US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI8237

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U/S BURNS AND F/S SARAN CLARIFY POSITIONS ON INDIA-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI8237
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI8237 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-10-24 11:30:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG IN External Political Relations
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 008237 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
DOE FOR SHANE JOHNSON, MAUREEN CLAPPER, MOLLY WILLIAMSON, 
ROBERT PRICE, TOM CUTLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ENRG, IN, External Political Relations 
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS AND F/S SARAN CLARIFY POSITIONS ON 
INDIA-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION 
 
REF: SECSTATE 190856 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: U/S Nicholas Burns' meeting with GOI Foreign 
Secretary Saran on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
 
SIPDIS 
clarified differing perceptions on how to sequence each 
side's fulfillment of obligations in order to build 
sufficient confidence in the other side's executive and 
legislative branches to encourage reciprocal steps. The GOI 
feels that its progress so far warrants prompt U.S. 
Congressional passage of India-specific legislation, after 
which the GOI would proceed with a phased separation of 
military and civilian facilities; and that guarantees of 
nuclear cooperation at a given civilian facility should 
precede its submission to IAEA safeguards.  Citing USG 
actions to date, U/S Burns stressed that, realistically, the 
GOI should first present and start implementing a credible 
and transparent separation plan in order to secure support 
for the passage of the necessary legislation by the U.S. 
Congress and the approval of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG); and that a facility's submission to IAEA safeguards 
would be a practical prerequisite for any cooperative 
programs. Both sides committed to work to bridge the gaps in 
implementing the interlocking obligations. END SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) GOI VIEW: At the U.S.-India Senior Civil Nuclear 
Political Working Group's first meeting in New Delhi October 
21, India Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Secretary Shyam 
Saran told U/S Nicholas Burns that the GOI expects the 
commitments and obligations of the Bush-Singh Joint Statement 
(July 18, 2005) to constitute the sole basis of bilateral 
cooperation (i.e. without further conditions by the U.S. 
Congress or the NSG). "We have to stake out the parameters of 
this agreement.  We do not want the GOI to have to be 
constantly responding to additional conditions imposed by 
Congress, the non-proliferation lobby in the US, or others," 
Saran stated.  Saran believes GOI steps on non-proliferation 
taken so far have demonstrated sufficient GOI good faith to 
warrant USG submission of India-specific, civil-nuclear 
enabling legislation to the US Congress. These GOI steps 
include: passage of new legislation on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) in line with international standards; 
harmonizing of India's export lists to Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
guidelines; and the GOI unilateral declaration against 
exporting fuel-enrichment or reprocessing technology. 
 
3. (C) The GOI is committed to separation of civil and 
military nuclear facilities, but Saran stressed that the 
process would be solely "India's own decision," would be 
comprehensive and not token, and would be phased, 
complicated, and expensive since historically they have been 
organically intertwined.  In order for the GOI to allow a 
civil facility to be placed under IAEA safeguards, it would 
first have to be assured of international cooperation at that 
facility -- otherwise it risks irrevocably giving up autonomy 
without a compensating benefit.  The GOI recognizes it needs 
U.S. cooperation to expand its nuclear power output in order 
to help supply the energy needed to sustain high GDP growth, 
said Saran. To help convince cautious parliamentarians and 
GOI officials, Saran said the GOI hopes the U.S. Congress 
would first pass India-specific "enabling legislation" that 
would allow commercial relations in fuel and technology and 
as India reached its milestones of separating military and 
civilian facilities. 
 
4. (C) USG VIEW: U/S Burns detailed vigorous USG advocacy 
efforts to date, in favor of full civil nuclear energy 
cooperation and trade with India, to members of the U.S. 
Congress and to NSG members states, including by two 
assistant secretaries at the recent NSG meeting.  Instead of 
opting for more expedited passage by attaching civil-nuclear 
legislation as a rider to a larger bill this fall, the USG 
was pursing a strategy of full Congressional hearings and 
debate, aimed at getting an India-specific law passed 
empowering the President to reach a full bilateral civil 
nuclear agreement during his proposed visit to India in early 
2006.  The USG is also advocating for India's full 
participation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental 
Reactor (ITER) and in the Generation-IV International Forum. 
 
5. (C) However, U/S Burns cautioned that -- realistically for 
Congress to pass legislation and for NSG members to agree on 
a special regime for India -- the GOI must first present a 
credible and transparent plan for separating civilian and 
military nuclear facilities, and start implementing it to 
show that the GOI would carry the process through to the end. 
 Moreover, if the GOI were to delay the separation process, 
seeking instead conditioned "kick-in" laws from Congress, it 
would risk having Congress impose the type of additional 
stringent conditions that Saran said the GOI would want to 
avoid. Similarly, the NSG member countries would want to see 
prior progress on separation.  So far NSG members Russia and 
the USA have strongly supported India's inclusion; the UK, 
France, and Germany have been favorable; Japan and Canada are 
still seeking some clarifications; and Italy has not yet 
expressed its opinion. 
 
6. (C) Moreover, both the USG and NSG members would expect 
India to agree to IAEA supervision at each civilian facility 
before agreeing to cooperation on fuel or technology for that 
facility. Dr. Grover (Director, Strategic Planning Group, 
Department of Atomic Energy) underscored that India has its 
own full fuel-cycle capability, and was more in need of 
natural uranium fuel than enrichment or processing 
technology. In response to some Indians' concerns that a 
facility put under IAEA safeguards may find itself without 
any compensating international cooperation, fuel, or 
technology, NSC Senior Director John Rood stressed that 
India's access to the vigorous competitive world market, made 
possible by fulfilling its obligations, would assure that the 
facilities would get the cooperation they sought. 
 
7. (C) Saran and U/S Burns confirmed that it was in the 
interest of both countries to reach an agreement.  Both 
acknowledged that each side was seeking confidence-building 
steps by the other side to help overcome respective 
parliament's caution and skepticism about agreeing to 
measures that potentially risked not receiving reciprocal 
action by the other country. Ambassador Mulford noted that 
the Joint Statement had not been explicit concerning the 
tactics by which the sides would coordinate fulfillment of 
their respective obligations.  Saran said he would present a 
progress report to the GOI's Apex Committee (apparently 
including the Prime Minister and the Defense Establishment) 
and further discuss the issues raised.   Both sides agreed to 
consider the other's concerns and seek ways to coordinate the 
interlocking process for implementing commitments and 
addressing legislative branch concerns. 
 
8. (SBU) USG Participants: 
-- U/S Nicholas Burns 
-- Ambassador David C. Mulford 
-- John Rood, Senior Director, NSC 
-- Don Camp, DAS, South Asia Bureau 
-- Robert O. Blake, DCM 
-- Marco DiCapua, Science Counselor, US Embassy 
-- Geoffrey Pyatt, Political Counselor, US Embassy 
-- Tobin Bradley, P Special Assistant 
-- Jason Ellis, T Special Assistant 
-- John Sanborn, ISN Technical Expert 
-- Adam Scheinman, DOE 
-- Stacey Gilbert, USEmbassy, POL 
-- Notetaker: Eric Anthony Jones, USEmbassy, ECON 
 
Government of India Participants: 
-- Shyam Saran, Secretary, GOI Ministry of External Affairs 
(MEA) 
-- V J Nambiar, Deputy National Securty Advisor 
-- Dr. R. Grover, Director, Strategic Planning Group, 
      Dept of Atomic Energy 
-- Dr. Raguraman, Head of International Studies Divisions, 
Dept of Atomic Energy 
-- Dr. S. Jaishankar, Joint Secretary (Americans), MEA 
-- Hamid Ali Rao, Joint Secretary (DISA), MEA 
-- Santosh Jha, Deputy Secretary, MEA 
 
9. (C) This cable was cleared by U/S Burns' delegation. 
MULFORD 

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