US embassy cable - 90MOGADISHU11232

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DECEMBER 22, 1990 MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

Identifier: 90MOGADISHU11232
Wikileaks: View 90MOGADISHU11232 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Mogadishu
Created: 1990-12-24 09:54:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PINR SO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
O 240954Z DEC 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1291
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL//
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOGADISHU 11232 
 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, SO 
SUBJ:  DECEMBER 22, 1990 MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER 
 
REF:  MOGADISHU 08583 
 
1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2. SUMMARY:  THE PRIME MINISTER ACCEPTED STOICALLY 
NOTIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF FUEL, EQUIPMENT AND USG 
CONTRACT PERSONNEL FROM BERBERA.  INITIALLY UPSET 
ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF USG PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS 
FROM MOGADISHU, HE CONCEDED THAT WE HAD THE RIGHT TO 
TAKE WHAT SAFETY PRECAUTIONS WE FELT APPROPRIATE. 
ASKED WHAT GAMEPLAN HIS GOVERNMENT HAD FOR POLITICAL 
RECONCILIATION FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
CAIRO CONFERENCE, HE COULD NOT IDENTIFY ONE.  THE 
PRIME MINISTER DID PLEA FOR FOOD AID AND REQUESTED OUR 
INTERCESSION WITH THE IBRD.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  INTRODUCTION:  CALLED DECEMBER 22, 1990 ON PRIME 
MINISTER MOHAMED HAWADLE MADAR TO OFFICIALLY NOTIFY 
THE GSDR OF THE SUSPENSION OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF PERSONNEL, FUEL AND EQUIPMENT 
FROM BERBERA.  I INFORMED THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF OUR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE STATUS 
DECEMBER 8.  BUT I SUBSEQUENTLY DELAYED TELLING THE 
GSDR WE HAD MOVED TO AN ORDERED DEPARTURE, AND OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, UNTIL OUR 
FILIPINO CONTRACTORS LEFT THE COUNTRY.  I WAS AFRAID 
THE GSDR MIGHT COMPEL THEM TO REMAIN, IN ORDER TO KEEP 
ITS PEACE CUBE MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK FUNCTION- 
ING.  MADAR MET ME WITHOUT A NOTETAKER OR OTHER AIDE. 
I WAS UNACCOMPANIED. 
 
- 
4.  EVACUATION:  INITIATING THE DISCUSSION, I 
EXPLAINED THAT THE CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF 
THE SECURITY SITUATION HAD LED TO A USG DECISION 
TO WITHDRAW ALL AMERICAN GOVERNMENT DEPENDENTS AND 
NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FROM SOMALIA.  UNFORTUNATELY, 
THIS STEP WOULD MAKE IT NECESSARY TO SUSPEND OUR CIVIL 
AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.  THESE WOULD RESUME 
WHEN AN IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMITTED 
THE RETURN OF THE PERSONNEL NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT THEM. 
THE FUEL AND EQUIPMENT STORED AT BERBERA ARE NEEDED 
BY U.S. FORCES IN THE GULF, I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER. 
THESE COMMODITIES, AND THE AMERICAN AND FILIPINO 
CONTRACTORS ASSIGNED TO BERBERA, WOULD BE REMOVED 
WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, I EXPLAINED. 
 
- 
5.  RESPONDING FIRST ON THE SUBJECT OF EQUIPMENT IN 
BERBERA, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SIMPLY, "IT BELONGS 
TO YOU.  IF YOU NEED IT ELSEWHERE, TAKE IT."  ON THE WITH- 
DRAWAL OF USG DEPENDENTS AND STAFF FROM MOGADISHU, MADAR 
FIRST REGISTERED UNHAPPINESS AT THE "UNILATERAL" AMERICAN 
DECISION.  BUT AS WE TALKED IT THROUGH, AND I REMINDED 
HIM HOW OFTEN I HAD TOLD SENIOR GSDR OFFICIALS THAT OUR 
PERSONNEL WOULD BE REDUCED IF THE SECURITY PICTURE 
BECAME BLEAKER, THE PRIME MINISTER BACKED DOWN.  HE 
FINALLY STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD MY FIRST CONCERN HAD 
TO BE THE WELFARE OF MY COLLEAGUES.  HE THEN ADMITTED 
HIS BASIC CONCERN WAS THAT THE REGIME'S OPPONENTS HAVE 
BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE PARTIAL EVACUATION OF THE 
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS NO NEED 
TO NEGOTIATE WITH HIS GOVERNMENT, BECAUSE IT IS ON ITS 
LAST LEGS.  I ASSURED MADAR THAT WE HAVE BEEN TRYING 
TO DISCOURAGE SUCH UNFOUNDED CONCLUSIONS BY TELLING THE 
OPPOSITION IT SHOULD TALK WITH THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE 
THE REGIME HAS CONSIDERABLE STAYING POWER. 
 
- 
6.  RECONCILIATION:  EXPRESSING REGRET AT THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE, I ASKED THE 
PRIME MINISTER TO OUTLINE THE GSDR'S NEXT STEPS 
TOWARD A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF ITS DIFFERENCES 
WITH ITS OPPONENTS.  IN RESPONSE, AN EXTREMELY 
DEFENSIVE MADAR SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY THE GOVERNMENT'S 
ARREST OF THE MANIFESTO GROUP MEMBERS, INSISTING THAT 
THE GSDR SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE POSTPONE- 
MENT OF THE CONFERENCE BECAUSE IT HAD ARRESTED TWO 
MEN GUILTY OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY.  RATHER THAN ENGAGE 
IN FRUITLESS DEBATE ON THAT ISSUE, I AGAIN ASKED THE 
PRIME MINISTER TO OUTLINE WHAT STEPS THE GSDR NEXT 
INTENDS TO TAKE TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH 
ITS OPPONENTS.  MADAR STATED THAT THE GSDR STANDS 
READY TO GO TO CAIRO OR TO MEET IN MOGADISHU WITH 
ANYONE CONCERNED ABOUT THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE.  IT ALSO 
MIGHT TRY TO HOST A CONFERENCE OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS, 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND INTELLECTUALS IN MOGADISHU, 
HE SAID.  HOWEVER, MADAR HAD NO STRATEGY TO DESCRIBE. 
IN FACT, HE ASKED ME TO SUGGEST ONE TO HIM.  HE PROVED 
UNFAMILIAR WITH HICKS' SPEECH ON FEDERALISM AND 
SKEPTICAL OF ITS THESIS WHEN I DESCRIBED IT. 
 
- 
7.  FOOD AID:  LABELING HIS GOVERNMENT AS THE FIRST 
CIVILIAN REGIME IN 21 YEARS, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID 
HE WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT HIS PROVISIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, UNDERTAKEN AT 
THE URGING OF WESTERN EMBASSIES, HAD NOT TRIGGERED THE 
RESUMPTION OF WESTERN ASSISTANCE HE EXPECTED.  THE 
WEST RISKS SEEING ANOTHER MILITARY REGIME IN SOMALIA 
HE INSISTED.  MADAR THEN TOOK ME TO TASK FOR THE 
ALLEGED REFUSAL OF THE USG TO PROVIDE FOOD AID TO 
SOMALIA, AT A TIME WHEN IT IS FURNISHING HOSTILE 
REGIMES IN ETHIOPIA AND MOZAMBIQUE WITH MASSIVE FOOD 
ASSISTANCE.  MADAR LISTENED PATIENTLY AS I EXPLAINED 
THE APOLITICAL NATURE OF USG EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAMS, 
INFORMED HIM THAT USG COMMODITIES ARE BEING DELIVERED 
TO THE ICRC AT BERBERA FOR USE IN THE NORTH, AND GAVE 
HIM A STATUS REPORT ON OUR PROPOSAL FOR 5 MILLION USDOLS 
IN EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR THE MOGADISHU AREA. 
 
- 
8.  PETROLEUM SHORTAGE:  BEFORE I COULD LEAVE, THE 
PRIME MINISTER ASKED THAT THE USG INTERCEDE WITH THE 
IBRD TO OBTAIN RELEASE OF THE THIRD TRANCHE 
OF THE AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM.  HE 
EXPLAINED THAT  THE GSDR WAS COUNTING ON IT TO FINANCE 
PETROLEUM IMPORTS FOR WHICH IT HAS NO OTHER FUNDS.  AS 
JUSTIFICATION, HE MENTIONED SEVERAL REFORMS THE GSDR 
HAS TAKEN SINCE THE RECENT DEPARTURE OF THE IBRD 
AGRICULTURAL TEAM.  IN RESPONDING TO MADAR, I GAVE 
HIM NO BASIS FOR ENCOURAGEMENT. 
 
- 
9.  COMMENT:  THE PRIME MINISTER'S INABILITY TO 
IDENTIFY A STRATEGY FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION 
REFLECTS MORE, I SUSPECT, THE NEAR PARALYSIS 
AFFLICTING SIAD BARRE'S GOVERNMENT THAN ANY 
WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT GENERAL MORGAN'S ONGOING 
MILITARY CAMPAIGN IS GOING TO CHECKMATE THE REGIME'S 
ARMED  OPPONENTS.  MADAR'S DEFENSIVENESS AND LACK OF 
A POLITICAL GAMEPLAN WERE ECHOED AT LUNCH DECEMBER 23 
BY REGIME LOYALIST BASHIR FARAH KAHIE, MADAR'S 
MINISTER OF COMMERCE. 
 
BISHOP 

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