US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI4316

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

PROSPECTS DIM FOR POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRC TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE DIRECTOR CHEN YUNLIN

Identifier: 05TAIPEI4316
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI4316 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-10-25 02:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL CH TW Cross Straits
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L TAIPEI 004316 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CH, TW, Cross Straits 
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS DIM FOR POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRC TAIWAN 
AFFAIRS OFFICE DIRECTOR CHEN YUNLIN 
 
Classified By: AIT Acting Director David Keegan, Reasons: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman 
Chang Chun-hsiung, told the Director on October 20 that the 
SEF welcomes a visit by PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Director 
Chen Yunlin and hopes that Chen will meet not just with the 
opposition Kuomintang (KMT) but also with government 
authorities.  The next day, however, National Security 
Council Counselor Chen Chung-hsin told the Acting Director 
that Taiwan will require Chen Yunlin to agree to hold talks 
with Taiwan Government officials as a condition for approving 
his visit to Taiwan.  Taiwan authorities expect Chen Yunlin 
to refuse unless Taiwan accepts the "92 Consensus."  That 
will be a deal breaker.  If the proposed visit by Chen Yunlin 
does not take place, the KMT will blame the ruling Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) for blocking dialogue, while the DPP 
will blame the KMT for being pro-China.  Once again, 
cross-Strait policy has become an electoral gambit.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Chang Chun-hsiung, Chairman of the SEF, noted to the 
Director on October 20 that the opposition KMT has proposed a 
visit to Taiwan by PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Director Chen 
Yunlin.  SEF's position, Chang said, is 1) that it welcomes a 
visit by Chen Yunlin, and 2) hopes Chen Yunlin will have 
contact not just with the KMT but also meet formally with the 
ruling party authorities.  From the viewpoint of SEF, this 
would be a breakthrough.  President Bush has called for the 
PRC to hold dialogue with the Taiwan ruling party in addition 
to the opposition and therefore, Chang argued, the SEF 
position on a possible Chen Yunlin visit tracks with U.S. 
policy. 
 
3.  (C) The next day, October 21, however, National Security 
Council Counselor Chen Chung-hsin told the ADIR that the 
Taiwan authorities will require Chen Yunlin to hold official 
talks with the Taiwan government as a condition for allowing 
him to visit Taiwan.  Chen Chung-hsin acknowledged that Chen 
Yunlin is very unlikely to agree to talks with Taiwan 
government officials because Taiwan rejects Beijing's 
precondition for such talks -- acceptance of the "1992 
consensus" on one China. 
 
4.  (U) According to Taiwan press reports, the KMT is 
inviting PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Director Chen Yunlin to 
attend a KMT-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forum on economic 
issues in Taiwan in mid-December and the KMT-run National 
Policy Foundation plans soon to apply to the Mainland Affairs 
Council for approval of the visit by the PRC delegation to be 
headed by Chen Yunlin.  Taiwan press also reports that an 
unnamed Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) official said there is 
no indication Chen Yunlin would be willing to meet with 
Taiwan officials and he might even avoid contact with 
officials, which would make it difficult for the Taiwan 
Government to approve a visit by Chen Yunlin.  Taiwan 
officials also ask rhetorically whether the PRC would be 
willing to invite a high-ranking Taiwan official to visit the 
Mainland, suggesting a possible Chen Yunlin visit also 
involves questions of reciprocity. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
5.  (C) Neither Chang nor Chen is a DPP policy insider.  In 
this case, we are inclined to credit Chen with the more 
realistic angle.  The DPP has nothing to gain from permitting 
a visit by Chen Yunlin and no reason to grant a victory to 
the KMT as elections approach.  Once again cross-Strait 
policy has been ensnared by politics. 
KEEGAN 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04