US embassy cable - 05ABUJA2037

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, NI, ELECTIONS 
SUBJECT: INEC'S PROMISES RAISE QUESTIONS 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Russell J. Hanks for Reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  In a rhetoric-heavy and superficial 
one-hour presentation to the donor's election support group, 
Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) chair, 
Professor Maurice M. Iwu, laid out his strategy to organize a 
high tech enabled election that would cost $66 Billion Naira, 
"and be the freest in Nigerian history and a model for 
Africa."  In a private meeting with DCM, Iwu made the same 
points but came up short on the means to implement such an 
ambitious undertaking.  INEC's history does not instill 
confidence in outside observers and the Commission's habit of 
changing stances to meet the political requirements of the 
moment has not changed. Without serious reform of the 
institution, Nigeria's INEC could be headed for a repeat of 
its performance in 1999 and 2003.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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INEC AND DONORS ADDRESS THE PUBLIC . . . 
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2.  (U)  In a rhetoric-heavy and superficial one-hour 
presentation to the donor's election support group on October 
17, Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) chair, 
Professor Maurice M. Iwu, laid out his strategy to organize a 
high tech enabled election that would cost $66 Billion Naira, 
"and be the freest in Nigerian history and a model for 
Africa."  Although the meeting was co-chaired by USAID and 
UNDP, the highlight was Iwu's presentation, which closely 
followed the strategy laid out in a sparsely detailed 12-page 
pamphlet. He made reference to his electronic voting dream 
package, which would include an electronic voting system, 
electronic voter's register, electronic voter's 
identification complete with biometrics, electronic balloting 
and transmission of results. He also ambitiously presented 
plans for computerized management functions of INEC and plans 
to implement a Geographic Information System, (GIS) to 
delineate constituency boundaries. "Give me the tools and I 
will deliver the goods," he said. 
 
3.  (U) Donors present, however, were skeptical. The 
representatives from the EU inquired about the technology, 
timeline, and costs. Few details were forthcoming, but Iwu 
did indicate that the electronic voting system would not be 
possible under current law. If the laws were not quickly 
amended INEC would go to plan B, which is to use the current 
technology. For voter registration, Iwu said it would be 
possible to push forward with electronic voter registration 
even within the current legal framework, although he slipped 
in a request for donor support to clear up an unspecified 
debt with the software provider from the 2003 debacle. 
 
4.  (U)  Iwu implied that INEC was very interested in 
controlling the electoral environment, first by approving 
which "genuine" NGO's could be observers and then by 
suggesting that Nigerian security agents could play a 
prominent role including being trained to be "election 
observers". No one followed up on that troubling remark. 
 
5.  (U)  The British, EU and Japanese delegations were 
interested in getting more details on the myriad of issues 
and suggested setting up a technical working group, which 
would hear out the specific details of some of these schemes. 
The Japanese said they might be interested in the election 
technology basket as part of the DFID/EU-led donor basket 
consortium. This technical/donor group will meet within two 
weeks and the larger, more general group will meet again 
November 8 at UNDP. 
 
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. . . WHILE IWU MEETS PRIVATELY 
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6.  (C)  In a meeting with DCM prior to the public session, 
Iwu outlined the elements necessary to complete the election 
process.  They include voter's registration, logistical 
planning and training of ad hoc staff, and computerization of 
the process.  Iwu said that the voter's register from 2003, 
one of the successes lauded by the USG, was "basically 
nonexistent."  He complained that no work had been done to 
digitize the list and that all that remained were scanned 
"pdf" files of the handwritten registration lists.  "We have 
to start from scratch," he said.  Iwu could offer no idea of 
a timeline to begin registering the 70 million or so voters 
and complained that INEC had yet to receive its funding for 
2005 from the GON. 
 
7.  (C) Iwu then described his plan to improve INEC's 
logistical preparations before 2007.  He pointed to contracts 
that had been awarded to construct warehouses in various 
parts of the country in order to have elections materials 
"prepositioned" closer to the areas where they would be 
needed.  He did not address the need to secure and control 
the various far-flung sites, but rather pointed to the need 
to reduce the distances the materials would travel. 
8.  (C) Iwu also offered no clear solution for the problem of 
employing over half a million ad hoc staff to man the polling 
booths on election day.  He did acknowledge the problems in 
training and paying the staff and said he was seeking 
solutions.  Possible scenarios, he suggested, would include 
utilizing students and teachers from around the country.  His 
focus was clearly on the computerization of the electoral 
process even though he had no answer for how to pay for the 
equipment and even whether it could be installed before the 
elections come due in early 2007. 
 
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QUESTIONS OF INDEPENDENCE AND COMPETENCE 
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9.  (C) Iwu's upbeat assessments and promises stand in stark 
contrast to several recent decisions and actions of INEC, 
which have raised questions about his tenure and credibility 
and, as a consequence, the credibility of the institution he 
leads.  Earlier this month, for example, INEC, under Iwu's 
leadership, inexplicably reversed itself on the contentious 
issue of elections in Anambra State. Under the previous 
leadership, INEC defended the result of the 2003 
gubernatorial vote against allegations that there was 
widespread fraud. When the special Election Petitions 
Tribunal ruled that, indeed, the elections were fair enough 
to declare a winner (although not the one supported by INEC), 
INEC now led by Iwu, reversed itself and appealed this 
decision and argued that a new election was needed because 
the previous process was deeply flawed by fraud. 
 
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COMMENT 
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11. (C)  These are the latest episodes in a series of 
controversial actions undertaken by Iwu's INEC directly 
benefiting allies of the President's faction of the ruling 
party, sidelining potential competitors or critics, or 
reducing transparency in the electoral process.  While Iwu's 
statements are generally positive, this does not change the 
fact that virtually every member of the elections board is 
either related to insiders in the Obasanjo government or is 
an active member of the ruling party.  The pattern of actions 
and decisions taken by INEC are reminiscent of the path taken 
by previous incarnations of the same body: questionable 
rulings on eligibility of specific parties and individuals 
and  rules detrimental to election transparency. If INEC is 
not to travel down this well-worn path, serious changes to 
its structure and composition need to take place before the 
2007 skirmishes begin and the battle is engaged. 
CAMPBELL