepal (ref D).  We understood that we needed 
HMGN's cooperation to implement the program, and now worried 
about the implication of the new directive. (Note: We will 
seek clarification from Foreign Minister Pandey upon his 
return from Russia and Pakistan.  The MFA apparently issued 
instructions to the Home Ministry on October 2 not to "issue 
Travel Documents, at any cost, to Bhutanese as well as 
Tibetan refugees in the days ahead" (October 20 letter from 
Home Ministry National Unit for the Coordination of Refugee 
Affairs to UNHCR).  The Ambassador met with Foreign Minister 
Pandey on October 6 to discuss the Tibetan refugee 
resettlement proposal and FM Pandey made no mention of the 
MFA's October 2 instruction.  End Note.)  In addition, the 
U.S., and other western countries, were working to resettle 
some particularly vulnerable cases of Bhutanese refugees who 
were at risk in the camps.  We were waiting for travel 
documents for three orphaned young sisters, one of whom had 
been raped in the camp.  The Ambassador reiterated that these 
vulnerable cases were being processed on humanitarian grounds 
and would not set a precedent with respect to the long-term 
resolution of the Bhutanese refugee problem. 
 
9. (C) V-C Giri professed not to know anything about the 
issue of travel documents, but undertook to raise the matter 
with FM Pandey upon his return.  He noted that pressure from 
China might have played a part in the decision regarding the 
Tibetan refugees, but added that he saw no reason why HMGN 
should not issue travel documents to the vulnerable Bhutanese 
refugees.  Both Vice-Chairmen wondered if the U.S. could 
provide assistance to the Tibetan refugees to help them 
integrate into Nepal.  The Ambassador explained that if HMGN 
were willing to integrate the Tibetans and provide them 
citizenship, that could be possible.  He added, however, that 
given that HMGN considered the Tibetan refugees resident in 
Nepal as stateless, as well as the continuing pressure from 
China on Tibetan refugee issues, resettlement could prove 
beneficial to Nepal as well as the refugees.  But first they 
would need travel documents.  Bista said he did not know and 
would have to see. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) In seeking weapons to replace the supplies suspended 
by the U.S., UK, and India, HMGN has been attempting not only 
to ameliorate a serious and growing problem for the Royal 
Nepal Army but just as importantly to convince both domestic 
and international audiences that it has the backing necessary 
to continue on its current course.  To the degree the King 
succeeds in portraying China as a backer that will do 
everything necessary to keep his regime afloat, his message 
to both Nepal's political parties and his country's 
traditional external friends will be that he has no need to 
compromise.  In that context, both Giri and Bista appeared 
stunned by the Ambassador's reminder that such a course of 
action could ultimately result in HMGN becoming an isolated, 
international pariah relying solely on brute force and the 
backing of a single autocratic state to stay in power. 
MORIARTY