US embassy cable - 05DOHA1779

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 001779 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, SY, LE, QA 
SUBJECT: QATARIS SEE TRUTH IN MEHLIS REPORT BUT ARE CAUTIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary. Qataris and resident non-Qatari Arabs 
(largely Palestinians, Jordanians, and Egyptians) are 
generally of the view that the Mehlis report on the Hariri 
assassination is credible but should not be used as a 
justification to use force against Syria. Qataris and 
non-Qatari Arabs hold similar views. There has been no public 
comment by the GOQ. The Amir, in a family dinner with the 
Ambassador October 21, did not defend Syrian President Bashar 
al-Asad as he had done previously, but he warned against U.S. 
military action. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Qataris and non-Qatari resident Arabs believe the 
Mehlis report on the assassination of  ex-Lebanese PM Rafiq 
al-Hariri is broadly accurate. There has been some 
questioning of how high the assassination conspiracy reached 
-- whether to the Syrian president's cohorts or to the 
president himself. Some contacts have said privately that 
such a thing cannot happen "in an Arab government such as we 
have throughout the region" without the highest level of 
approval. 
 
3. (C) While accepting the general truth of the report, the 
Arab community remains skeptical about its accuracy of its 
details. They characterize it as a preliminary report that 
was completed rapidly and is not a final account. Many of 
these private commentators see the need for a more thorough, 
final investigation. Almost all share the view that the 
Mehlis report should not be used alone as a justification for 
a "judgment" against Syria. 
 
4. (C) Viewing the report more negatively are those who see 
it as a tool of the U.S. against Syria. They believe the U.S. 
position is based on a desire to break Syria and does not 
reflect a concern for the Lebanese people, as U.S. officials 
have stated. Balancing this more critical view are those who 
say that the report, by putting pressure on Bashar al-Asad, 
gives him an opportunity to "clean house" of senior Baath 
party officials who are pursuing their own agendas. 
 
5. (C) In a family dinner with the Ambassador October 21, the 
Amir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, did not 
come to the defense of al-Asad. In the past, when asked about 
Syria in meetings with U.S. officials, the Amir has 
vigorously defended al-Asad, calling him someone the U.S. 
should cultivate and support against "his father,s cronies." 
The Amir's rambling reply was essentially recognition that 
dad and junior shared the same cronies. The Amir said the 
U.S. would do itself great harm by intervening in Syria, but 
later he said he sees no likelihood of such intervention. 
 
6. (C) Background and Comment. Senior Qatari officials have 
been meeting with Syrian counterparts over the past year, 
presumably to play an intermediary role with respect to 
Lebanon and the U.S. Most significantly, President al-Asad 
spent approximately six hours privately with the Amir in July 
of this year. Cementing the political efforts, Qatar signed a 
memorandum the same month to establish an investment company 
capitalized at $100 million to channel investments to Syria. 
With the Mehlis report fingering the Syrian government, 
Qatar's efforts at private diplomacy may have been derailed 
and their role on the UN Security Council -- with its 
enforcement role -- will come to the forefront. 
UNTERMEYER