US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI8247

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NEPAL, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRANIAN TERRORISM: FOREIGN SECRETARY DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH U/S BURNS

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI8247
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI8247 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-10-24 12:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER MASS EAID ENRG PHUM IN NP AF PK CH CE BM TH External Political Relations
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 008247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MASS, EAID, ENRG, PHUM, IN, NP, AF, PK, CH, CE, BM, TH, External Political Relations 
SUBJECT: NEPAL, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRANIAN TERRORISM: FOREIGN 
SECRETARY DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH U/S BURNS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  This message contains an ACTION REQUEST for SA.  Please 
see para 11. 
 
2.  (C) Summary: Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and his 
regional Joint Secretaries told visiting U/S for Political 
Affairs Nick Burns on October 22 that the GOI would announce 
that day the opening of several points along the LOC for 
earthquake-related transit between India and Pakistan.  Saran 
responded favorably to discussion of possible Indian 
participation in an Afghan PRT, but pushed back on New 
Delhi's responsibilities for pressing Iran over terrorism and 
human rights.  India remains very concerned with the 
deteriorating political situation in Nepal and the rise of 
religious extremism in Bangladesh (including growing ties to 
groups in Southeast Asia), even as it sees a chance for 
progress on long-running border disputes with Pakistan. 
Saran expressed hope for peace and democratic elections in 
Sri Lanka, while emphasizing concern for the LTTE's lack of 
cooperation in the peace process.  End Summary. 
 
Nepal: Still Some Hope 
---------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Saran, joined by much of his senior management team, 
began his tour d'horizon with an overview of Nepal, stressing 
that New Delhi greatly appreciates close consultations with 
the US in responding to the problems there.  India's 
objectives remain aligned with those of the US, he 
emphasized, including first, prevention of a Maoist takeover, 
and second, restoration of multiparty democracy.  Although 
the "prospect is dismal," the GOI still hopes to see King 
Gyanendra and political parties work together in a democratic 
government that will then be able to resolve the Maoist 
insurgency through a political process.  New Delhi has "some 
indications" that the King may be reassessing the situation, 
and recognizing that his actions post-February 1 have not 
been successful.  Even close palace confidantes and 
traditional backers have told Indian interlocutors that they 
feel the King is now part of the problem and not the 
solution, said Saran, and the Nepalese elites have been 
working on their "Plan B," including taking savings out of 
Nepal and purchasing homes around New Delhi under assumed 
names. 
 
4.  (C) Political parties and civil society organizations are 
likely to step up street demonstrations after the Tihar 
holiday in November, Saran predicted.  "Time is running out" 
for the palace to reconcile with the parties, he observed, 
pointing out that civil society had become more vocal at 
protesting the King's actions than the political parties, and 
the "republican sentiment" is growing among Nepalese.  While 
there is a risk the King would use the RNA to suppress the 
demonstrations, Saran admitted, New Delhi would strongly 
protest any such attempt to use the RNA in such a political 
role.  While the GOI has decided to stay engaged with the 
monarch to continue to press for reconciliation with the 
political parties, the King has on many occasions made the 
right promises, but then done the opposite, Saran lamented, 
pointing to recently enacted curbs on media freedom. 
 
More Reported Arms Sales 
------------------------ 
5.  (C) Gyanendra continues to try to break out of his 
political isolation, Saran observed, commenting that the EU 
troika statement was constructive, but that other states 
including China and Pakistan appear to be willing to break 
that isolation by selling arms and ammunition.  Saran 
highlighted a report from two days earlier that China planned 
to sell 14,000 - 16,000 AK-47 rifles to the RNA, adding that 
the GOI had raised arms sales with Islamabad and Beijing, but 
would appreciate Washington doing the same.  U/S Burns 
responded positively.  Early fears of RNA shortages of 
ammunition have disappeared, Saran observed, partly as a 
result of other suppliers providing ammunition, and partly 
because the RNA has not taken the fight to the Maoists but 
remains in its barracks. 
 
Maoist Intentions? 
------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Saran observed that the Maoist cease-fire appeared to 
be holding, and cited "indications" that the Maoist 
leadership, having patched up the Bhattarai-Prachanda split, 
may be inclined to extend the cease-fire, and eventually give 
up their arms under UN auspices as part of a political 
settlement.  In the meantime, he added, they continue their 
contacts with the political parties to work out the contours 
of an eventual settlement.  When U/S Burns expressed strong 
USG concern over reports that top Maoist leaders were allowed 
to live in India openly, Saran assured him that there was "no 
question of a free run" for Nepalese Maoists in India, adding 
that the GOI has arrested several Politburo members and other 
top leaders even in the past few months.  New Delhi has "no 
hesitation" about curbing their activities as much as 
possible, he explained, especially in light of GOI concerns 
that Nepalese Maoists collaborate with Indian extremists. 
However, he added, if the Maoists are willing to give up 
violence, enter into a democratic process, and attempt to win 
seats in elections free from intimidation, India would accept 
their participation, following the same strategy New Delhi 
has toward domestic extremists. 
 
Iran: What Do Strategic Partners Do? 
------------------------------------ 
 
7.  (C) U/S Burns forcefully spelled out serious US concerns 
with Iran's behavior, outlining its long history of political 
and financial support for terrorism from the 1979 Embassy 
hostage-taking to present support for terrorism in Iraq.  The 
new hardline government is likely to increase the role of 
religion in state affairs and lead to further crackdowns on 
human rights and radicalization in its foreign policy.  The 
last five months of the EU-3 engagement on nuclear issues led 
to disappointment, and Iran must recognize that with the 
EU-3's credibility on the line, Tehran cannot walk away from 
negotiations without repercussions.  The USG hoped its 
strategic allies would review their assumptions about Iran, 
U/S Burns said, commenting that Washington relies on its 
allies and friends that have diplomatic relations with Tehran 
to let Iran know "how misguided its policies are."  He 
stressed that the international community needs to use its 
resources to check Iran's nuclear ambitions. 
 
8.  (C) Saran listened to USG concerns about Iran's history 
and behavior, but said India's perspectives and concerns were 
different.  Although the US-India strategic relationship is 
growing, and India opposes Iran's nuclear ambitions, 
Washington should not expect New Delhi to follow suit in all 
areas.  India will weight US views more significantly as the 
strategic partnership moves forward, but there will be issues 
on which New Delhi has different policies "because of our 
strategic compulsions," Saran said.  Noting that India has 
had to deal with fundamentalist regimes in its neighborhood 
before, Saran stated that New Delhi believes that isolating 
Iran would only lead to further radicalization.  J/S Dilip 
Sinha observed that after an initial period of uncertainty 
from the new and inexperienced Iranian leadership, the 
Ahmadinejad regime is perhaps becoming "more moderate," 
citing as evidence the return of Rafsanjani to the leadership 
group. 
 
Afghanistan: We're Involved, Why Not the Russians? 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
9. (C) The Undersecretary said that the US and India should 
have more dialogue on Afghanistan.  Although not yet US 
policy, he suggested that India might usefully be involved 
with a PRT in Afghanistan.  U/S Burns explained the evolving 
post-Bonn framework for US engagement in Afghanistan, noting 
the expanding role of NATO in security operations across the 
country.  He also previewed NATO intentions to establish a 
formal partnership with Afghanistan modeled on the 
Partnership for Peace (PFP) with former Soviet-bloc states, 
arguing that such a partnership is a logical extension of 
NATO's increasing role in Afghanistan.  The USG would be 
asking European nations to do more in the future, he said. 
Responding to Saran's question about Russian and Chinese 
reactions to a NATO partnership, U/S Burns stated that the US 
does not discuss Afghanistan much with Beijing, but that 
Moscow should have no complaint, as Russia was a founding 
member of the PFP.  U/S Burns also reviewed the Secretary's 
recent trip to Central Asia, noting the agreements with 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for military facilities, but not 
permanent bases. 
 
10.  (C) Saran noted that he would accompany the Foreign 
Minister to Moscow on October 27 and would be discussing 
regional issues including Afghanistan.  He said New Delhi 
would favor greater Russian and Chinese participation rather 
than seeing them sidelined as NATO's role expands.  Our goal 
should be to "maintain the international consensus on 
Afghanistan that existed after 9/11," he suggested.  U/S 
Burns welcomed an increased role, but pointed out that the 
Russians have a "credibility gap" among Afghans, and the 
Chinese are not doing "one tenth of what we are."  Saran 
emphasized India's centuries-old ties with Afghanistan and 
desire to remain strongly engaged in reconstruction, noting 
"we are putting our money where our mouth is."  He seemed to 
agree with U/S Burns' point that future international 
assistance could be more efficiently managed through a 
central coordinator for multilateral assistance instead of 
sectoral leaders.  New Delhi also strongly supports 
Afghanistan's participation in SAARC, Saran said, noting that 
Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah recently sent a formal 
request for inclusion to Pakistan's Foreign Minister Kasuri 
(the current SAARC chair), and that India would support the 
request at November's SAARC summit. 
11.  (C) ACTION REQUEST: Saran conveyed a GOI request for 
Central Bureau of Investigation access, if in US custody, to 
Akhtar Usmani and Mansoor Akhtar, two former Taliban 
officials wanted for questioning in India regarding the 
hijacked IC 814 flight.  Please provide guidance to respond 
to this request. 
 
Pakistan: Progress on Sir Creek and Siachen 
------------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Saran informed the delegation that India and 
Pakistan had made recent progress on border talks in the 
Siachen glacier and Sir Creek regions.  Islamabad had agreed 
to a joint survey of the "vertical section" of the Sir Creek 
border as a way to narrow the differences in positions, 
similar to a helpful survey done earlier on the "horizontal 
section."  Additionally, India and Pakistan have agreed to 
discuss options for a maritime boundary, beginning from the 
seaward side, in order to reduce the uncertainty in maritime 
borders that remains the most problematic outcome of the 
disagreement on the land boundary terminus at Sir Creek. 
 
13.  (C) The main difference on Siachen remains the issue of 
recording the current positions of forces before a 
withdrawal, Saran stated, as Pakistan preferred only to 
record the post-withdrawal positions, and demarcate a zone of 
disengagement.  New Delhi wants a mutually-agreed document 
recording the current positions, and "it will take more time" 
to settle the details, he said, but Pakistan agreed in 
principle to recording the positions at the last discussion. 
The two nations also agreed to have no activity in the zone 
of disengagement without pre-notification following the 
withdrawal, and further discussions on extending the Line of 
Control (LOC).  "I think we'll have some movement" on both 
boundary areas, Saran concluded. 
 
Quake Relief 
------------ 
 
14.  (C) Saran and his deputies outlined Indian assistance to 
Pakistan including 8500 blankets, 600 tents, 22 tons of 
medical supplies, 10 tons of plastic sheets, and USD 500,000 
in private assistance (with more to follow).  Islamabad has 
requested additional medicine, tents, and blankets, he said, 
and India expects to send another consignment of tents and 
blankets soon.  New Delhi planned to announce that day that 
several points on the LOC would be opened for quake-related 
civilian travel, and could serve as points for relief 
supplies to transit.  Additionally, India has allowed 
international organizations to purchase supplies in India and 
use the border crossing between Amritsar and Lahore to send 
them to Pakistan. 
 
Bangladesh: More Worries 
------------------------ 
 
15.  (C) Observing a convergence in Washington's and New 
Delhi's assessment of Bangladesh, Saran outlined Indian 
concerns that the BDG is still in denial about the extent to 
which participants in the ruling government support violent 
extremism, preferring to relegate jihadist activities to a 
problem of law and order, or to blame the opposition or 
India.  The GOI has "no doubts" about ISI links to the 
extremist forces in Bangladesh, Saran stated.  The arrest of 
Mufti Abdul Hannan of Harkatul Jihad in Bangladesh showed 
links to Harkat al-Din in Pakistan, Saran said, and his 
interrogation revealed ties to partner in the government JEI. 
 
16.  (C) Beyond Bangladesh and Pakistan, Saran reported, the 
GOI has seen links between Bangladeshi extremists and 
terrorist organizations operating in Southeast Asia.  The 
Government of Thailand has shared information with the GOI 
showing Bangladeshi ties to militant Muslim groups operating 
in Southern Thailand, he stated.  Bangladesh's inclusion in 
this "international network" and its turn away from a 
liberal, open strain of Islam is a "huge concern" to New 
Delhi.  Using the strongest language we have yet heard from 
the GOI, Saran said that New Delhi is very concerned about 
the "determined attempt to eliminate moderate and secular 
voices" in Bangladesh through the "politics of assassination 
and intimidation."  The August 17 blasts were a message from 
the Islamic extremists to the government, he speculated, to 
say "don't try to take action against us," as they have 
proved their ability to cause havoc in Bangladesh.  The US is 
"equally worried" about Bangladesh, U/S Burns responded, 
relating the stiff conversation that the Secretary had with 
Bangladesh's Foreign Minister at UNGA.  J/S Mohan Kumar 
agreed with U/S Burns' focus on Bangladeshi elections, 
commenting that electoral reform in Bangladesh is critical. 
 
17.  (C) In addition to Bangladesh's domestic extremism, New 
Delhi is frustrated by the continued presence of anti-India 
insurgents operating from across the border, Saran stated. 
The recent Foreign Secretary meetings went well, and the GOI 
hopes for better cooperation with Dhaka on illegal 
immigration, cross-border insurgents, and "economic 
complementarity," Saran said, mentioning the proposed 
trilateral gas pipeline from Burma, and GOI encouragement of 
Indian investment in Bangladesh, including a 2 billion dollar 
project from Tata Corporation.  The GOI plans to attend the 
November SAARC summit, notwithstanding "deep" concerns about 
the security situation in Dhaka. 
 
Sri Lanka: Hope for Peaceful Solution 
------------------------------------- 
 
18. (C) Saran noted that India is in favor of a negotiated 
political settlement in Sri Lanka but expressed concern that 
the LTTE is not fully cooperating.  New Delhi is committed to 
the unity of Sri Lanka and a peace settlement must recognize 
the principles of democracy, not reflect LTTE dictatorship, 
he said.  India believes that it bears some responsibility 
for the Tamil community and the GOI has started small 
community development projects in northern Sri Lanka.  The 
international community needs to take more aggressive action 
in monitoring LTTE activities and Saran wanted assurances 
that the USG monitors the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization 
(TRO), an LTTE front in the US.  Saran also noted that 
Islamic fundamentalism is growing in eastern Sri Lanka.  He 
hoped that elections in December would be successful, and 
suggested continued monitoring of the peace settlement in the 
meantime.  It is not clear if the LTTE is committed to the 
cease-fire, he observed. 
 
19. (C) PDAS Don Camp reassured Saran that the USG continues 
to watch LTTE activities in the US.  Nonetheless, the TRO, 
unlike the LTTE, is not on the terrorist list; thus the USG 
cannot stop financial flows from them.  Camp explained that 
USAID contact with the LTTE is limited to interaction 
necessary to deliver humanitarian aid to Tiger-controlled 
territory.  U/S Burns noted that the USG is disappointed that 
the EU did not designate the LTTE as a terrorist 
organization.  Saran welcomed the EU's recent statements on 
Sri Lanka but questioned Norway's continued interest in the 
peace process since the GON did not participate in the New 
York Core Group meeting.  U/S Burns responded that the USG 
would be surprised if Norway did not try to maintain its 
leading role in conflict resolution, and expressed 
disappointment that India was not permitted to attend the 
Core Group meeting.  The USG would welcome an Indian role, he 
said, but noted that the Group is not as effective as hoped. 
 
China 
----- 
 
20.  (C) Saran did not elaborate on India's relations with 
China, other than to comment that Beijing is uneasy with 
US-India cooperation in Afghanistan.  Saran expressed GOI 
interest in continuing discussion on China. 
 
21.  (U) Participants in the meetings: 
 
GOI 
--- 
 
FS Shyam Saran 
J/S (Americas) S Jaishankar 
J/S (International Security) Hamid Ali Rao 
J/S (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) Dilip Sinha 
J/S (Nepal and Bhutan) Ranjit Rae 
J/S (East Asia) Ashok Kantha 
J/S (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives) Mohan Kumar 
PolCouns Designate (Indian Embassy Washington) Renu Pall 
Director (Americas) Gaitri Kumar 
Deputy Secretary (Americas) Santosh Jha 
Undersecretary (Americas) Raj Srivastava, notetaker 
 
US 
-- 
U/S Nick Burns 
Ambassador David Mulford 
SA PDAS Don Camp 
DCM Bob Blake 
PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt 
P Staff Toby Bradley 
AMBX Laura Taylor-Kale, notetaker 
Poloff Jai Nair, notetaker 
 
22.  (U) U/S Burns has cleared this message. 
 
23.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
MULFORD 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04