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| Identifier: | 05NEWDELHI8247 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NEWDELHI8247 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy New Delhi |
| Created: | 2005-10-24 12:01:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PTER MASS EAID ENRG PHUM IN NP AF PK CH CE BM TH External Political Relations |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 008247 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015 TAGS: PREL, PTER, MASS, EAID, ENRG, PHUM, IN, NP, AF, PK, CH, CE, BM, TH, External Political Relations SUBJECT: NEPAL, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRANIAN TERRORISM: FOREIGN SECRETARY DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH U/S BURNS SIPDIS Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 1. This message contains an ACTION REQUEST for SA. Please see para 11. 2. (C) Summary: Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and his regional Joint Secretaries told visiting U/S for Political Affairs Nick Burns on October 22 that the GOI would announce that day the opening of several points along the LOC for earthquake-related transit between India and Pakistan. Saran responded favorably to discussion of possible Indian participation in an Afghan PRT, but pushed back on New Delhi's responsibilities for pressing Iran over terrorism and human rights. India remains very concerned with the deteriorating political situation in Nepal and the rise of religious extremism in Bangladesh (including growing ties to groups in Southeast Asia), even as it sees a chance for progress on long-running border disputes with Pakistan. Saran expressed hope for peace and democratic elections in Sri Lanka, while emphasizing concern for the LTTE's lack of cooperation in the peace process. End Summary. Nepal: Still Some Hope ---------------------- 3. (C) Saran, joined by much of his senior management team, began his tour d'horizon with an overview of Nepal, stressing that New Delhi greatly appreciates close consultations with the US in responding to the problems there. India's objectives remain aligned with those of the US, he emphasized, including first, prevention of a Maoist takeover, and second, restoration of multiparty democracy. Although the "prospect is dismal," the GOI still hopes to see King Gyanendra and political parties work together in a democratic government that will then be able to resolve the Maoist insurgency through a political process. New Delhi has "some indications" that the King may be reassessing the situation, and recognizing that his actions post-February 1 have not been successful. Even close palace confidantes and traditional backers have told Indian interlocutors that they feel the King is now part of the problem and not the solution, said Saran, and the Nepalese elites have been working on their "Plan B," including taking savings out of Nepal and purchasing homes around New Delhi under assumed names. 4. (C) Political parties and civil society organizations are likely to step up street demonstrations after the Tihar holiday in November, Saran predicted. "Time is running out" for the palace to reconcile with the parties, he observed, pointing out that civil society had become more vocal at protesting the King's actions than the political parties, and the "republican sentiment" is growing among Nepalese. While there is a risk the King would use the RNA to suppress the demonstrations, Saran admitted, New Delhi would strongly protest any such attempt to use the RNA in such a political role. While the GOI has decided to stay engaged with the monarch to continue to press for reconciliation with the political parties, the King has on many occasions made the right promises, but then done the opposite, Saran lamented, pointing to recently enacted curbs on media freedom. More Reported Arms Sales ------------------------ 5. (C) Gyanendra continues to try to break out of his political isolation, Saran observed, commenting that the EU troika statement was constructive, but that other states including China and Pakistan appear to be willing to break that isolation by selling arms and ammunition. Saran highlighted a report from two days earlier that China planned to sell 14,000 - 16,000 AK-47 rifles to the RNA, adding that the GOI had raised arms sales with Islamabad and Beijing, but would appreciate Washington doing the same. U/S Burns responded positively. Early fears of RNA shortages of ammunition have disappeared, Saran observed, partly as a result of other suppliers providing ammunition, and partly because the RNA has not taken the fight to the Maoists but remains in its barracks. Maoist Intentions? ------------------ 6. (C) Saran observed that the Maoist cease-fire appeared to be holding, and cited "indications" that the Maoist leadership, having patched up the Bhattarai-Prachanda split, may be inclined to extend the cease-fire, and eventually give up their arms under UN auspices as part of a political settlement. In the meantime, he added, they continue their contacts with the political parties to work out the contours of an eventual settlement. When U/S Burns expressed strong USG concern over reports that top Maoist leaders were allowed to live in India openly, Saran assured him that there was "no question of a free run" for Nepalese Maoists in India, adding that the GOI has arrested several Politburo members and other top leaders even in the past few months. New Delhi has "no hesitation" about curbing their activities as much as possible, he explained, especially in light of GOI concerns that Nepalese Maoists collaborate with Indian extremists. However, he added, if the Maoists are willing to give up violence, enter into a democratic process, and attempt to win seats in elections free from intimidation, India would accept their participation, following the same strategy New Delhi has toward domestic extremists. Iran: What Do Strategic Partners Do? ------------------------------------ 7. (C) U/S Burns forcefully spelled out serious US concerns with Iran's behavior, outlining its long history of political and financial support for terrorism from the 1979 Embassy hostage-taking to present support for terrorism in Iraq. The new hardline government is likely to increase the role of religion in state affairs and lead to further crackdowns on human rights and radicalization in its foreign policy. The last five months of the EU-3 engagement on nuclear issues led to disappointment, and Iran must recognize that with the EU-3's credibility on the line, Tehran cannot walk away from negotiations without repercussions. The USG hoped its strategic allies would review their assumptions about Iran, U/S Burns said, commenting that Washington relies on its allies and friends that have diplomatic relations with Tehran to let Iran know "how misguided its policies are." He stressed that the international community needs to use its resources to check Iran's nuclear ambitions. 8. (C) Saran listened to USG concerns about Iran's history and behavior, but said India's perspectives and concerns were different. Although the US-India strategic relationship is growing, and India opposes Iran's nuclear ambitions, Washington should not expect New Delhi to follow suit in all areas. India will weight US views more significantly as the strategic partnership moves forward, but there will be issues on which New Delhi has different policies "because of our strategic compulsions," Saran said. Noting that India has had to deal with fundamentalist regimes in its neighborhood before, Saran stated that New Delhi believes that isolating Iran would only lead to further radicalization. J/S Dilip Sinha observed that after an initial period of uncertainty from the new and inexperienced Iranian leadership, the Ahmadinejad regime is perhaps becoming "more moderate," citing as evidence the return of Rafsanjani to the leadership group. Afghanistan: We're Involved, Why Not the Russians? --------------------------------------------- ----- 9. (C) The Undersecretary said that the US and India should have more dialogue on Afghanistan. Although not yet US policy, he suggested that India might usefully be involved with a PRT in Afghanistan. U/S Burns explained the evolving post-Bonn framework for US engagement in Afghanistan, noting the expanding role of NATO in security operations across the country. He also previewed NATO intentions to establish a formal partnership with Afghanistan modeled on the Partnership for Peace (PFP) with former Soviet-bloc states, arguing that such a partnership is a logical extension of NATO's increasing role in Afghanistan. The USG would be asking European nations to do more in the future, he said. Responding to Saran's question about Russian and Chinese reactions to a NATO partnership, U/S Burns stated that the US does not discuss Afghanistan much with Beijing, but that Moscow should have no complaint, as Russia was a founding member of the PFP. U/S Burns also reviewed the Secretary's recent trip to Central Asia, noting the agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for military facilities, but not permanent bases. 10. (C) Saran noted that he would accompany the Foreign Minister to Moscow on October 27 and would be discussing regional issues including Afghanistan. He said New Delhi would favor greater Russian and Chinese participation rather than seeing them sidelined as NATO's role expands. Our goal should be to "maintain the international consensus on Afghanistan that existed after 9/11," he suggested. U/S Burns welcomed an increased role, but pointed out that the Russians have a "credibility gap" among Afghans, and the Chinese are not doing "one tenth of what we are." Saran emphasized India's centuries-old ties with Afghanistan and desire to remain strongly engaged in reconstruction, noting "we are putting our money where our mouth is." He seemed to agree with U/S Burns' point that future international assistance could be more efficiently managed through a central coordinator for multilateral assistance instead of sectoral leaders. New Delhi also strongly supports Afghanistan's participation in SAARC, Saran said, noting that Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah recently sent a formal request for inclusion to Pakistan's Foreign Minister Kasuri (the current SAARC chair), and that India would support the request at November's SAARC summit. 11. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Saran conveyed a GOI request for Central Bureau of Investigation access, if in US custody, to Akhtar Usmani and Mansoor Akhtar, two former Taliban officials wanted for questioning in India regarding the hijacked IC 814 flight. Please provide guidance to respond to this request. Pakistan: Progress on Sir Creek and Siachen ------------------------------------------- 12. (C) Saran informed the delegation that India and Pakistan had made recent progress on border talks in the Siachen glacier and Sir Creek regions. Islamabad had agreed to a joint survey of the "vertical section" of the Sir Creek border as a way to narrow the differences in positions, similar to a helpful survey done earlier on the "horizontal section." Additionally, India and Pakistan have agreed to discuss options for a maritime boundary, beginning from the seaward side, in order to reduce the uncertainty in maritime borders that remains the most problematic outcome of the disagreement on the land boundary terminus at Sir Creek. 13. (C) The main difference on Siachen remains the issue of recording the current positions of forces before a withdrawal, Saran stated, as Pakistan preferred only to record the post-withdrawal positions, and demarcate a zone of disengagement. New Delhi wants a mutually-agreed document recording the current positions, and "it will take more time" to settle the details, he said, but Pakistan agreed in principle to recording the positions at the last discussion. The two nations also agreed to have no activity in the zone of disengagement without pre-notification following the withdrawal, and further discussions on extending the Line of Control (LOC). "I think we'll have some movement" on both boundary areas, Saran concluded. Quake Relief ------------ 14. (C) Saran and his deputies outlined Indian assistance to Pakistan including 8500 blankets, 600 tents, 22 tons of medical supplies, 10 tons of plastic sheets, and USD 500,000 in private assistance (with more to follow). Islamabad has requested additional medicine, tents, and blankets, he said, and India expects to send another consignment of tents and blankets soon. New Delhi planned to announce that day that several points on the LOC would be opened for quake-related civilian travel, and could serve as points for relief supplies to transit. Additionally, India has allowed international organizations to purchase supplies in India and use the border crossing between Amritsar and Lahore to send them to Pakistan. Bangladesh: More Worries ------------------------ 15. (C) Observing a convergence in Washington's and New Delhi's assessment of Bangladesh, Saran outlined Indian concerns that the BDG is still in denial about the extent to which participants in the ruling government support violent extremism, preferring to relegate jihadist activities to a problem of law and order, or to blame the opposition or India. The GOI has "no doubts" about ISI links to the extremist forces in Bangladesh, Saran stated. The arrest of Mufti Abdul Hannan of Harkatul Jihad in Bangladesh showed links to Harkat al-Din in Pakistan, Saran said, and his interrogation revealed ties to partner in the government JEI. 16. (C) Beyond Bangladesh and Pakistan, Saran reported, the GOI has seen links between Bangladeshi extremists and terrorist organizations operating in Southeast Asia. The Government of Thailand has shared information with the GOI showing Bangladeshi ties to militant Muslim groups operating in Southern Thailand, he stated. Bangladesh's inclusion in this "international network" and its turn away from a liberal, open strain of Islam is a "huge concern" to New Delhi. Using the strongest language we have yet heard from the GOI, Saran said that New Delhi is very concerned about the "determined attempt to eliminate moderate and secular voices" in Bangladesh through the "politics of assassination and intimidation." The August 17 blasts were a message from the Islamic extremists to the government, he speculated, to say "don't try to take action against us," as they have proved their ability to cause havoc in Bangladesh. The US is "equally worried" about Bangladesh, U/S Burns responded, relating the stiff conversation that the Secretary had with Bangladesh's Foreign Minister at UNGA. J/S Mohan Kumar agreed with U/S Burns' focus on Bangladeshi elections, commenting that electoral reform in Bangladesh is critical. 17. (C) In addition to Bangladesh's domestic extremism, New Delhi is frustrated by the continued presence of anti-India insurgents operating from across the border, Saran stated. The recent Foreign Secretary meetings went well, and the GOI hopes for better cooperation with Dhaka on illegal immigration, cross-border insurgents, and "economic complementarity," Saran said, mentioning the proposed trilateral gas pipeline from Burma, and GOI encouragement of Indian investment in Bangladesh, including a 2 billion dollar project from Tata Corporation. The GOI plans to attend the November SAARC summit, notwithstanding "deep" concerns about the security situation in Dhaka. Sri Lanka: Hope for Peaceful Solution ------------------------------------- 18. (C) Saran noted that India is in favor of a negotiated political settlement in Sri Lanka but expressed concern that the LTTE is not fully cooperating. New Delhi is committed to the unity of Sri Lanka and a peace settlement must recognize the principles of democracy, not reflect LTTE dictatorship, he said. India believes that it bears some responsibility for the Tamil community and the GOI has started small community development projects in northern Sri Lanka. The international community needs to take more aggressive action in monitoring LTTE activities and Saran wanted assurances that the USG monitors the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), an LTTE front in the US. Saran also noted that Islamic fundamentalism is growing in eastern Sri Lanka. He hoped that elections in December would be successful, and suggested continued monitoring of the peace settlement in the meantime. It is not clear if the LTTE is committed to the cease-fire, he observed. 19. (C) PDAS Don Camp reassured Saran that the USG continues to watch LTTE activities in the US. Nonetheless, the TRO, unlike the LTTE, is not on the terrorist list; thus the USG cannot stop financial flows from them. Camp explained that USAID contact with the LTTE is limited to interaction necessary to deliver humanitarian aid to Tiger-controlled territory. U/S Burns noted that the USG is disappointed that the EU did not designate the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Saran welcomed the EU's recent statements on Sri Lanka but questioned Norway's continued interest in the peace process since the GON did not participate in the New York Core Group meeting. U/S Burns responded that the USG would be surprised if Norway did not try to maintain its leading role in conflict resolution, and expressed disappointment that India was not permitted to attend the Core Group meeting. The USG would welcome an Indian role, he said, but noted that the Group is not as effective as hoped. China ----- 20. (C) Saran did not elaborate on India's relations with China, other than to comment that Beijing is uneasy with US-India cooperation in Afghanistan. Saran expressed GOI interest in continuing discussion on China. 21. (U) Participants in the meetings: GOI --- FS Shyam Saran J/S (Americas) S Jaishankar J/S (International Security) Hamid Ali Rao J/S (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) Dilip Sinha J/S (Nepal and Bhutan) Ranjit Rae J/S (East Asia) Ashok Kantha J/S (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives) Mohan Kumar PolCouns Designate (Indian Embassy Washington) Renu Pall Director (Americas) Gaitri Kumar Deputy Secretary (Americas) Santosh Jha Undersecretary (Americas) Raj Srivastava, notetaker US -- U/S Nick Burns Ambassador David Mulford SA PDAS Don Camp DCM Bob Blake PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt P Staff Toby Bradley AMBX Laura Taylor-Kale, notetaker Poloff Jai Nair, notetaker 22. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this message. 23. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) MULFORD
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